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A
V I E W
OF THE
English Interests in India;
AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE
MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN THE
Southern Parts of the Peninsula,
during the Campaigns of 1782, 1783, and 1784.

IN TWO LETTERS;
Addressed to the Right Honourable the Earl of *****,
and to Lord MACARTNEY and the SELECT
COMMITTEE of *Fort St. George.*

BY
WILLIAM FULLARTON of FULLARTON, M.P.
F.R.SS. of London and Edinburgh, and late Commander
of the Southern Army on the Coast of Coromandel.

THE SECOND EDITION.

L O N D O N:
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MDCCCLXXXVIII.

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TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE MEMBERS
OF THE
BOARD of CONTROUL.

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

AS your Right Honourable Board is invested with the controlling power of this country in all matters of Eastern regulation, I take the liberty of inscribing to you the following Account of the Operations of the Southern Forces on the Coast of Coromandel, and a View of the English Interests in that quarter of the Globe.

The remarks which I now presume to lay before you, are the result of personal observation, unbiaſſed by prejudice or partiality; and it will afford me the moſt unfeigned ſatisfaction, if any thing contained in theſe pages ſhall prove at all deſerving of your conſideration.

I have the honour to be, with great reſpect,

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

Your moſt obedient

and very faithful Servant,

W. FULLARTON.

P R E F A C E

T O T H E

S E C O N D E D I T I O N .

TH E attention with which the Public has received the first edition of the following sheets has certainly been pleasing to the writer. He has had occasion to hear the remarks of friends, as well as the objections of others; and has bestowed on both the consideration to which they were entitled. Unconscious of reserve, and unbiassed by any party or personal consideration, he has expressed his sentiments with a freedom, which, to men who value discretion more than truth, may appear to border on presumption. He trusts, however, that even those who differ from him will allow, that the qualities which characterize

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racharacterize a cautious individual are of little merit in a public discussion. On the other hand, it cannot be denied, that no circumstance tends more strongly to elucidate a great and complicated subject than the free and unreserved communication of contending sentiments. For, although collision and counteraction, whether in opinion or conduct, seldom fail to prove destructive in the executive departments of a country, yet assuredly they afford the best means of detecting fallacy and of establishing truth in every question of a deliberative nature. The original object in the publication will be fully answered, if the remarks which it contains have any tendency to fix the public eye upon the former instability and want of system in the government of India; or to draw the national attention to the improvements of which our Indian governments are capable.

The

The reader is requested to remember, that the actual situation of affairs in India, during the years 1782, 1783, and 1784, formed the crisis which has been described; and it is with singular pleasure the writer of these sheets has now occasion to observe, that the arrangements which have taken place, and the reforms which have lately been effected in Bengal and the Carnatic, may be considered in a great degree as provisional remedies to the defects of which he has complained.

In stating these defects, at a moment when the calamities which they occasioned were fresh in his memory, it was impossible to refrain from some expressions of severity. The names of individuals, however, have seldom been introduced, unless where it appeared that they were entitled to praise; and if in some instances it may be thought that terms of approbation have been too sparingly bestowed, it ought to be remembered,

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bered, that the work in question is not a history, but a sketch; composed, by no means for the purpose of recording the pretensions of particular men, but to exhibit such a view of our affairs in India as might enable us to ascertain the means of rendering the English character respectable, and our interests permanent, in that quarter of the globe.

It has been stated in objection to the first edition of the following work, that Bengal and its dependencies, so far from having suffered by oppression and misgovernment, are now more flourishing than at any former period. Were not the writer of the following sheets fully satisfied with the notoriety of the facts which he has advanced, he might draw the most indisputable confirmation of his assertions from the plans of œconomy transmitted to India by the Court of Directors, with the sanction of the Board of Controul, and from the conduct of the Bengal government since his work was written.

written. The late Governor-general, Sir John Macpherson, during his administration, effected a retrenchment in the public annual expenditure to the amount of more than one million sterling, and Lord Cornwallis has pursued a similar system of general reform.

The exertions of those Governors have been directed to prevent waste and prodigality in the application of public money; to establish checks against the gross abuses which have long prevailed in the manner of collecting the revenues, as well as in providing the Company's investment; and to devise means for protecting the landholders, husbandmen, manufacturers, and other classes of native inhabitants, from violence and oppression. The very nature and extent of these reforms, imply a belief in the Supreme Board, that there did exist evils and abuses, extremely detrimental to the security of the natives and to the welfare

of the country. Nor does the writer entertain a doubt, but, when this subject shall be fairly investigated, it will indisputably appear that the picture in question has not been overcharged; and that he has not gone farther in assertion than has been justified by the public acts of the supreme government in India, and by the records of Parliament at home.

With regard to the charge of having expressed himself disrespectfully concerning the military service in Bengal, the writer is confident that nothing whatever, contained in his work, can justify a similar imputation. On the contrary, he has stated the military on that establishment to be brave and zealous, and able to beat any native enemy who should hazard a close engagement in the field. He flatters himself, that no man entertains a more sincere admiration of the exertions made by the brave army that crossed India under General Goddard;

Goddard; for the services performed by the gallant corps commanded by Colonel Popham; or for the detachment which marched to the Carnatic under Colonel Pierse, of whose discipline and good conduct he can testify from personal observation in the field, while they were acting with that distinguished veteran Sir Eyre Coote.

Any military man, who is insensible to the merits of those troops and of their leaders, is unworthy to hold a military situation. Still, however, he will venture to repeat the observations which have been arraigned, and to assert, that great abuses had existed in the formation of corps; that the military in Bengal were many months in arrears when the letter was written; and that these, with other circumstances, had proved extremely detrimental to the discipline of the native troops*.

Neither

* Any person who still entertains a doubt on this subject, will be pleased to read General Stibbert's Letter of

Neither ought it to be considered as any imputation on the English gentlemen employed in India, if our rulers have too frequently been induced to act with little delicacy in quartering such numbers of individuals on the Nabob of Oude, and other native Princes:—a practice which has occasioned great complaints on the part of those powers, who have repeatedly declared, that by such measures their countries have been thrown into confusion, and that they themselves have been left with an exhausted treasury.

It has been farther objected, that too much stress is laid on the mischiefs which have befallen the native powers who have had the misfortune of our intercourse. The writer of these sheets, assuredly, never did intend to suggest that there was any permanent and systematic perfidy in the

the 24th December 1780, dated Calcutta, and addressed to the Supreme Board, as inserted in the Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Select Committee, No. 13. M.

councils

councils of the English, relative to the native Princes of India. But he was extremely anxious to impress the minds of his readers with a strong and lasting sense of the outrageous violations of public faith, which have resulted from fluctuating councils and discordant powers. This he has ever considered as the chief source of our disasters, and the part of our Indian proceedings in which a change of system is indispensably required.

A friend having suggested, that the statement given in the second Letter, p. 95, concerning the reduction of Shevigunga by General Joseph Smith, might possibly be misunderstood; it may be proper here to insert a narrative of the transaction as it really happened, by which it will appear, that no imputation whatever could be intentionally conveyed against so valuable a character, and one which, in another part
of

of the same Letter, is mentioned with particular expressions of respect.

“ In the year 1773, it was judged expedient by the government of Madras, and the Nabob Mahomed Ally, to send a detachment under General Joseph Smith, for the attack of Calicoil. It is surrounded by very thick woods, which greatly add to the defence of the place. The difficulty of approach made it necessary for him to draw the attention of the Polygars, by sending a detachment under Lieutenant-colonel Bonjour, who was to make a large circuit, and to invest or attack the fort at a given hour, on the opposite side from the General’s approach. The General summoned the Rajah to surrender, or to treat for the payment of the arrears due by him to the Nabob Mahomed Ally.

“ Vakeels

“ Vakeels were sent by the Rajah to the
“ General’s camp, with full powers to treat
“ with the young Nabob, who was de-
“ puted by his father to act in this expe-
“ dition. The Vakeel saw the preparations
“ making for this attack. After some short
“ delay, an agreement was concluded be-
“ tween the young Nabob and the Rajah,
“ which was followed by a cessation of
“ hostility.

“ General Smith then gave the Vakeel
“ a letter to send or deliver to Colonel
“ Bonjour, directing him to halt where-
“ ever he should receive that letter, as all
“ points were adjusted between the Nabob
“ and the Rajah. The General took this
“ precaution, as the safest and surest me-
“ thod of the intelligence reaching Colonel
“ Bonjour in time ; for the Vakeel was
“ only to pass immediately from the camp
“ to the fort, and proceed on the opposite
“ side, to the place where Colonel Bon-
“ jour

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“ jour had been ordered to march. Where-
“ as, if the General had sent the letter by
“ the same circuitous route which Colonel
“ Bonjour had taken (the woods being
“ impervious but to the inhabitants of
“ them), it might have miscarried, or at
“ least would have been twenty-four hours
“ in the delivery, while, by the short cut
“ through the fort, Colonel Bonjour might
“ have received it in three or four hours.

“ The Vakeel made some unnecessary
“ delay, and when he did proceed towards
“ Colonel Bonjour’s detachment, he met
“ them in full march towards Calicoil, and
“ entirely ignorant of the cessation of ho-
“ stilities.

“ Perhaps a shot might have been fired
“ at the Vakeel, taking him for one of
“ the enemy. He took fright, and, with-
“ out making any endeavour to convey
“ to the commanding officer the letter
“ which

“ which he had received from General
“ Smith, he retreated with the utmost preci-
“ pitation to the fort. Colonel Bonjour, find-
“ ing no impediment, marched forward with
“ rapidity, and entered Calicoil in the most
“ hostile manner. Under this unhappy
“ mistake the unfortunate Rajah fell a sa-
“ crifice.”

It only remains to express an earnest wish, that the unparalleled energy and enterprize by which our Indian territories were acquired, may continue to be exerted for their preservation; that the errors of the past may operate with a monitory influence on all future arrangements for that country; and that the inestimable benefits derivable from those possessions, may be called forth with the utmost amplitude of advantage to our Indian subjects and to the British empire. Whoever writes on this interesting subject, would do well to consider the im-
partial

partial judgment necessary on such occasions. And above all, it becomes those who are intrusted with any legislative, judicial, or executive arrangement relative to India, never to forget the advice of Cæsar to the Roman senate : “ Omnes homines qui de
“ rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, metu,
“ ira, atque misericordia, vacuos esse de-
“ bent, namque haud facile, animus ve-
“ rum providet ubi illi officiunt ; neque
“ quisquam omnium, libidini simul ac ufui
“ paruit.”

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN order that the local descriptions and military operations mentioned in the following Work may be rendered more intelligible, Mr. FADEN, Geographer to his Majesty, has completed a Map of the Southern Provinces of India, from Madras to Cape Comorin, on a large scale, according to the Plans of Colonel Kelly, Captain Wersebe, and other accurate Surveyors.

In this Map, the movements of the Southern army, during the Campaigns of 1782, 1783, and 1784, are faithfully traced, and the errors of former Topographers are carefully corrected.

ADVERTISEMENT:

I have been for the last description of
military operations mentioned in the following
pages, and I have been more than
satisfied to find that the
author has given a description of the
manner of the operations to the
reader, or a large part of the
Plan of Colonel K. H. G. and
other accounts.

In this Map, the movements of the
army, during the Campaign of 1781,
1782, and 1784, are faithfully noted, and
the errors of former topographers are
fully corrected.

Of the British

B

respect

th 1783 and commanded by

(General Staff.

Adj.^t Gen.^l....Cap.^t Oram.

D. Adj.^t Gen.^l...Lieu.^t Beale.

Q. M. Gen.^l...Cap.^t M.^cLeod.

Deputy,.....L.^t Chaundley

1st Aid. de Camp Cap.^t Moody



V I E W
OF THE
English Interests in India.

LETTER I.*

MY LORD,

IT would afford me the greatest satisfaction, if the transactions which have occurred since my departure from England, enabled me to lay before you any information that might prove interesting, and that might tend to evince the sentiments of

* This letter was written on the passage from India to Europe, subsequent to the Letter addressed to Lord Macartney and the Select Committee of Fort St. George.

B respect

respect and veneration which impress me when I venture to address your Lordship.

If the expedition in which my regiment embarked had been suffered to pursue its original object, the tenour of our operations might have afforded a narrative not undeserving your attention ; but our after-destination against the Cape of Good Hope, our progress from thence to India, and our subsequent proceedings there, furnish so inferior a subject of communication, that I should have been unwilling to intrude upon your serious engagements, had not the state of our East India possessions become an object of general importance to this country.

Although these considerations and your Lordship's goodness may incline you to receive indulgently such observations as my recent opportunities suggest on this subject, it is far from my intention however to trespass

pass upon your patience, with any detail of particulars relating to myself, or to the events that preceded my arrival in the East, farther than to request your perusal of the papers inserted in the Appendix. My chief object is to lay before you an unbiassed statement of recent occurrences in India, and of our actual situation there.

The principal exertions during the concluding period of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, were made by the forces south of the river Coleroon, which I had the honour to command; and our operations were so intimately connected not only with those on the Malabar Coast, but with all the transactions that occurred within the range of hostility, that no just view could be given of the one, without a corresponding statement of the other.

In my address to the Government of Fort St. George, the distressful condition in

which I found those countries when appointed to the southern command, is faithfully related ; the rise and progress of military measures in the southern countries, as well as their interruption by a pacification with Tippoo Sultaun, are likewise recapitulated ; the local mismanagement and inherent grievances that have reduced our affairs upon the Coast to the last symptoms of decay, are afterwards explained ; and my observations conclude with suggesting such measures of reform as appear indispensable to the preservation of India.—A copy of that narrative accompanies this Letter, together with several authentic communications necessary to elucidate the subject.

You have heard much, my Lord, and read more, of the misgovernment in India. There have been declamations without end on the peculations of the Company's servants,—and acts without number to retrieve,

trieve, if possible, the Company's affairs : but these declamations have only tended to ascertain the rhetorical estimation due to the persons who delivered them,—and those acts have too frequently confirmed the evils they were meant to remedy.

In treating of this subject it never should be forgotten, that the leading principle of all Eastern institutions is permanency ; but the principle, or at least the practice, of all English politics in India, has been productive of the most pernicious instability. By the first, laws, manners, rites, and regulations, are handed down from age to age undiminished and unaltered ;—by the second, the general order and arrangements of the country are torn asunder with capricious innovation : and to enforce a system so destructive of the dearest tenets of the natives, the continued operation of violence is required.

The distribution of the Gentoos into Talyngas, Malabars, Marattas, Canaras, and Malleallums, as well as into the different sects of Bramins, Rajahpoots, Nyars, and into many inferior subdivisions of merchants, labourers, and artificers, has remained inviolate since the promulgation of the laws of Brimha, whose Shaster contains the ordinances of their faith, and the pandects of their jurisprudence. These institutes have withstood the ravages of time, the irruptions of invaders, and the revolutions to which, in all recorded periods, those countries have been exposed.

The wisdom of the Moorish conquerors of Indostan failed not to preserve this ancient fabric of Indian adoration. In fact, the Mahometan governments apparently reverence the rites of the Gentoos, who still constitute the mass of subjects on the peninsula. Under the Moors, they are liable to oppressions incident to all arbitrary govern-

governments ; yet their tyrants have mingled policy with force ; and as the Goths adopted the manners of those nations whom they conquered, so the Mussulmen have assimilated with the customs of their Indian subjects. They encourage them in husbandry and manufacture—employ them in their armies—entrust them with their finance—and, above all, preserve to them the purity of their Casts, the sanctity of their Bramins, and the pomp of their religion. So fully do the Moorish princes feel the necessity of treating with respect those customs and opinions, for which the most timid of Gentoos would sacrifice his life, that Hyder Ally never failed to make large endowments to the chief temples or pagodas. In 1781, when his army invested Tritchinopoli, he waited in person on the Bramins of Seringham Pagoda, with a propitiatory acknowledgment to Vistnou, the tutelary deity of that sanctuary. By these means, in addition to superior talents

in war, and a vigorous administration in peace, the Moors have extended their dominions over the richest parts of the peninsula.

The Portuguese, on the other hand, whose arms and enterprise obtained a geographical extent of territory greater than the circuit of the Roman empire in the days of Augustus, blindly zealous to propagate the Christian faith, found it easier to conquer kingdoms than to subvert established doctrines. By violating the tenets of their subjects, they have ceased to be accounted among the powers of India.

Happily for the English interests, intolerance in matters of religion has not mingled with our Indian policy. But in our civil and military conduct, intolerance has united with instability, to violate the most revered institutions, and to force pacific powers into measures for our extermination.

nation. So fully are these assertions verified by every circumstance attending the origin and growth of our power in India, that on a conviction of our restless and unstable views, was founded the policy of the Mogul, the Nizam, the Marattas, and other states of India, who lately associated to accomplish our destruction.

It is not necessary for me at present to enumerate the various transformations by which the private merchant grew into a powerful sovereign, with formidable armies, large revenues, rich manufactures, industrious subjects, and territories more extensive, populous, and productive than the most flourishing kingdoms of Europe. My intention is, to convince your Lordship that, notwithstanding the enterprise and talents by which various subjects of this country have signalised themselves during the course of Indian operations, no individual efforts
can

can prevent the superstructure from tottering while the groundwork is so insecure.

In the earliest periods of our aggrandisement Lord Clive exerted his utmost efforts to correct the vices of our Eastern system. His letters to the Court of Directors recommended an œconomical detail in the departments of public expenditure, a regulated watchfulness over the defensive preparations of the country they had acquired, a constant attention to the commercial purposes of their institution, a rigid justice and inviolable security to their subjects, and a liberal encouragement of industry and cultivation. Above all, says he, you must support a permanent system of conciliatory measures towards the country powers: for while a doubt exists respecting your pacific inclinations, their fears will incite them to form machinations to effect your ruin.

Although

Although the current instructions from home to the different Presidencies have been in unison with these admonitions, our Eastern governors avowedly have disobeyed all orders ; they have commenced hostility, negociated for peace, and renewed the war, just as suited their convenience.

I will not carry you farther back, my Lord, than 1767, when the Government of Madras, after flagrantly offending the Nizam, by occupying the Circars under the pretence of a firmaun or charter from their then dependant the Mogul, sent a deputation, to submit their claim to the discussion of the very Nizam who was the injured party in the question ; and, without satisfying him for the violation, farther than by a huddled compromise to pay him a tribute for the Northern Circars, entered into engagements with him to act conjunctly against Hyder Ally, then invaded by the Marattas. No sooner was this union formed,

formed, than it was dissolved ; and the Nizam separating from the English army under General Smith*, immediately joined Hyder, and continued in hostility against us ; but after several unsuccessful engagements, he became weary of the contest, and returned with his army to Hyderabad.

The after-narrative of that disgraceful warfare, as expressed in General Smith's letter to Lord Clive, exhibits the most striking picture of our Eastern councils. There we may learn, by what inverted policy it is possible to defeat the best-founded expectations ; to render abortive the exertions of the ablest general, and bravest army ;—how an enemy may be reduced, by repeated loss in battle, to propose the most favourable terms of accommodation ; and yet, thus weakened and exhausted, how he

* See General Smith's Letter to Lord Clive.

may be enabled to triumph over every disaster.

My reference to these facts is only meant to evince, that the contempt which Hyder Ally entertained for our councils, and his enmity towards our establishment, however ruinous to our interests, originated in our aggressions. We had hardly breathed after the war with Hyder, when the public consternation was excited by unprovoked hostility with the Maratta states, against whom, whatever might be the ostensible pretext, I know not of any subject of complaint, excepting that they held possessions on the Malabar coast, extending from the northward of Surat to the vicinity of Goa; while our Presidency of Bombay, exclusive of their island, were circumscribed within the narrow limits of a factory at Surat, and another at Telicherry. Your Lordship has no doubt observed in the printed
and

and official communications respecting that contest, a mass of incidents, compared with which, the indignities incurred by the Madras Government in the preceding war of 1767 with Hyder, almost cease to appear disreputable*.

Hostilities at last commencing between the English and French, the English were again involved in war with Hyder Ally. Under these circumstances, it became necessary to consider of a pacification with the Marattas. Negotiations were opened; but as we had fought without concert, so we treated without communication. The General negotiates, the Government of Bombay negotiates, the Supreme Board negotiates, the representative of a higher power negotiates—all differ, all counteract each other; and the Maratta Government found it so impossible to reconcile their contradic-

* See Pechell's account of military affairs at Bombay.

tory propositions, that they continued the war as the only means of security with such unexplicable adversaries. Long afterwards however, on the eve of our dissolution, as the *sine qua non* of our existence in India, they forced us to purchase peace from them, and to restore all the possessions of which we had robbed them, excepting Salcet; having first wasted the treasures of Bengal, reduced Bombay to a state of insolvency, and exposed our conduct to the whole world, as a lasting monument of perfidy and weakness.

We now arrive at the most eventful period that the English have experienced in Asia, surpassing every previous misfortune in the iniquity from whence it sprang, and in the calamity with which it was attended. From the date of the disgraceful treaty with Hyder Ally in 1769, till the year 1780, our rulers in the Carnatic seemed to
have

have forgotten that he ever had invaded them, or rather that he ever could invade them again. The superior genius of Hyder perceived, that the territories and position of the English, as well as their proficiency in military science, would render them desirable allies, and give unequivocal superiority to his forces when conjoined with theirs; but experience proved, that he could not rely on men so disunited and unprincipled. To adopt a neutral system, neither promised security nor suited his decisive character. What then remained but hostile measures, against a nation with whom alliance or neutrality appeared alike unsafe?—His campaigns during the preceding war exposed their vulnerable parts;—their disregard of military preparation marked out the Carnatic as an inviting field of new acquirement;—and the growing profligacy of each succeeding Government, improving on the rapacity

rapacity of that which preceded it, confirmed the hatred which our previous conduct justified *. Hyder's enmity was roused to indignation by our attack on Mahee, a French settlement under his protection: still more was he incensed at the negociation with Bazalet Jung, brother of the Nizam, and proprietor of Adoni, by which that prince ceded to the English the Guntoor Circar, upon condition that a force should be employed in his defence.

This stipulated force actually marched under Colonel Harper to Inikonda, in its way to Adoni; but in consequence of various procrastinations so many months were wasted, that Hyder had full leisure to post a strong party at the entrance of the pass near Inikonda. The Colonel, finding the enemy in great strength, and that their orders were to attack the English if

* This was the case, until the unalterable rectitude of Lord Macartney checked the progress of venality.

they should attempt to march across Hyder's territory, receded from the enterprise.

Bazalet Jung, on this occasion, experienced the treachery of Europeans; for, relying on our good faith, he had ceded the Guntoor Circar, and afterwards discovered that the movement of the troops towards him was delusive, and that the delays which enabled Hyder to prevent their march to Adoni, were fraudulently contrived by the Madras Government, in order to defeat the performance of their stipulations. On the other hand, had we fulfilled our engagements with Bazalet Jung—had we marched a respectable army to Adoni, such were the advantages of that situation, that while we could have maintained it, no power in India would have ventured an invasion of the Carnatic; for Adoni* menaces Myfore, Beddanore, the countries of the Marattas,

* It is superior, in a topographical point of view, to any interior position in the peninsula.

and the Decan, while the natural strength of that fortress, and the resources it commands, secure it, if well garrisoned, against any danger from a native power: but all these considerations were sacrificed—Bazalet Jung was displeased—the Nizam offended—and Hyder exasperated.

Every power in India saw the danger that threatened the Presidency of Madras; and the Carnatic was actually over-run by Hyder with an army of 100,000 men, at the very moment when that Government boasted that he durst not meditate hostility. The melancholy and disgraceful events that followed, are too unpleasing to admit of observation. The fate of Colonel Baillie's detachment, and the subsequent retreat of the army to Madras, are fresh in every memory. After the surrender of Arcot and the chief forts to Hyder, he appointed renters—collected the revenues—coined money—and exercised all acts of sovereignty, being *de facto* Nabob of the Car-

natic. It is unnecessary to enlarge on the subsequent transactions: the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote from Bengal—the junction of a detachment from thence with Colonel Pearse—the battles of Porto Novo, Pulaloor, and Shulengur, and the other operations of the Carnatic army; or to recapitulate the successes of the squadron under Sir Edward Hughes *, against Negapatam and Trincomalee, which formed the concluding incidents of the year 1781. It is only meant to offer some remarks on our political situation in those countries, in order to prove the errors of our past conduct, and to suggest what appears to be the least objectionable mode of permanent reform.

* That distinguished Admiral exhibited, in the reduction of those important places, the same superior conduct which he afterwards displayed in his naval actions with the French.

Having had the good fortune to serve with my regiment on board the squadron during the course of those engagements, I cannot mention the name of Sir Edward Hughes, without expressing the warmest sentiments of attachment and respect due to such professional merits and inestimable private worth.

In

In this stage of our disasters, the fragments of the Cape expedition arrived at Madras *. It is impossible to impress your Lordship's mind with any adequate representation of the deplorable condition of that Presidency; nor would it be an agreeable task to expatiate on such extremes of human wretchedness as were there experienced. If any scene of danger and distress could insure concord and co-operation among men, the full display of those virtues might have been expected at Madras.

Hyder was in possession of the country—Tippoo about this time cut off our southern detachment with Colonel Braithwaite *—the French were landing a body, apparently of sufficient force to decide the contest. In this situation, our apprehensions of the enemy, as well as the desire of recovering the reputation we had lost, should have excited us to act with cordial effort; indeed, no prospect of defence remained,

* February 1782.

but in the united energy of every individual connected with our cause.

Under such circumstances, your Lordship will hardly credit the assertion, that the business of the war was by no means the main object of attention. Councils—generals—seamen—soldiers—and civilians—servants of the King, Company, and Nabob, seemed almost to have forgotten that the enemy were at their gates, and that they had any adversaries to contend with but each other.

Such pernicious counteractions, at a moment too when the public distresses ought to have precluded all private contention, excited my surprise. On tracing the source of these disorders, it appeared that they did not originate in any blameable disposition of the parties; on the contrary, the leading characters were distinguished by superior talents, and eminent in the different walks of life to which they belonged. From a discordant principle in the political part of our Indian system, arose those evils,

evils, which were too inveterate to yield to any palliative expedient. Individuals are in a great measure out of the question; for the disunion alluded to, is not the collision of one man, or set of men, against another; it is not of one period, or of one Presidency; but it is a general contention—a shock of situations—and a war of departments.

In this critical state of affairs, it was most fortunate for the preservation of our Indian territories, that Lord Macartney had assumed the Government of Madras in the preceding June. From the first moment, he dedicated his time and talents to restrain abuse, with an undeviating vigour and uprightness of intention. Could he have imagined or foreseen the ruin and distraction in which the preceding Governments had involved the establishment, it is not probable that he would have left Europe, to adventure on the manage-

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ment of a country so overwhelmed by every species of calamity, that such fortitude, integrity, and perseverance as he possessed, could alone have prevented its condition from becoming irretrievable:—but to a mind like his, when once engaged in an important public object, no difficulty could appear unfurmountable, no combination of embarrassments exceed the reach of his exertions.

In a short time he concluded an arrangement with the Nabob of Arcot, by which the revenues of the countries under his Highness's authority were rescued from mismanagement, and assigned to the Company, in order to support the exigencies of the war.—The security of Madras, which he found actually experiencing the severities of famine, was provided for with the utmost wisdom and dispatch.—The inefficient defensive system on which the war had been conducted in the Carnatic,

tic, he endeavoured to extend into offensive operations, and every effort was made by the Civil Government to enable the Carnatic army to advance into the enemy's possessions of Myfore.—The siege of Negapatam was undertaken by the direction of the Governor, and proved successful, notwithstanding the opposition to that measure by the Commander in Chief.—Troops were also sent to enable the squadron to reduce and garrison Trincomalee. — The previous extravagance, by which the finances of the country had been wasted and public credit overthrown, was restrained by a firm and rigid hand. The most anxious retrenchment was enforced in every department; not a single malversation, negligence, or abuse, seemed to escape the penetrating observation of the Governor; who, at a crisis the most distressful and alarming that the English had ever

ever experienced since their establishment in India, exhibited an assemblage of talents, energy, and rectitude, of which few examples can be traced in any country *.

In order to account for the rise and progress of these dissensions, and of that discordant principle in which they originated, your Lordship will be pleased to recollect, that the spirit of our primary establishment in India knew no power superior to the Company's Government. This authority, perplexed and wavering as it might be rendered by the politics of the different Presidencies counteracting each other, had

* However strong my inclination is to do justice to the merit of Lord Macartney's Government, it would ill become me to attempt a detail of the great and complicated transactions in which he was engaged. Destitute of materials, and unequal to such an undertaking, it only remains for me to express my hopes that his Lordship will be induced to give the Public a history of the important affairs which he conducted with such distinguished ability.

yet

yet somewhat of unity in the idea of its formation; so far at least, that the native powers, considering the Company as the fountain of all English authority in the peninsula, regulated their conduct by such communications as were conveyed through the medium of the Company's representatives. While this prevailed, the Nabob Mahomed Ally, and other native princes in our alliance, conducted themselves with the utmost deference towards the established Government; and though at times they were severely pressed by some rapacious members, they felt a degree of security, and enjoyed an intercourse of good offices, that bordered on prosperity.

The errors of the Company's management having attracted the attention of Administration at home, an act of the legislature was passed in 1773, by which the powers of sovereignty were continued in the Company; but the authority of parlia-

parliament assumed an executive interference in those very powers of sovereignty, by the appointment, recommendation, or confirmation of certain officers of justice, and others to be established in India. The power and dignity of the Crown had, at an earlier period, been brought into direct competition, though not on equal terms, with the power and sovereign authority of the Company. An embassy had been sent immediately from the Crown to the Nabob of Arcot, unavoidably in opposition to the power of the Company. Vehement disputes arose between the Ambassador and the Presidency of Fort St. George. The Governor and Council constituted the regular authority of the settlement, and possessed the powers of administration; while the other claimed superiority as representative of the Sovereign. The Nabob and all the other native princes were perplexed. They had been taught, that in the Company was vested the supreme authority of England, as far

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as respected India—that no other power had any right of interference there. Now they are told, the Company is nothing more than a private body of merchants, without consequence or consideration in their own country, and who are soon to lose all power and consequence in India.

In this situation of affairs, what shall the unfortunate Nabob believe?—how shall he act?—A host of needy adventurers possess themselves of his confidence, impose upon his credulity, and taint his mind with opinions that have since proved his destruction.

“ Your Highness (say these adventurers)
 “ must shake off your connections with
 “ those traders;—you must now adhere to
 “ the sovereign power and majesty of Eng-
 “ land:—You, Sir, are an independent
 “ prince;—you are guaranteed in your
 “ territory of the Carnatic by the treaty
 “ of Paris;—the kings of France and
 “ Spain have ratified that treaty, and the
 “ king

“ king of England is your protector.—
“ Throw off, therefore, all dependence on
“ the mercantile association.”

You will not be surpris'd, my Lord, that an Asiatic Prince, who cannot reconcile the contradiction of a body of merchants possessing sovereignty, should have been deceived by language so congenial to his natural propensities; especially when confirmed by the solemnity of public letters, and an embassy from the Sovereign.

From that moment, his attachment to the Company was shaken:—he spoke lightly of their power, disregarded their servants, and counteracted their intentions.

The Government of Madras resented this defection, and forced him to confess that his new allies were either negligent of their promises, or unequal to resist the Company, in whose hands the executive control still remained.

Since

Since that time, the Presidency of Madras has been a continued scene of counteraction. The Senior Officer of the squadron has usually represented his Majesty at the Durbar, and that situation tends to render him, *ex officio*, an object of jealousy to the Company's Government. The Commander in Chief on shore has likewise held an authority from the Crown, so indefinitely expressed, that he could neither submit to the government without incurring professional unpopularity, nor resist without exciting ruinous commotions.

When Sir Eyre Coote assumed the command of the Carnatic army during the administration of Mr. Smith, he had been suffered to engross the whole direction of the war. The succeeding Government found by these means all power and consequence centered in the General. As the Governor and Council of each Presidency,

by

by the Company's constitution, are the delegates of their authority, it seemed necessary that the Board of Madras should have some control over operations for the conduct and result of which they stood responsible to their superiors.—They represented these circumstances to the Supreme Board, but sentence was pronounced against them, and the General was confirmed in the unparticipated direction of the war. The movements of the army however did not prosper:—the same narrow limits marked their progress:—the same deficiencies of draught, carriage, and conveyance, as well as of grain and money, still frustrated all hopes of profiting by success, and defeated every suggestion of vigorous endeavour.

The Supreme Board, after much acrimonious discussion, revoked their sentence, and replaced the controlling power in the hands of the Madras Government: but
another

another event soon afterwards occurred, which put reconciliation at defiance.—
 The Supreme Board determine to rescind the assignment of the Nabob's territory to the Company, and to restore his Highness to the management of his own country.—
 They farther resolve, it is said, to enforce this edict by military power. Sir Eyre Coote is therefore invested with full authority for that purpose, and on his return to the Coast in April 1783, is instructed at all events to carry the order into execution. His death, which happened in the same month, is supposed to have prevented much bloodshed in the settlement: for it is understood that the General was determined to enforce, and the Government to resist, the order of restitution; at a time too, when the country belonged more properly to Hyder and the French, than to either party.

The succeeding Commander, General Stuart, was involved in discussions similar to

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those

those between the Civil Government and Sir Eyre Coote. The campaign under that General against Cuddalore, was interrupted by a cessation of hostility between the English and French. Those dangerous neighbours were thus left in possession of a post, the loss of which would probably have obliged them to abandon India, had not the disunion of the ruling and executive powers distracted our measures, and added a farther proof, that under the influence of discordant principles, neither time nor means, circumstance nor opportunity, can ensure success. The General was superseded in the command of the army, called to the Presidency, and afterwards remanded to Europe.

Sir John Burgoyne succeeded as Commander in Chief of the King's troops.— He asserted powers and privileges that the Government declared to be incompatible with

with the constitution of the Company. He persisted, and was superseded by a Colonel on the Company's establishment, who, on this occasion, was raised to the rank of Lieutenant General, and Commander in Chief upon the Coast. Sir John Burgoyne, in consequence of this promotion, claimed the exclusive command at least of the King's troops,—and was arrested.

Another General became senior of the King's service, and submitted. The remaining Generals had signed a remonstrance against the violation offered to [the royal service by the arrest of their Commanders. Some of them adhered to their declarations, and left the country; others, pliant to the times, enjoyed the benefits of unserviceable, but not unprofitable, stations.—After this detail, your Lordship will not be surprised at any disturbance that has since occurred in those possessions.

It is not within the limits of my purpose to enlarge upon the acts of the legislature now existing, on those that have been proposed respecting India, or on the proceedings of Parliament in their late capacity as a Court of Inquest*.——The pretensions of Governor and Commander still remain in collision with each other,—the King and Company still continue in that country to be contending powers,—while the Company and Nabob are bound over to perpetual variance. Between the civil and military no line is traced; no redress for the latter, no mode of coercion for the former, and the warfare of the Presidencies is extended and confirmed.

My Letter to the Select Committee of Fort St. George contains every other

* Since this paper was written, the powers of Governor and Commander in Chief have been united in the person of Lord Cornwallis, and other important arrangements have taken place for the correction of our Indian system.

material

material incident respecting the concluding period of the war, the circumstances under which the peace with Tippoo Sultaun was concluded, and the enumeration of internal evils on the coast of Coromandel. In the discussion of those important particulars, I have not hesitated to suggest the detail of means by which alone I conceive it possible to effect a reformation in the East. These observations on the interior misgovernment of the country are, in their general tendency, not only applicable to Coromandel, but to the other Presidencies; and as similar evils operate in each, corresponding remedies must be applied to all.

If our condition be desperate upon the Coast, it will appear not less deplorable in Bengal; when we consider that the decline of that Government has advanced with rapid strides during peace, while Madras has suffered the devastations of war.

But before we enter on a particular view of this melancholy subject, it may be necessary to state the extent and local circumstances of our possessions in that quarter.

The provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, as possessed by the British, and including Benares *, contain an area of 162,000 square miles; their annual revenues are supposed to have amounted, in happier times, to 5,000,000 *l.* sterling, and their population to 11,000,000: the province of Oude and its dependencies comprehend an area of 53,286 square miles, yielded a revenue of 3,500,000 *l.* and maintained 20,000,000 of people.

It must be observed, that the Mogul Government in India was a foreign and oppressive government; and consequently, that the countries under its authority were far from having attained their highest period of improvement. It is likewise demonstrable,

* See Major Rennell's Memoirs.

that

that Bengal and the lower parts of the other provinces, being extremely fertile, and chiefly adapted to the cultivation of rice, ought to maintain a greater number of people on an equal surface, than any the most fertile country where rice will not grow; because rice yields two or three annual crops, and the average of each crop is comparatively greater than that of any other grain. Let us now compare the produce, population, and revenues of these countries with those of Great Britain, which, according to Major Rennell, contains an area of 96,400 square miles. The population of Great Britain may amount to 8,000,000, and the present revenues are about 14,000,000*l*. By this standard your Lordship will be able to judge of the comparative value of the English possessions in Bengal; and if to those you add the coast of Coromandel, its area being 65,944 square miles, ancient population 9,000,000, and revenue in former times 3,000,000*l*., the aggregate of these territories will form a

dominion nearly equal in revenue, and far superior in population as well as in extent, to Great Britain,—to the richest and most productive kingdom, in proportion to its area, that ever existed in the temperate zones.

In former times the Bengal countries were the granary of nations, and the repository of commerce, wealth, and manufacture in the East. Vessels from all quarters poured out their treasures on the banks of the Ganges, and the numberless nations that people the northern regions of Indostan, as far as Cashmire, Lahore, and Thibet, including a range of several thousand miles, used to deposit their riches there, as the great mart and centre of their traffick. But such has been the restless energy of our misgovernment, that within the short space of twenty years many parts of those countries have been reduced to the appearance of a desert. The fields are no longer cultivated,—extensive tracts are already overgrown with
thickets,

thickets,—the husbandman is plundered,—the manufacturer oppressed,—famine has been repeatedly endured,—and depopulation has ensued. The districts are farmed out to Renters, or Zemindars,—and the collections, as well as all other business relating to finance, are committed to a Provincial Chief, who reports to the Committee of Revenue. The Renter holds by a precarious tenure, while it costs him so much to procure and maintain his situation, that if his exactions bear proportion to his risk and advance of money, they must be extremely severe indeed. Neither would it suit the views of a Chief to be less industrious in the business of extortion. They must therefore be unusually inexperienced if they do not between them contrive to distress the inhabitants, to ruin agriculture, and to defraud the Government of at least thirty or forty *per cent.* of the stipulated payments. This they manage by statements of approaching want, which they them-

themselves have occasioned ; by accounts of provincial works, which are never performed ; by unjustifiable deductions, and by connivance at the defalcations of the managers.

The husbandmen and Ryots dependent on these depredators (compared with whom the feudal Serfs were in a state of freedom) are in their turn happy mortals, when contrasted with the weavers and manufacturers. If the former be plundered of their grain, the chaff at least is left for their subsistence ; but such is the system of commercial regulation, that the wretched manufacturers have hardly a resource. The Commercial Chief, to whom they are subject, and who, under the Committee of Trade and Manufacture, is charged with the business of investment, assigns to all the portion of their labour,—by a small advance pretends to an appropriation of their industry,—denies their right to use their ingenuity for their own advantage,—
establishe

establishes a ruinous monopoly, by the abuse of power, and treats them as bondsmen toiling for his benefit. The consequence is, desertion among the weavers, a decreasing investment for the Company, enormous acquisition for himself, and a fatal stagnation of all trade and manufacture throughout his district.

In Oude, Rohilcund, and all the upper countries within our influence, the natives are, if possible, still more distressed. Various hordes have been driven to despair by hardship and exaction. They have assembled in formidable force, and menaced the whole country:—the husbandman goes to the plough with a firelock over his shoulder, while the government is too feeble to restrain these outrages, and too much depressed to afford relief.

If we trust to our military on the Bengal establishment for protection against these

alarming enormities, we shall find, that entire corps have existed on paper, who, exclusive of the Commandant and Staff, never had any existence but on paper; and it will farther appear, that those Sepoys who have a real existence, are neither well disciplined nor regularly paid. The decreasing produce of the country is consumed by the utmost contrivance of profusion; and so wasteful is the mode of contribution, that the country of Oude, period after period, has fallen into arrears, leaving the exhausted prince without means of supporting his government, or of maintaining his family.

When Lord Clive, by his treaty with Sujah Dowla, restored that great country to its rightful owner, stipulating only in behalf of the Company forty-six lacks of rupees for its military defence*, he meant to proclaim aloud throughout Indostan, the

* To pay a brigade which the Company stations in the province.

justice and moderation of English policy, and to convince the country powers that the Company rather chose to be friends and protectors, than tyrants and usurpers over those they conquered. Little did that superior genius foresee, that by his boasted treaty the treasures of a powerful prince were indirectly to be transferred into a sinking-fund, and his whole dominions converted into an asylum for the sole use and benefit of prodigals and incorrigibles.

It would be a trespass on your patience, my Lord, to expatiate farther on the impolicy by which a country, superior in wealth and means to the whole kingdom of England, has been so speedily precipitated, without convulsion or internal war, into a state of actual insolvency: neither can I, without impertinence to your Lordship's ready apprehension, enlarge upon the strong suggestions which impress my mind with the impending catastrophe, about to close this scene of unexampled depravity.

But

But the industry of the Supreme Board is by no means confined to Bengal and its adjacent provinces; they have an extended latitude of power: every other board and presidency is subject to their sway, and their controlling influence pervades the whole politics of India. Without discussing the merits of this unbounded interference, experience has evinced, that in its present modification, it has disconcerted every measure of the other Governments, and sunk them in the estimation of all neighbouring states; while the Supreme Board stationary in Calcutta has laboured under such impediments of distance, local ignorance, and endless avocation, that in every instance where they have descended to such interference, they have exposed themselves to public ridicule; and, after marring the business beyond all chance of remedy, have been forced at last to throw it from themselves upon the Presidency, to which from habit, vicinity, and connection, it did of right belong.

At

At one time, they propose to surrender the whole of the northern Circars to the Nizam for a trifle; at another, they dispatch a negociator, to offer the rich province of Tinnivelly to the Dutch for less than a trifle, for the use of one thousand Dutch mercenaries!—Fortunately, notice of a Dutch war was received, before this extraordinary treaty could be executed, and the negociator, Mr. Dighton, got no farther than Madras.—But observe, my Lord, supposing the province of Tinnivelly to yield an annual revenue of 250,000*l.* at twenty years purchase, the property of it is worth 5,000,000*l.* At this rate did the Supreme Board of India propose to purchase the use of one thousand Dutch mercenaries!—You will hardly require any farther illustration, that though this stationary Board, circumscribed in the means of intercourse and information, and overwhelmed in the interior business of Bengal, cannot easily accomplish any public benefit, by the
latitude

latitude of its control, yet assuredly it is enabled to defeat all useful views of every other Board, to thwart or over-rule all plans of public service, and, in a paroxysm of political phrensy, to make away with half the peninsula.

If it be judged expedient to have a Supreme Board of India, in whom all the controlling powers of Government shall ultimately concentrate, in the name of common sense let it be a Board of Circuit;—let it be a Board of inspection, as well as of control, composed of members from each presidency, detached from the embarrassments and corruption of provincial regulation:—let it be a Board that can observe with impartiality, judge with accuracy, and act with vigour;—that can move to any spot in India, where public emergencies are most urgent, and call more immediately for its presence. Thus, and thus only, can it become a Board of extended efficiency either
to

to enforce obedience, restrain subordinate misconduct, or unite in one connected system the vast and complicated mass of Indian affairs *.

Leaving this gloomy retrospect, let us consider how we are situated with regard to other powers, and what we are likely to become on the peninsula. The territories of hither India, or what has inaccurately been called the empire of the Great Mogul, extends 1680 miles in length, 1440 in breadth, contains an area of 1,138,400 square miles, and maintains 110,000,000 of inhabitants. Taking the area of Great Britain and Ireland at Major Rennell's estimate of 131,800 square miles, and 10,000,000 of inhabitants, it is nearly nine

* The preceding remarks on the condition of Bengal and its adjacent territories are not the result of personal observation, and therefore may be considered as less deserving attention than those which I have ventured to offer on the affairs of Coromandel. There is little doubt however, considering the natural fertility of those countries, that a mild and permanent administration might soon restore them to prosperity.

times as extensive, and contains eleven times as many people, as the three kingdoms.

I will not hazard any calculation of the gross produce and revenue of that empire, but they bear more than a due proportion to this superior population and extent. Its soil affords every article for the subsistence or conveniency of man that can be cultivated in the lower latitudes. It has for ages been the seat of manufacture, industry, and commerce. Its inhabitants are civilized, ingenious, and refined, accustomed to war, and proficient in the arts, sciences, and embellishments of peace. With such superlative advantages, no state recorded in the annals of Europe could stand in competition with the Mogul Empire, if such an empire did in fact include under one government the territories to which it gives a name; but the vast tract comprehended under that vague description is parcelled out among a multiplicity of discordant powers, and peopled
by

by numberless tribes, dissimilar in manners, language, and religion.

If we divide the whole region into 114 geographical parts, we shall find, that of these, something less than one part belongs to the Mogul and his immediate adherents; to the Affgans, Kashmirians, Pitans, Candahars, Seets, Abdallahs, and various other northern Hordes, twenty-five parts; to the Maratta States, including Berar, forty-eight; to the Nizam, including Adoni, five and an half; to the Circar of Tippoo Sultan, including Cudapah, eight and an half; to the Rajah of Travancore, one; to the English, and their adherents, twenty-eight and an half: the remainder may be assigned to the petty Rajahs, Polygars, and other classes of aboriginal Gentoos, who have hitherto defied the powers of the Crescent and the Cross, and, under cover of woods, mountains, and inaccessible retreats, have asserted independence.

Of these, the Travancore Rajah, the Malabar Rajahs, and such of the interior Chiefs as never had the misfortune of our intercourse, have, I believe, no reason to complain of us; but every other individual state has been so deeply injured and insulted by the English, that if their resentments be proportioned to their wrongs, they can scarcely ever be effaced.

When the Bengal Government withdrew their covenanted stipend from the Mogul, and forced him, by their ill usage, to fly from his residence at Ilhabad, and to throw himself upon the mercy of the contending Chiefs and Hordes who infest the environs of Delhi, they should have recollected that, fallen as he is, and diminished in his splendour, he is still of material consequence in the affairs of India, being the acknowledged paramount of all the Mahometan powers in those countries *.

* His late minister Nidziff Cawn had 60,000 horse under his command.

The Affgans, Pitans, Doranies, Abdallahs, Candahars, Kashmirians, and other hordes of Mussulmen who people the northern territories of Indostan, are brave and warlike, impatient of peace, and eager for adventure. So unsettled is the present state of all those northern countries adjoining to Bengal, that any resolute leader, black or white, of military reputation, might, on the shortest notice, raise an army of 100,000 men, ready to follow him as long as he could feed and pay them. Even in Oude, near 150 lacks of the revenue cannot be collected, but by the aid of a leader, who constantly maintains 10,000 troops and fifty pieces of cannon ready for emergencies.

The Duab * has been twice farmed out to English gentlemen, on condition that they should raise or employ a force sufficient to collect the revenues of it, with permission, after paying the stipulated sum into

* A province near Oude.

the Nabob of Oude's treasury, to plunder and ranfack the diftricts for their own advantage: but of late it has become the receptacle of the rich and difaffected leaders throughout the country, who fortify themselves there, maintain confiderable force, and assert a ftate of open independence. The followers of Nidziff Cawn, and of other great Chiefs, have hitherto been maintained by quartering different bodies of them on particular diftricts, with orders to the Commander of each body to collect the revenues of the country, and to fubfift his troops by force of arms. But by this outrageous system, those countries are already exhausted, and these destroyers, like the Huns and the Visigoths, must seek for fubfiftence and plunder in new acquifitions.

If they direct their progress towards Bengal *, they will find that country as open to invasion as it was on the day when we

* Bengal is, however, naturally a strong country.

first took possession of it:—not a fort, not a barrier, not a post to resist their progress, to the very suburbs of Calcutta.

It would ill become me to offer any suggestions unfavourable to the military upon that establishment. Brave and zealous they undoubtedly are, and would probably defeat their enemies as often as they hazarded a close engagement; but allowing, which is not the fact, that they were neither deficient in Europeans nor in cavalry,—that their Sepoys were in the highest state of discipline, and that the vigour and dispatch of Government, contradicting all former instances, should enable the army to quit their cantonments in the best order on the first notice of invasion; still we are taught, by recent and severe example, that a force constituted on the principle of our Indian armies, without previous well-concerted measures of defence, cannot possibly protect an extended country from the rapid devas-

tations of hostile cavalry. If they should fail in driving us from the provinces, they are at least sure to enrich themselves with spoil, and to render them, like the Carnatic, a possession scarcely worth contending for.

The same observations apply with equal truth to the Maratta states. Their sentiments towards us are not less justly marked with impressions of resentment. They have repeatedly asserted the claim of Chout or tribute from Bengal, which, in their idiom, is nearly synonymous with impending invasion. Their numbers and co-operation, in contrast with our discordant weakness, ensure them an ample crop of laurels, as soon as they shall resolve to pass the Jumna. With regard to the Nizam, our momentary security is founded on his pacific character. Possessed as he is of a great and fertile sovereignty, ample revenues, and an army of 60,000 troops, which
he

he could double with facility on a few months notice, nothing was wanting but determination to have gratified to the full his enmity against the English. When Hyder invaded the Carnatic, the Nizam had only to march a force into the Northern Circars, and those enviable territories must infallibly have reverted to their rightful owner.

But these are inferior dangers, when compared with the strength and menacing condition of Myfore. The recent growth and warlike advancement of that state exhibit a phenomenon unparalleled in history. In the earlier part of this century, when the Delaway or Regent of Myfore marched against Trichinopoly with a great body of horse, their troops were in the lowest stage of military ignorance; and their unskilfulness was only equalled by their pusillanimity. The country was then governed by a native Rajah, the lineal heir of the Musnud. He was

was of the Canara cast, and the great body of his people were likewise of Canara or Gentoo descent. They were happy under his government; but they were neither rich nor respectable.

By the ghauts or mountains, on which the table land of Myfore is elevated, it is separated from the Carnatic on the east, from the great plains of Coimbatore on the south, from the Malabar territories on the west, and from the countries of Beddanore and Ghutty on the north.—These ghauts are only accessible at particular places, and oppose no inconsiderable obstacles to the progress of invaders. The situation of Myfore is remote from habitual interference with adjacent powers; its soil is less fertile than the lower countries that surround it, and its inhabitants were not enriched by commerce and manufacture, nor by these means exposed to their more powerful and industrious neighbours.

Under

Under such circumstances, it might have enjoyed its primeval tranquillity, had not a superior genius effected a signal revolution in the affairs of that country.

Hyder Naick, or Hyder Ally, the son of a Killidar who commanded a fort of some strength on the confines of Myfore, soon rendered himself superior to all the other commanders in the Myfore service. At the attack of the bloody Choultry on Seringham island, mentioned in Mr. Orme's invaluable history, he particularly distinguished himself, as well as on every other occasion in which he either acted or advised. Without dwelling on the gradations of his conduct, in attaining confidence and elevation, it is enough to say that he rose to be the prime general and chief minister of his master. Clothed with the authority of these employments, and supported by his aspiring talents, he soon left his sovereign nothing but the name, and

and at last doomed him and his whole family to confinement, exhibiting them from time to time in great state, to soothe and please the people, while he in fact transferred the sceptre to his own hands.—He trained his peaceful subjects to the use of arms, by new-modelling the military system; by inviting all ranks of Moormen, Rajapoots, and other warlike casts, to join his standard; by encouraging or rather alluring French and other Europeans to enter into his service; and above all, by a course of severe and unremitting duty in the field. He attacked, and successively subdued, the numerous Polygars, Chiefs, and petty Rajahs, whose possessions lay within his reach. He extended his views against the countries south of the ghauts, as far as the confines of Trichinopoly and Madura. On the Malabar coast, he reduced the Zamorin or Sovereign of Calicut, the Rajah of Paligat, the other Malabar Rajahs, and rendered the Rajah of Cochin tributary

tary to his Circar. He conquered Beddalore, Goutty, and Chiteldroog; the countries of Cudapah, Kanoul, and Savanore; thus extending his dominions as far north as Goa on the Malabar sea, and across the peninsula to the country of Palnaud and Ganjam, on the coast of Coromandel.

With these, and other interior acquisitions, the Rajahship of Mysore grew into a powerful state, 400 miles in length from north to south, and near 300 miles in breadth from east to west, with a population of many millions; an army of 300,000 men, and 5,000,000 *l.* of annual revenue. These achievements were the result of intrepid perseverance. He next ventured to try his strength with the Marattas and with the English,—though he could not vanquish them, yet he increased in self-confidence and public estimation. His very failures he turned to account, and,

and, like Czar Peter, submitted to be worsted, that he might learn to be superior.

During the long interval of peace with the English, from 1769 to 1780, the improvement of his country, and the strictest executive administration, formed the constant objects of his care. Under his masterly control, they attained a perfection never heard of under any other Indian sovereign; the husbandman, the manufacturer, and the merchant, prospered in every part of his dominions; cultivation increased, new manufactures were established, and wealth flowed into the kingdom. But against negligence or malversation he was inexorable. The renters, the tax-gatherers, and other officers of revenue, fulfilled their duty with fear and trembling; for the slightest defalcation was punished with the chaubuck*, or with

* The chaubuck is an instrument for scourging criminals.

death.

death. He employed spies and intelligencers in every corner of his own dominions, and in every court of India; and he had other persons in pay, who served as checks upon them, and watched all their operations.

The minutest circumstance of detail, the produce of a crop, the cultivation of a district, the portion paid to the Circar, and that reserved to the inhabitants, were accurately known to him:—Not a movement in the remotest corner could escape him,—not a murmur or intention of his neighbours but flew to him.—It will hardly appear exaggeration to say, that he was acquainted with every spot, and almost with every person in his empire, when we consider that he was in a continued round of inspection.—In his Durbar, during the hours of business, reports from all corners were received:—his secretaries successively read to him the whole correspondence of the day:—

to each he dictated in few words the substance of the answer to be given ; which was immediately written, read to him, and dispatched.

On his right and left hand, during these hours, were placed bags of gold and silver ; out of which, those who brought him intelligence were rewarded by one or more handfuls of coin, proportioned to their deserts ; he was accessible to all : every horseman or sepoy, that wanted to enter his service, was inspected by himself ; every Jemidar, or officer of any note, was intimately known to him. His troops were amply paid, but not a fraction was lost. Those who supplied his camps, garrisons, and cantonments, were all under such contribution, that almost the whole military disbursements reverted to his treasury. There was no contractor bold enough to hazard a public imposition. There was no commander ingenious enough to screen
inability

inability or disobedience, nor a defaulter that could elude detection. He possessed the happy secret of uniting minuteness of detail with the utmost latitude of thought and enterprise. As his perseverance and dispatch in business were only equalled by his pointedness of information, so his conciseness and decision in the executive departments of a great government, are probably unprecedented in the annals of men. Conscious from experience of his own ability, and of the weakness and distraction of the English, he planned their extirpation from India. He summoned all the native powers to join his cause:—they hesitated. He determined to act alone—and conquered the Carnatic.

His death, in December 1782, left the accomplishment of his farther designs to his son and successor, Tippoo Sultaun, to whom he bequeathed an overflowing treasury,

fury, which he had filled,—a powerful empire, which he had created,—and an army of 300,000 men, whom he had formed, disciplined, and enured to conquest.

In my annexed letter to the Board of Madras, the perspective of events in the concluding period of the war, as well as the circumstances under which the peace with Tippoo Sultaun was concluded, are faithfully pourtrayed. The subsequent proceedings of our adversary have confirmed the prevalent belief, that the present cessation is only a short respite with a view of afterwards renewing the contest, when, through our negligence and his exertion, he may be enabled to attack us with superior advantage. His conduct has not been equivocal:—his contempt of the English incites him to disdain evasion, and his enmity is a constant stimulus to his hostile preparations. In order more effectually

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ally to complete his arrangements for driving the Christians out of India, he had hardly signed the treaty with our Commissioners, when he solicited all the great Mahometan powers, the Grand Signior himself not excepted, to contribute their assistance in stores, arms, and artificers. He established forges, founderies, and armories throughout his dominions,—replenished his magazines, which had been exhausted during the war,—and new-modelled his army on the most efficient footing.

While these arrangements are so formidable as to excite well-grounded apprehensions, his public acts and declarations already ascertain their object and direction. He has claimed and menaced the Guntour Circar, adjoining to the country of Cudapah. If he should be suffered to take possession of that district, the whole northern Circars will unavoidably be severed from the Presidency, and his dominion be extended over

all those valuable provinces. On the other hand, if we resist his assumptions, he hoists his junda *, and renews the war.—And, under some pretence or other, a renewal of the war is unavoidable:—he has sworn to it.—While we, on our part, must wish for that event, if we mean to regain our character, or ever to be numbered among the powers of India.

There was a period when peace and forbearance formed the principle, though they never were the practice, of our Indian policy. In those days, investment only was our object, and the increase of territorial acquisition was reprobated by every faithful and enlightened servant of the public.—Prove yourselves just,—prove yourselves moderate,—evince to all India that you are determined to refrain from conquest,—was the sound and earnest doctrine of Lord Clive to the Directors. Had these tenets

* The banners under which Indian armies fight.

been adhered to from the first, our establishments in India would have continued peaceful factories;—we should have remained expert, successful traders, and never have exposed ourselves as unprincipled usurpers. But, before Lord Clive urged those restrictive sentiments, they were no longer apposite: the pacific mask was thrown aside, and we stood confessed an insidious, warlike, and ambitious race. From that moment the name of Englishman impressed the mind of every Indian power with jealousy and apprehension. Our subsequent misconduct and disasters would already have disarmed their resentments, if they could be pacified with less than our destruction. Till of late they hated, but they dreaded and respected us. To judge by our conduct, the *oderint dum metuant* was our favourite motto; but now they have mingled hatred with contempt. We gained an empire by violence and injustice, it is true; but we main-

tained it by courage and exploit. We established over the Asiatics an ascendancy founded on superior energy and skill in every mental and bodily exertion.

Whether it be for the interest of England, every circumstance considered, to retain her Indian possessions, is a question too intricate and important for me to determine; but it appears an irrefragable truth, that if we are to exist at all in India, it must be in the character of a great, warlike, and territorial power—a power at all times able to exalt our allies, and to depress our enemies. We may farther venture to assert, that if any other system be adopted, it will in fact prove an absolute surrender of that country.

The means by which it is conceived yet practicable to reform our civil and military establishments having been expressed at large in my annexed correspondence with the
Board,

Board, it is unnecessary to enumerate them at present: one thing however is indisputable, that if Government hope to preserve a shred of their Indian empire, not a moment must be lost in correcting the alarming outrages under which it labours;—in removing those causes of dissension that threaten its existence;—in reforming those abuses, civil and military, by which its strength has been wasted, and its power decayed; and in bringing every man, measure, and resource, of those distracted settlements, into one decided point of obedience, co-operation, and effect.

Could we flatter ourselves, that there is yet vigour, union, and integrity enough in the nation, to atchieve such a re-establishment, it would not be chimerical to indulge the most exalted expectations.—The intrinsic value of those possessions would then be fully known to us. We should then recognise the inestimable benefits, of which an equitable and united Government could render them productive

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tive beyond all aggregate resources in the British empire. The countries subject to our influence under any administration that did not openly cherish discord, and exult in malversation, would yield an annual revenue of 10,000,000*l.* sterling, and would increase in value with every subsequent improvement. The manufactures of those countries, if at all encouraged, would afford employment for the whole commercial stock of England. The shipping * engaged in that trade would swell into a formidable arma-

* At present the India ships are mere trading vessels, without force, discipline, or defence; and in time of war are in danger of falling a prey to every well-armed privateer. But the slightest observation must suggest, that they ought to be all constructed on the principle of two-deckers, as the Dutch India ships are; and, improving on that model, that they should be well armed, completely manned, and subject to naval officers under the articles of war. In that event, whenever they had their war complements and instructions on board, they would form a fleet superior to any probable attack. If it should ever be judged expedient to build ships of force in India, a whole navy might be constructed at Bombay, and at other places on the Malabar coast, where Teak timber abounds.

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ment for the national defence. The resources or finance of those establishments, where 1000*l.* can hardly be raised at this moment, might be fixed on so secure a basis as to support a pile of public credit, more wonderful than that of London or of Amsterdam, and enriched by a circulation more extensive than the whole exchange of Europe.

To crown the series ; were it possible for us ever to be consistent, ever to be upright, ever to be trusted, or ever to be trust-worthy in the East ; I may venture to assert, that the idea suggested in my annexed letter to the Board, of granting permanent support to the Gentoo interest throughout the Peninsula, in opposition to their invaders and oppressors, would unalterably attach the great mass of the inhabitants to our cause, and, leaving their native Rajahs in the full interior direction of their districts, would afford us a voluntary

tary contribution more than sufficient to defray the whole ordinary and contingent charges of our Indian establishments. An efficient re-espousal of the cause and interests of the great Mogul, and of the Mussulmen who predominate north of the Peninsula, is by no means incompatible with that system, and, in the present state of the northern countries, would render us the immediate Paramounts of Indostan.

Thus, my Lord, I have presumed to lay before you a sort of Mosaic tablet of our past proceedings and present state in India. The component parts are not fitted and disposed with the skill and ingenuity of a professed artist; they are only passing sketches, whose utmost effect will be produced, if they exhibit to your nice discernment, any justness of perspective or accuracy of delineation. In the whole course of my observations I have endeavoured to represent men and things in their true proportions,

portions, and to place them in their relative positions. Having freely expressed my sentiments on points of such importance to the British Empire, I should not take the liberty of submitting them to your Lordship's inspection, were I not persuaded that they convey a faithful portraiture of the subject in its real aspect; and that they tend to confute the fallacies of some former productions, which seem pencilled by a biased hand, to mislead the national judgment, and deceive the public eye.

With every sentiment of attachment and respect, I have the honour to be, &c.

ENGLISH INTERESTS IN INDIA

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hand, to mislead the natural judgment, and
deceive the public eye.

With every sentiment of attachment and
respect, I have the honour to be, Sir,

LETTER II.*

*To Lord MACARTNEY and the SELECT
COMMITTEE of Fort St. GEORGE.*

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

BEFORE I embark for Europe, allow
me to express my best acknowledg-
ments for the approbation with which you
have distinguished me, since I have had
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* This Letter was begun in India, and it was my wish
to have delivered it as a sort of *compte rendu* to the Board of
Madras, before my departure from that country. Having
been prevented however, by unavoidable business of the ser-
vice and severe illness, from fulfilling my intention, I left a
copy of it at the Cape of Good Hope, to be forwarded from
thence to Fort St. George; but that copy had not reached
Madras

the honour to command the troops and garrisons south of the Coleroon.—Permit me farther to obtrude on your Lordship and the Board, a brief relation of my proceedings in the command of the southern forces, and of other incidents material to the welfare of your southern territories. Independently of an impulse to state the particulars of my conduct while entrusted with a public charge, I cannot think of leaving India, without presenting to you in one view the merits of the southern army, the difficulties under which it laboured, and the services it has performed.—I flat-

ter Madras when Lord Macartney sailed from thence. Since that time I have made many alterations and additions, still preserving the form of address in which the Letter was originally written. This circumstance has betrayed me into several violations of official propriety, in explaining to the Board various incidents and local particulars, with which they were previously acquainted; but without a detail of this nature, the work could hardly have been rendered intelligible to the generality of European readers. In its present form, a copy has been sent to the Court of Directors, that it may be forwarded to Fort St. George, in order to be entered on the records of that Presidency.

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ter myself also, that the circumstances in which I acted, enable me to form an unbiased statement of resources as they exist in those southern countries, of embarrassments as they have been felt, and of transactions as they have been conducted; affording at the same time well-grounded hopes, that, by speedy measures of reform, what is beneficial may be improved, and what is amiss may be corrected *.

To introduce more distinctly the narrative of military proceedings that occurred during my command †, it may be necessary to solicit your attention to a detail of the misfor-

* The efforts made by Lord Macartney's government to restore the safety of the Southern Countries, were exemplary and successful; but the confusion in which the war and other circumstances had involved those territories rendered it impracticable to carry into immediate execution a complete and general system of reform.

† I proceeded to the Southward in October 1782, in the command of the King's troops on that station; and in May 1783 was appointed to succeed Colonel Lang, in the general command of the forces south of the river Coleroon.

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tunes which previously to your President's arrival in India had almost entirely exhausted the resources and ruined the inhabitants of every district south of the Coleroon.—Your possessions in that quarter are of sufficient magnitude and value to call forth the most vigorous endeavours for their protection; but such was their condition when you assumed the government, that, without your opportune attentions, they must inevitably have been severed from the English dominions.

Those territories, in my opinion, had not obtained their due share of estimation under any former Government: divided into various districts, held by different tenures, and occupied by tribes at variance with each other, many parts of them remained uncultivated, and almost unexplored. Nor was it practicable for the most enlightend of your servants, to form a just appretiation of the benefits they
2 afford,

afford, until, by the assignment of the Nabob of Arcot's revenues to the Company, you were invested with the internal management of those countries *.

From the river Coleroon, their northern boundary, which divides them from the Nabobship of Arcot, to Cape Cormorin, the southern extremity of the Peninsula, is not less than 300 miles; and from the sea, which forms their limits on the east, to the countries of Caroor and Dindigul, belonging to Tippoo Sultaun, and the Rajahship of Travancore, upon the west, is on an average at least 150 miles. Immemorial mismanagement, and late disaster, have hitherto rendered those countries unproductive; but under a system in any

* The assignment was concluded in the end of the year 1781, between Mahomed Ally and Lord Macartney's government. Previously to that arrangement, the Company's servants were not allowed to interfere in the territorial affairs of the Nabob.

degree permanent, and founded on the equitable principles that have hitherto directed the conduct of your Lordship and the Board, they would undoubtedly yield an annual revenue of 1,000,000 *l.* sterling.

Of those territories, the Rajahship of Tanjore is the most fertile * ;—it is watered by a multiplicity of streams, which, by means of embankments and reservoirs, are diverted into every field ;—it annually affords two or three luxuriant crops of rice ;—the forests abound with valuable trees ;—the country is overstocked with sheep and cattle ;—and formerly teemed with an industrious race, who were expert in agriculture, and habituated to manufacture :—while such are the natural benefits it enjoys, that no spot upon the globe is superior in productions for the use of man.

* The following geographical remarks, which have been inserted since the Letter was originally written, would have been superfluous, if meant only for the Board.

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You are well apprized, however, that from the establishment of the reigning family of the Maratta race in 1675* to the present period, there has been such a progressive diminution of cultivation, that the annual produce of late years is less by fifty *per cent.* than it was a century ago.—As Europeans never interfered in the management of that country, and as it has been seldom ravaged or invaded, its decline must be attributed to the malversation of its Maratta or Gentoo administration: but even in its impoverished state†, it used to produce, before the late war, about seventy-five lacks of cullums of rice, worth about eleven lacks of pagodas, or 440,000*l.* sterling:—of this, 160,000*l.* was paid as tribute for your protection, agreeably to the stipulation of 1776, after the last siege

* The country of Tanjore contained 5753 towns and villages at the time when the Maratta government was established,

† See the annual statement of Tanjore produce, in the Appendix.

of Tanjore, when the Rajah became a tributary of the Company.—The difficulties that occurred in reducing that capital, the strength of the works, and obstinacy of the defenders, evince its importance in a military view * :—neither do the inferior forts, and the rivers, rice fields, and embankments that intersect the country, afford less eminent advantages in the moment of invasion.

The state of Tritchinopoly, extending from the western limits of Tanjore along the Coleroon, which divides it from the Carnatic on the north, till it reaches Tip-poo's dominions on the west, near Caroor and Dindigul, including a range of fifty miles by forty, is circumscribed on the south by the country of Tondiman, and by the woods of Nattam inhabited by Col-

* Tanjore was supposed to contain 100,000 inhabitants previously to the destruction that followed Hyder's irruption.

leries.—Though less valuable than the country of Tanjore, the vicinity of the Coleroon still renders it extremely productive of rice. Under the Nabob Mahomed Ally's management, the expences of collection absorbed the greater part of the revenue arising from this territory, which is at present let to a renter under the assignment of the Nabob's revenues to the Company for about ten lacks of rupees, or 100,000/. In prosperous times, however, it possesses the means of extended cultivation, and consequent increase of revenue. The size and situation of the city, the abundance of subsistence in the district, and the long residence of the Nabob Mahomed Ally's second son the Ameer Ul Omrah at that place, have rendered it the favourite establishment of the Mussulmen to the southward of the Coleroon. The two great Pagodas of Jumbakistna and Seringham, on the adjacent island of Seringham, command the veneration of Gentoos; while every spot on that

island on the opposite or northern side of the Coleroon, about Semiaveram and Volkon-dah, as well as on the plains of Tritchinopoly, are recorded for the bloody contests of Chunda Saheb, Astruc, Clive, and Lawrence, and mark with classical reverence the scene of those achievements. But above all, it becomes important in a political and military view, as the strongest and most advanced garrison upon your frontiers towards the territories of Mysore, and the best position for cantoning your army, in order to menace that power*.

The country of the Colleries, including the territories of Tondiman, Mellore, and Nattam, extends from the sea-coast to the confines of Madura in a range of sixty miles by sixty-five †. With the exception of

* See my Letter to the Board, dated the 26th of April 1784.

† Tondiman is less uncultivated than his neighbours, and has at all times proved himself the most faithful adherent

of some spots which have accidentally been cultivated, it is overgrown with thickets, and inhabited by savage tribes. Before that country can be rendered valuable, the woods must be cleared, the strong holds occupied, and the Colleries compelled to relinquish their predatory habits: for, in its present condition, fertile tracts are lost to cultivation, and the wild inhabitants, amounting to 30 or 40,000 men in arms under different Chiefs, are ever ready to increase the public danger in the moments of hostility.

The territory of Shevigunga, or the Little Marawa, stretches from the sea-coast on the east, to the districts of Mellore and Madura on the west, and from the country of Tondiman and the Nattam Colleries

herent of the Nabob and of the Company. The father of the present Chief, by his firmness and attachment, in the days of General Lawrence, supplied the force at Trichinopoly with provisions, at a time when their cause seemed desperate. And the Nabob, sensible of the obligation, ever afterwards exempted him from tribute.

upon the north, to the territories of the Great Marawa on the south; containing about fifty miles in length and forty in breadth. The soil in general is unfriendly to the growth of corn, though not quite destitute of running streams or artificial reservoirs; but the country is overgrown with thorns and bushes. The woods of Calicoil extend nearly forty miles in circumference. They are secured with barriers, and other defences around the fort of Calicoil, which is situated in the centre of the thickets, and considered as a refuge from exaction or invasion. These woods, and the surrounding country, abound with sheep and cattle:—the inhabitants are numerous, and can bring 12,000 fighting men into the field, armed with swords, pikes, spears, and firelocks. Though less barbarous than the Collieries their neighbours, yet arts and industry have made little progress among them. The country

country is capable of great improvement, but at present hardly yields more than five lacks of rupees to the Rajah, who pays one lack and 75,000 rupees to the Nabob of Arcot *. The Rajah is of the Taver family, and a descendant of the sovereigns of the Great Marawa, from which Shevigunga was separated at no very distant period. At the reduction of this territory in 1773 by General Joseph Smith, the Rajah having been killed, his widow, then with child, and some of the leading people of the country, escaped into the Myfore dominions, and there lived under the protection of Hyder Ally, until the commencement of the late war. During that period, the country was managed by a renter; and, in quiet times, the people acknowledged themselves to be tributaries of the Nabob Mahomed Ally. But while their woods and barriers are suffered to remain, their disaf-

* Mahomed Ally.

fection may be dreaded on the first prospect of their profiting by disturbance.

The Great Marawa, or Rajah of Ramnad, occupies a country fifty miles in length and thirty in breadth, extending from the boundaries of Shevigunga and Mellore upon the north, to the sea upon the east and south, and to the confines of Tinivelly on the west.—Nature has been little more propitious to this principality, than to that of Shevigunga; yet arts and industry have made superior progress.—The country is well peopled, the inhabitants are civilized, and the villages full of weavers, who manufacture the cottons produced by the adjacent lands. The city of Ramnad, where the Rajah usually resides, is large, and respectably fortified. The sea-coast is skirted with a track of open woodland, that shelters innumerable herds of cattle. The revenues are equal to five lacks of rupees a year, and the tribute to
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the Nabob is one lack and 75,000 rupees. The reduction of the country in the year 1773 by General Joseph Smith, and a garrison of the Nabob's troops constantly stationed in the capital, have deprived the native prince even of personal freedom. Still however he is venerated by Gentoos, on account of his high descent, and as the guardian of the sacred waters and Pagoda of Ramiserum.

I come now to the state of Madura, bounded by Mellôre on the east, by the Nattam Colleries on the north, by the country of Dindigul, belonging to Hyder, on the west, and by Tinivelly on the south. Its territory is not more than forty-five miles in length and thirty-five in breadth, and its annual revenue is diminished to 34,000 *l*. When the Gentoo Rajah Trimalnague reigned there in the last century, his territories extended over many parts of the southern countries. His treasures were
great,

great, and the monuments of magnificence left by him, which are hardly surpassed in any age or country, still remain a melancholy contrast with present poverty and depopulation. The gallant resistance made by Mahomed Iffoof, when he disclaimed allegiance to the Nabob Mahomed Ally, is a sufficient proof that when the works are in repair, this place may be defended against the most powerful Indian enemy; while its vicinity to the country of Dindigul, belonging to Tippoo Sultaun, renders it a position of capital importance in the event of any future operations against that power.

The last but not the least considerable of your southern territories is Tinivelly, which is divided by a ridge of inaccessible mountains on the north from the wild valleys of Watrap and Outumpollam belonging to Tippoo Sultaun. It stretches to the confines of Madura and Ramnad on the north-east and east, reaches to the sea upon the south,

south, and borders on the west with the Rajahship of Travancore, both terminating near Cape Comorin. Its surface is generally flat from the sea-coast, till it approaches the mountains on its northern boundary. Nature has been peculiarly bountiful to this province:—The rivers by which it is intersected, ensure luxuriant crops of rice, and the driest parts yield cotton in abundance. The productions that enrich the neighbouring island of Ceylon would flourish here, and might render us the rivals of the Dutch in the cinnamon trade: but the particular tenure under which Tinivelly has been held, the convulsions it has endured from the first intrusions of the Mussulmen in the course of this century, and the depravity of its rulers, have counteracted the benefits of nature. Even when a native Rajah governed this province, the flat and open country only was reduced, and was let for specific sums to great renters, who were invested with

with despotic powers, and harassed the peaceful subject; while various leaders, possessing considerable territory, maintained armed force, and withheld their stipulated tribute on the first appearance of disturbance. These chiefs, who at present amount in number to thirty-two, are capable of bringing 30,000 brave though undisciplined troops into the field; they have also fortified towns and strong-holds in the mountains, whither they retire in cases of emergency.

Beside the territory that these chiefs, who, as well as their subjects, are called Polygars, possess under the range of hills that forms the northern boundary of Tinivelly, many of them hold ample tracks in the flat and cultivated country. Adverse to industry, they suffer their own possessions to remain waste, while they invade each other, and plunder their industrious neighbours. Such is the dread of those ravagers, that every district

district in the province has been forced to purchase their forbearance by enormous contributions. In this situation, you have rather cause to wonder that your superintendant, Mr. Irwin, should have been enabled to procure so large an increase of revenue, than that the produce of this country should in no recorded period have borne any proportion to its natural advantages.

The preceding observations can only be considered as a hasty outline of the Company's possessions south of the Coleroon; which, in extent, are nearly equal to the Carnatic; but in point of soil, water, situation, and capability of improvement, surpasses any district under your controul.

The calamities with which the invasion of Hyder Ally in 1781 overwhelmed the Carnatic, fell heavily upon the southern countries. No sooner had the multitudes
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under that ravager poured down from the mountains of Mysore, than desolation extended across the Coleroon. Thousands of his plunderers overran the countries of Kivelore, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Madura. A most luxuriant crop, with which the ground was at that time covered, was instantly swept off, and every water-dyke and embankment totally destroyed. The inhabitants who escaped the sword, sought shelter in the forts; where, adding misery to distress, they perished in the streets; while the whole country, laid waste by fire and sword, exhibited the sad reality of a general conflagration. At length Hyder, having left nothing to destroy in the Carnatic, and regardless of our force, which from the time of Colonel Baillie's defeat had never ventured from its encampment near Madras, resolved to lead in person his victorious army to the southward. After remaining some weeks encamped within random shot of

Tanjore, he proceeded to invest Tritchinopoly, and threatened to fill up the ditch with his Moormen's slippers. The repeated checks sustained by the Company's troops in that quarter, the corps that Hyder had cut off, and the forts he had reduced, spread so general a consternation, that the important and defenceless garrison of Tritchinopoly seemed ready to surrender. In that event the southern countries must have submitted to his power, had not the repulse of Sir Eyre Coote's army against Chilumbrum elated Hyder with the hopes of defeating the only force that could endanger his conquest. This induced him to renounce more solid, though less brilliant prospects, and to fight the battle of the 1st July 1781, at Porto Novo.

Notwithstanding his ill success in that engagement, and his personal absence from the southward, our affairs in that quarter still remained in great confusion. The Tan-

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jore country was occupied by the enemy, who secured its crops and cattle, repulsed the Company's troops at Tricatapooly, Putticottah, and Trivelore, and confined them within the fort of Tanjore. There, the granaries were empty, the Rajah's subjects disaffected, and he himself accused of negotiating with Hyder, and of introducing arms clandestinely into his palace. He likewise suffered the whole crops of his country to be collected by the enemy, while he resisted every sollicitation to fill his magazines, and provide for impending events.

The defeat of Colonel Braithwaite in February 1782, and the loss of his detachment (attacked by a powerful army under Tippoo Sultaun), would have proved a deadly blow, had it not been warded off by the active abilities and conciliating manners of Mr. Sullivan, to whom the safety of Tanjore and of all the southern provinces was

then justly ascribed. The subsequent capture of Colonel Horne, proceeding to the southward from the Presidency with military supplies, added extremely to the distress and embarrassment experienced at Tanjore. In the provinces south of Tanjore and Trichinopoly, the prospect was not less alarming. The Great Marawa country was infested by a host of rebels under Maupely Taver, a relation of the reigning family, who over-ran the territory, occupied its best positions, and for many months invested the garrison of Ramnad.

The Little Marawa country was controlled by Perry and China Mordeen, who, after the death of the late Rajah in 1773, had fled to the protection of Hyder, and returning at the time of his invasion, maintained the country under his authority, keeping the infant Rajah a state-prisoner, and ravaging the territories of the Company and Nabob.

The districts of Madura, Mellore, and Palemery, were so harassed with Colleries, Polygars, and the enemy, that your troops and subjects were often attacked within range of the forts, and the sentries fired at on the works. All the Polygars of Tinivelly were in rebellion, and closely connected with the Dutch government at Colombo, from whence attempts were meditated, in conjunction with them and with Maupely Taver, to reduce those countries and the Marawa dominions. Near 100,000 Polygars and Colleries were in arms throughout the southern provinces, and, being hostile to Government, considered public confusion as the only safeguard against punishment. To repress these outrages, and to retrieve your affairs in the present exigency, your southern force was inadequate. The treasury was drained,—the country depopulated,—the revenues exacted by the enemy,—and the troops undisciplined,

ciplined, poorly fed, and unsuccessfully commanded *.

The complicated dangers arising from this situation of the country induced you, in September 1782, to send a reinforcement of Europeans and Artillery to the Southward, under the command of Colonel Lang. You were led to hope that this detachment, when reinforced by the troops to be collected from every quarter of the South, might have materially promoted the views of Colonel Humberstone, who was then at Paniani, preparing to proceed against Palacatcherry, and to penetrate into Coimbatour, according to the plan suggested by Mr. Sullivan, approved of by your Lordship and the Board, and afterwards carried into

* Such was the state of affairs to the Southward when Lord Macartney's Government commenced, and for some time afterwards authority in military matters was vested in Sir Eyre Coote by the Supreme Board; but as soon as that authority was restored to the Governor and Select Committee, they made the most meritorious efforts to provide for the safety of the southern countries.

execution by myself. But from a variety of circumstances it happened, that the operations of Colonel Lang were confined to the reduction of Caroor, Aravarcourchy, and Dindigul. Being limited in his movements to those districts of the enemy, and to the track between Negapatam, Tanjore, and Trichinopoly, the southern countries continued nearly in their former state of desolation. Many as the representations were that reached your Board on this subject, it would have been desirable for you in person to have beheld the malversations that had been committed, the miseries that were endured, and the patience of your subjects under unsupportable grievances.

The ravages of the enemy, however, were by no means the greatest evils that those districts had sustained. There were inherent and increasing causes of decline: cultivation was neglected,—the husbandmen were killed or driven off,—the cattle
were

were wild,—and the fields were desolate. Yet over this wilderness, the Renter, the Amuldar, the Monagar, the Tefieldar, and all the instruments of public exaction, tyrannised with unabating rigour. The forts, excepting Tanjore, were neglected and decaying ;—the military stores had been in a great measure expended or embezzled ; and those that now remained were ill constructed and worse arranged ;—the military Storekeepers, Grainkeepers, Paymasters, and Commissaries, belonging to the civil service, were habituated to disavow any controlling power in the Commandant of the place ;—nor were the exhortations and example of Mr. Sullivan sufficient to correct the evil. Hence disorder arose in those departments. The civil and military, the King and Company's officers, were at variance. The adherents of the Nabob were loud in their complaints against Europeans, while the Tanjorines extended their aversion to all classes of our countrymen. The large arrears due to the

troops, and other grievances, rendered it impracticable for officers to maintain strict discipline in their corps; as it required the utmost efforts to prevent mutiny among men, who, brave and faithful as they undoubtedly were, could hardly be blamed for clamour and complaint when reduced to procure subsistence by selling their own children!

The discordant powers of the civil servants in the different departments increased the evils already enumerated. Such was the extent of those evils, that the ablest persons at one time despaired of retrieving your affairs in that quarter; nor was it held practicable to maintain the southern army in the field, dispirited by defeat and destitute of resources*.

* No circumstance could tend more clearly to evince the meritorious efforts of Lord Macartney, than his having been able to retrieve the southern provinces from the wretched condition to which he found them reduced on his accession to the Government.

Some

Some preceding incidents, however, proved the inefficiency of that defensive system under which the Carnatic war had been conducted, indicated offensive operation as the only means of future prosperity, and confirmed the merit of those endeavours made by your Lordship and the Board to attack the enemy in his own possessions *. On this principle Colonel Humberstone had acted on the Malabar coast. He obliged Tippoo Saib to march across the peninsula, and to retire with loss from the engagement in November 1782 at Pa-

* Lord Macartney's system of promoting offensive operations against Tippoo Sultaun does him peculiar honour; not only on account of the judgment that suggested these ideas, and the vigour with which they were carried into execution in moments of great difficulty, and against the opinions of powerful opponents, but also from the eminent success with which they were attended. Besides directing the southern army to penetrate into the richest possessions of Tippoo Sultaun, his Lordship reinforced the Malabar army under Colonels Macleod and Humberstone, and formed a considerable force in the Northern Circars, under General Jones; thus distracting the enemy's attention, and enabling the English arms to regain their ascendancy.

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niani *. The subsequent success of General Matthews against Mangalore, Beddalore, and the principal forts of the adjacent countries, still farther evinced the wisdom of Mr. Sullivan's opinions, and of Colonel Humberstone's operations. Tippoo was forced to march from Arcot to Beddalore; his father's death in December 1782 having made him cross the peninsula from Paniani to Arcot. This event relieved the Carnatic, and was the first circumstance during the war that gave a turn to our affairs. For the movements and countermovements of the Carnatic army, and even the repeated defeats sustained by Hyder, had proved of little ultimate avail in the decision of the contest.

* It is impossible for me to do justice to Colonel Humberstone as a man and as an officer. A narrative of the services he performed in command of the forces on the Malabar coast, would afford convincing proof of his distinguished military talents, and add to the regret which his untimely loss occasioned in the minds of all who knew his merits and his character.

At

At this crisis it was fortunate for the English interests, that your Lordship and the Board resolved to direct the southern troops to make every effort against the enemy. The first object of my command was to augment our field force, by battalions from Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Tinivelly. The zealous support of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin speedily enabled me to equip the army, and to prosecute offensive operations; which your Lordship and the Board judged to be essential to the re-establishment of the public welfare.

The high sense I entertained of the treaty formed by Mr. Sullivan under your Government, for the restoration of the ancient Gentoo family of Mysore, formerly deposed, and still confined by Hyder, was only equalled by my attachment to the system of conciliating all classes of the natives. This was no less congenial with the general tenor of your conduct, than
with

with the spirit of Mr. Sullivan's negotiations, and was requisite to give effect to his enlightened views. In support of these ideas, the abilities as well as influence of the Bramins rendered it essential to treat them with particular indulgence; and by similar attentions the numerous Polygars of Dindigul were reconciled to our interests, as has been fully evinced by the supplies derived from those possessions while under our Government.

The dependents of his highness the Nabob * felt themselves extremely humbled by the assignment of his territory to the Company. For however eligible and indispensable this measure might appear on principles of public necessity, it could not fail to deprive his adherents of their power and situation. As far as depended

* As the dependents of the Nabob are in general Mahometans, this observation does not apply to the Gentoos, who form the great body of inhabitants in the Nabob's country.

upon

upon me I endeavoured to convince them all, that their wants should be relieved, their rights protected, and their consequence maintained. They were pleased to credit my declarations, and by these means we restrained the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants and native soldiery, many of whom are warmly attached to the Nabob, and were ready to burst forth in the most alarming disorders. The same principle formed the rule of my conduct towards the Rajah of Tanjore and the other chiefs whose countries fell within the limits of my command—conscious, that all our measures respecting the native Princes and their subjects, should be directed by liberal concession and unbiaſſed justice.

My next endeavour was, in conjunction with Mr. Sullivan, to unite all descriptions of men in cordial exertions to retrieve the public interests, and to enure the troops to discipline and enterprise; without which
they

they neither could be subsisted, nor could we hope for any reputable termination of our ill-fated contest. That these attempts have not proved entirely unproductive of important public benefits, has been repeatedly testified by your Board in terms most flattering to myself.

By the 25th of May, the army marched from Dindigul towards Daraporam, which fell to us on the 2d of June *. That valuable place affords ample supplies of grain
and

* The particulars of the attack and surrender of this place are expressed in my Letter of the 2d of June, addressed to the Governor and Select Committee. One circumstance deserves to be mentioned, in order to prove the ingenuity of intelligencers in India. When the army encamped before Daraporam, it was not practicable to approach so near the fort as to determine with precision the most advantageous point of attack; but a Braman Harcarrah explained every particular respecting the position of the works, and the nature of the ground adjoining to the place, in such terms as enabled me to draw a plan from his description. The Adjutant General Captain Oram did the same, from the accounts of another intelligencer. On comparing the two plans, thus drawn from verbal information,

and cattle, is capable of considerable defence, and is far advanced in the enemy's country, being equally distant from the two coasts. Although the position of an army there would always be of eminent advantage, it was more peculiarly so when we reduced it, because Tippoo Sultaun had recovered Beddanore, captured General Matthews, and invested Mangalore. The southern army was not in sufficient strength to think of marching to Seringapatam*, and was so far from being able to oppose the whole power of Tippoo Sultaun, that we could not even afford to garrison Darapuram, and were obliged to destroy the fortification. Yet we might assuredly have reduced the rich tract that lies below the

ation, we found such topographical resemblance that we marched a body of troops in a dark night, crossed a river, and occupied a strong position within 400 yards of the fort, from whence we erected our batteries and effected a breach.

* The capital of Mysore.

mountains of Myfore *, which would probably have forced Tippoo Sultaun to raise the siege of Mangalore, and march his main body against us; or if Tippoo had persisted against Mangalore, we should have amply subsisted the army, have reduced a valuable territory, and prepared for more important conquests.

General Stuart's order on the 31st of May, to march towards him at Cuddelore with the utmost expedition, obliged me to relinquish those advantages. You were pleased to think favourably of my precautions for the defence of Dindigul, which was garrisoned with the sixth Car-

* Extending from Caroor to Combatour, and from the bottom of the hills to the confines of Madura and Trichinopoly. A country abounding in every kind of production for the support of armies, and which may be considered as a chain of magazines established by Tippoo Sultaun for the invasion of the Southern Provinces, in the same manner as the Burmaul country may be considered as affording him the means of invasion on the east.

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natic battalion, and a body of the Nabob's independents *. Some heavy guns and military stores were likewise thrown into the place, and directions given that grain might be collected, wood prepared, and every effort made to ensure a desperate resistance. The fort of Aravarcourchy † had been destroyed soon after its reduction; and, in obedience to your orders respecting the demolition of Caroor ‡, mines were constructed, and the works blown up. My instructions to the southern commandants respecting the distribution of their troops, and preparations for defence, likewise received your commendation.

* Dindigul is situated in a rich valley of the same name, about fifty miles south-west from Caroor. The town is large, and well fortified; its principal strength consists in a very high and almost inaccessible rock, on which there is a fortress that might be rendered impregnable; but the southern army took the place by storm in May 1783.

† Aravarcourchy was taken by assault in April 1783. About 500 people were killed in the attack.

‡ Caroor is a place of very considerable strength, fifty miles from Trichinopoly, on the frontiers of the Mysore dominions; was reduced by the southern army in April 1783, after several weeks of open trenches, and contained great quantities of provisions, stores, and ammunition.

On our arrival at Tritchinopoly in June, the troops were supplied with grain, the gun-carriages repaired, cattle collected for the army at Cuddelore, and boats provided for crossing the Cavery and Coleroon, which, with two intermediate streams, were then unfordable. At Munfurpet on the northern bank of the Coleroon, I received farther instructions from General Stuart to march without delay to Cuddelore. The injunctions of your Board no less pointedly directed me to recross the river, and continue to the southward. But you had been pleased to invest me with a discretionary latitude of acting as exigencies might require; and intelligence had reached me that Suffrein's squadron had anchored at Cuddelore, that a disembarkation of many thousand men was intended, and that the English army was harassed with the duty of the trenches. It appeared therefore to be most congenial with the general tenor of your intentions, that we should march to-
wards

wards General Stuart, being conscious that the public safety could have no existence if his army were defeated. Colonel Forbes, who remained in command of the southern provinces, inspired every one around him with a full reliance on his zeal and military talents; and I shall ever gratefully acknowledge, that on the first communication of those proceedings, you were pleased to honour me with your approbation.

Upon our arrival within three forced marches of General Stuart's camp, a cessation of hostility with the French was announced, and we returned towards the southward *. The same dispatches intimated General Stuart's suspension, and that General Bruce commanded the Carnatic army. I wrote to General Bruce, offering to make an unexpected movement against the fort of Salem, which secures the most important pass from the Carnatic into Mysore, and con-

* July 1783.

tained many months provisions for an army; adding, that nothing would be requisite on the part of General Bruce, but to send a force sufficient to garrison the place, until he could move thither with the troops from Cuddelore. The General finding it necessary to reject this proposal, we left him to struggle with his difficulties, and proceeded to Munfurpet.

My intention was to move next day by Tarriore to reinstate your tributary the Rheddey in his paternal inheritance, and to advance against the forts and magazines of Settimungulum, Namkul, and Sankerrydurgum, on the north of the Coleroon; from thence to cross the river and besiege Erode, with a view of establishing a strong garrison at that place, and in order to prepare supplies for moving, when sufficiently reinforced, against Seringapatam. But our expectations were disappointed by your intimations of an armistice with Tippoo Sultaun.

During

During the course of these proceedings, it was found impracticable to carry into execution the salutary measures intended by your Board, for the re-establishment of public authority in your southern provinces, which unavoidably remained in their former confusion. The Polygars, Colleries, and other tributaries, ever since the commencement of the war, had thrown off all appearance of allegiance. No civil arrangement could be attempted without a military force, and nothing less than the whole army seemed adequate to their reduction. While such a considerable portion of the southern provinces remained in defiance of the Company's government, it was vain to think of supporting the current charges of the establishment; far less could we hope to reduce the arrears, and to prepare for important operations, in the probable event of a recommencement of hostility. It became indispensable therefore, to restore the tranquillity of those provinces by vigorous

military measures, as the only means that could render them productive of revenue; and in this view your wise arrangements for augmenting the southern force, proved not less beneficial, than in their influence on the operations against the enemy.

You had been pleased to reinforce us with 500 Europeans and two battalions of Sepoys under Colonel Stuart, immediately after the siege of Cuddelore; another detachment of equal strength marched towards us under Colonel Elphinston. It was my intention to have joined those corps at Dindigul, in order to act against Tippoo, in case he should not accede to the terms proposed; but finding that the detachment could not reach Dindigul for many weeks, it appeared eligible to employ the intermediate space in fulfilling the objects already stated. In concurrence therefore with the requisitions of Mr. Sullivan,

Sullivan *, we proceeded to Mellore, in order to awe the rebellious Colleries of that district. We left a strong body encamped there, and marched with the remaining troops on the 4th of August to Shevigunga, about twenty miles east from thence. The two Murdeens, who rule the Little Marawa, fled precipitately with their young Rajah to the woods of Calicoil, and collected their force to the amount of 10,000 men: nor could they be prevailed on to return to their habitations, and trust to my assurances.

Besides the immediate discharge of their arrears of tribute, I demanded from their deputies 90,000 rupees, in compensation to the Company for the ravages they had committed, and concluded with declaring, that if these conditions were not fulfilled, we should attack their woods, storm their

* Resident of Tanjore, and Superintendant of assigned revenues of Trichinopoly and the Marawas.

fort, and drive them from the country. Notwithstanding the procrastinating spirit of Gentoos, they paid near 40,000 rupees, and gave security for their remaining debt.

The lenity and dispatch of this transaction (for it was concluded in four days) afforded a cordial satisfaction when contrasted with the circumstances of the expedition in 1773, against this very place. On that occasion the Rajah, trusting to the woods and barriers that surround the fort of Calicoil, and expecting to conclude the business by negotiation, conceived himself in security when the place was surprised, and he was killed on the attack. I rejoiced to mitigate the rigorous treatment which the delinquency of the successor, or rather of his ministers, merited, in consideration of the severities which the predecessor had experienced.

There next remained a more important undertaking. The numerous Polygars of
Tini-

Tinivelly, who had rebelled on the commencement of the war, committed daily ravages from Madura to Cape Comorin. They subdued forts, and occupied districts, belonging to the Circar*, or held by a tenure different from their own. Mr. Irwin, superintendant of Madura and Tinivelly, had repeatedly urged me to proceed against the Polygars, in order to restore tranquillity and recover the revenues. It was now for the first time in my power to direct my operations towards that quarter, at a moment when the most powerful of the Polygars in confederacy against your Government, and in alliance with the Dutch, had assembled 12 or 14,000 men, and were actually besieging the fort of Chocumpetty, a Polygar place of some strength, below the hills that form the north-west boundary of the province.

* Circar means the ruling power of the country, and the detail of its revenue.

When

When it was determined that we should march into Tinivelly, during the interval requisite for Colonels Stuart and Elphinston's detachments to reach Dindigul, my object was to strike an unexpected blow, and to intimidate the Polygars into submission. Of all the Tinivelly chiefs, the principal in power and delinquency, excepting Shevigherry, was Catabominaigue: he was personally engaged at the siege of Chocumpetty, from whence his fort of Pandalamcourchy, on the south-east quarter of Tinivelly, is distant more than seventy miles. The usual route to Tinivelly passes by Madura; and the Polygars, hearing of our movement towards Shevigunga, expected us in that direction. To favour this opinion, provisions for the army were ordered to be prepared at Madura; my real intention was perfectly concealed; and we moved off with the force from Shevigunga, in the evening of the 8th of August, to Tripechetty, a place twenty miles distant on the

the southern border of the Mellore country. We there joined the remainder of the army, and leaving the seventh battalion and some irregulars under Captain Oliver to restrain the Colleries at Mellore, proceeded next morning by Pallemery, Pandalgoody and Naiglapour, and reached the fort of Pandalamcourchy on the fourth day, being 100 miles from Shevigunga*.

As soon as the line approached the fort, a flag was sent, desiring the headmen to open their gates and hold a conference: they refused. The eighteen-pounders were therefore halted in the rear of an embankment facing the north-east angle of the works; a hasty battery was constructed; and in three hours we were ready to open on the bastion. The works were manned with several thousand people, and every circumstance denoted an intention of resist-

* Fahrenheit's thermometer was frequently above 110 degrees during these marches,

ance. It was material to storm without delay, in order to strike terror by dispatch, and also lest Catabominaigue with his confederate chiefs might hasten to obstruct our operations. We opened on the bastion; but finding ourselves retarded by its thickness, we resolved to breach the adjoining curtain, and to render the defences of the bastion untenable by the besieged. They kept up a constant and well-directed fire, and notwithstanding our utmost efforts, it was dark before a practicable breach was effected. The attack was therefore deferred until the moon should rise. The storming party consisted of two companies of Europeans, supported by the thirteenth and twenty-fourth Carnatic battalions, and continued in the rear of the battery: the cavalry, the first, and light infantry battalions, were posted at right angles with the other three salient angles of the fort, with detachments fronting each gateway, in order to prevent the besieged from receiving supplies, or making

making their escape, while the other troops remained to defend the camp, which was within random-shot.

Our next object was to remove a strong hedge fronting the breach and furrounding the whole fort, as is the practice in the Polygar system of defence. This dangerous service was effected with unusual skill, by Ensign Cunningham, commanding the pioneers; and about ten at night, with the advantage of bright moon-shine, the storm commenced. Our troops, after they gained the summit of the breach, found no sufficient space to lodge themselves; and the interior wall having no slope or talus, they could not push forward from the summit as they advanced. The defenders were numerous, and opposed us so vigorously with pikes and musquetry, that we were obliged at last to retire and reach the battery, with considerable slaughter on both sides. Immediate measures were taken to renew the charge;

charge; but the Polygars, dispirited with their loss, abandoned the place, and sallied forth at the eastern gate.

The corps posted round the works were so exhausted by the preceding marches, that many of the fugitives effected their escape: the rest were taken prisoners. The breach was covered with dead bodies, and the place contained a large assortment of guns, powder, shot, arms, and other military stores, which were of course applied to the public service: 40,000 pagodas were also found, and immediately distributed to the troops. Your Board were pleased to confirm the distribution, on the footing of prize-money; than which no measure could more effectually tend to animate the army in our after-operations. Some other facts respecting these transactions, and the treaty between the Dutch Government of Colombo and Catabominaigue (of which the original was taken in his fort), were referred to

to in my letters of the 13th of August, addressed to your Lordship and the Board *.

Having left Captain Jacobs with five companies of the 25th battalion to garrison the place, I proceeded to Palamcottah, in order to inspect the state of that fort; and from thence moved with the army by Shankanakoil to Shevigerry. It was hoped that the reduction of that strong-hold belonging to the most powerful of all the Polygars, in addition to the fall of Pandalamcourchy, would intimidate the less considerable offenders, and convince the whole confederacy that their treatment would be proportioned to their misconduct. Besides, the outrages committed by the Shevigerry Chief were atrocious, and could not be forgiven without a total surrender of your authority. He had barbarously murdered Captain Graham Campbell, and cut off a detachment

* See the letter of the 13th of August, inserted in the Appendix.

under command of that officer. On former occasions, he had beat off considerable detachments, and avowedly protected your enemies who thought themselves secure in the fort of Shevigerry. He had collected magazines sufficient to supply the Dutch force that was expected from Colombo, as well as to resist the most tedious blockade ; for he did not conceive his fort could be stormed, and every circumstance in his conduct marked, that he held himself beyond the reach of military power.

On our arrival before the town of Shevigerry, he retired to the thickets near four miles deep in front of his Comby *, which it covers and defends. He manned the whole extent of a strong embankment, that separates the wood and open country ; was joined by Catabominaigue, with other associated Polygars, and mustered 8 or 9,000 men in arms.

* A strong-hold in the mountains.

In the present instance lenity would have been accounted imbecility; but the approach of Colonels Stuart and Elphinston to Dindigul, and Tippoo Sultaun's refusal of the proposed accommodation, rendered me extremely anxious to finish this Polygar warfare, in order to proceed towards the enemy's frontiers. The Shevigerry chief and his associates were therefore informed, that we meant immediately to attack the place, unless they would convene the Head Polygars of Tinivelly, amounting to thirty-two chiefs, liquidate all arrears, and refund the amount of depredations committed since the commencement of the war, agreeably to authenticated vouchers in the different districts. It was farther intimated, that if they, on the part of the confederacy, would engage to pay 120,000 *l.* in lieu of all demands, their proposal should be forwarded to the superintendant of revenue (Mr. Irwin), and on his acceptance, that the troops

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would

would be withdrawn, and that they would be recommended to forgiveness. They wished to confer with me, but refused to visit me in camp. As their distrust arose from various outrages committed against them by former commanders, instead of increasing their apprehensions by resentment, I proposed to meet them alone and unattended at their own barrier; adding, that if any accident befel me, it would not pass unresented. The Shevigerry chief, Catabominaigue, and the deposed Polygar of Chocumpetty, with a large retinue, met me in front of their embankment. Before they finished their explanations, it was dark, and a musket inadvertently fired in the rear alarmed our advanced picket, who thought it was aimed at me. To prevent the ill consequences of that mistake, I took leave of the Polygars, expressing my wish to hear of their acceding to the terms proposed. We refrained from hostility next day, but finding that they trifled with

our propofals, the line was ordered under arms on the morning following, and we made the diftribution of attack. It proved as desperate as any conteft in that fpecies of Indian warfare; not only from the numbers and obftinacy of the Polygars, but from the peculiar circumftances which had acquired this place the reputation of impregnable.

The attack commenced, by the Europeans and four battalions of Sepoys moving againft the embankment which covers the wood. The Polygars in full force oppofed us, but our troops remained with their firelocks fhouldered under a heavy fire, until they approached the embankment; there they gave a general difcharge and rufhed upon the enemy. By the vigour of this advance we got poffeffion of the fummit, and the Polygars took poft on the verge of the adjoining wood, difputing every ftep with great lofs on both fides.

After reconnoitring, we found that the Comby could not be approached in front. We proceeded therefore to cut a road through impenetrable thickets for three miles, to the base of the hill that bounds the Comby on the west. The pioneers under Ensign Cunningham laboured with indefatigable industry; Captain Gardiner of the 102d supported them with the Europeans, and Captain Blacker with the third and twenty-fourth Carnatic battalions, advanced their field-pieces as fast as the road was cleared. These were strengthened by troops in their rear, forming a communication with those in front; for this purpose two other battalions were posted within the wood, and as soon as we gained the embankment, the camp moved near it, and concentrated our force.

We continued to cut our way under an unabating fire from 8,000 Polygars, who constantly pressed upon our advanced party, rushed

rushed upon the line of attack, piked the bullocks that were dragging the guns, and killed many of our people. But these attempts were repulsed by perseverance, and before sunset we had opened a passage entirely to the mountain; it is extremely high, rocky, and in many places almost perpendicular. Having resolved to attack from this unexpected quarter, the troops undertook the service, and attained the summit. The Polygar parties posted to guard that eminence being routed, after much firing on all hands, we descended on the other side, and flanked the Comby. The enemy seeing us masters of the mountain, retreated under cover of the night, by paths inaccessible to regular troops, and we took possession of the wonderful recess. The particulars respecting ordnance, stores, and provisions, found in the place, are stated in my letter of the third of September*. We left the third and ninth bat-

* See Letter of the third of September, in the Appendix.

talions to secure the magazines, and moved the army to Shevlepatore within four marches of Madura, in order to awe the northern Polygars of Tinivelly.

It was little more than a month since we had left Tritchinopoly. Your authority was re-established throughout the whole track that we had traversed, extending more than 300 miles: and besides the arrangement with the Shevigunga Rajah, we were masters of the two strongest places belonging to the Polygars. We remained some time in expectation of their proposing a general accommodation, but they knew that Tippoo still invested Mangalore, and that we must quickly join the force at Dindigul. This intelligence corroborated their spirit of procrastination. I therefore convened the Vakeels*, whom the chief Polygars had sent to treat with me in camp, and directed them to inform their

* Vakees are deputies, agents, or ambassadors.

respective

respective principals, that we should leave the province on the twenty-first of September; adding, that if they did not return to their allegiance, I should make a vow to Siven, the Gentoo god whose attribute is *vengeance*, to march back and spread destruction throughout every possession of the defaulting Polygars: this declaration alarmed the whole assembly. My letters to Mr. Irwin expressed my regret on leaving the province before any settlement was concluded with the Polygars; and in return he forwarded to me the terms on which he thought it expedient to restore their forts to Catabominaigue and Sheviggerry.

Vakeels from these chiefs waited on me at Trimungulum*, and stipulated, in the name of their masters, that they would pay thirty thousand chuckrums† each, in

* Trimungulum is fifteen miles south-west of Madura.

† A chuckrum is somewhat less than a pagoda.

lieu of all preceding claims. They likewise gave their bonds for fifteen thousand pagodas, or 6,000 *l.* each, in consideration of the restitution of their forts. Obligations were farther exacted, that the defences of Pandalamcourchy should be demolished; that the guns, stores, and ammunition should be removed to Palamcottah; that the road which we cleared to the Comby of Shevigerry should continue open; that the means of defence should be removed from the place, and that the southern commanders, and the Company's troops, should at all times be admitted within their forts and barriers: I concluded with injunctions to observe a more submissive conduct, if they valued their lives, property, or posterity. As soon as the restitution of the forts and prisoners * could possibly take place, the third and ninth battalions

* Among the prisoners there was a daughter of Catambominaigue, who, as well as all the others, amounting to many hundreds, were treated with the utmost attention.

under Captain Mackinnon, were directed to march from Shevigerry, and to join the force at Dindigul, whither the army proceeded by the route of Madura.

Your Lordship and the Board are not unacquainted with the unworthy practices by which the fertile province of Tinivelly has suffered since the disreputable expedition thither under Maphuze Cawn and Colonel Heron. Their defeat by the Nat Colleries near Madura was not more disgraceful, than the principles upon which that and subsequent armaments against the Polygars had been conducted. Though clear statements and specific charges, leaving no retrospect of exaction, together with simplicity of arrangement, and dispatch in execution, are the great barriers against malversation, the opposite of such conduct constantly prevailed; until your Lordship and the Board assumed the management of those territories, nothing was definite—nothing was
con-

concluded; partial payments were received; past claims were left for future settlement; many months were wasted in fitting out an expedition, and still more in performing slight services. During the whole period of protraction, the Renter, the Amuldar, the Phouzdar, and the European commander, were reaping the harvest of corruption, and sowing for an after-growth of speculation. The Polygars are subtle and acute:—they took advantage of so corrupt a system;—and, notwithstanding their internal feuds, they united against a common invader. They administered to the avarice of their opponent by bribes, and to his passion for command by procrastination. Thus the province was impaired,—its cultivation failed,—its manufactures diminished;—every new Collector and Commander entailed new evils, and taught the Polygars to consider their peshcush * not as a just tribute to their

* Peshcush is the sum paid by those who hold of a superior.

sovereign, but as a price to purchase the forbearance of oppressors.

The conduct of Mahomed Iffoof Cawn deserves to be exempted from this general accusation. While he ruled those provinces, his whole administration denoted vigour and effect: his justice was unquestioned,—his word unalterable,—his measures were happily combined, and firmly executed;—the guilty had no refuge from punishment: his maxim was, that the labourer and the manufacturer should be the favourite children of the Circar, because they afford strength and comfort to the public parent; but that the Polygar and the Collery, though equally entitled to truth and justice, have no pretension to indulgence, because they are the worthless prodigals who waste their own means and ravage those of others. “Let them become Zemindars,” said he, “and cultivate their own lands, instead of plundering their industrious neighbours;” then

“ then they shall be cherished : but while
“ their habit is idleness, and their business
“ devastation, I will treat every one as a
“ public enemy, who wields a pike, or
“ wears the turban of a Polygar.” On
comparing the state of that country with
his conduct and remarks, I found that wisdom,
vigour, and integrity were never more
conspicuous in any person of whatever climate
or complexion.

On my arrival at Dindigul, an order of
encampment was transmitted to your Board
in two lines *, containing one European
and three Sepoy brigades, besides four flank
battalions that acted as a fifth brigade. Our
artillery consisted of sixty-five pieces of
cannon with field-ammunition, and 10,000
battering shot; the engineers' department
was stored with besieging tools and other
implements; the pioneer corps was strengthened;
the cavalry, excepting three troops,
were natives and irregulars; they amounted

* See the annexed Plate.

to 1000 men, and served to flank the baggage on the line of march. The Commissary of Stores department, including the conveyance of artillery, required a numerous retinue of draught and carriage cattle: these we had for several months used unremitting efforts to procure; and by the assistance of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Irwin, and Mr. Johnston, in addition to our own exertions, we assembled a greater number of bullocks than ever were attached to any English force in India.

The Agent Victualler was obliged to convey arrack and provisions for 2000 Europeans. But the business of the Grain-keeper was still more embarrassing; where 14,000 fighting men and many thousand public followers * were to be subsisted, without money or other means of supply, except

* The public followers consist of Lascars for the tents, drivers of bullocks, artificers, and doolymen to carry the sick and wounded.

such magazines of the enemy as we were enabled to reduce. It had been the usage of Indian commanders to levy duties on all articles bought or sold in the bazar or market of the army. Under whatever sanction this custom took its rise, it is an odious tax upon the soldier for the benefit of his superior.—I permitted no such practice.

Another material object was the mode and order of marching.—The practice on the coast has been to form the Sepoy corps three deep, and the Europeans two deep, and then to move by files with a strong advance guard, and a still stronger rear guard, in order to cover the carts and other wheeled conveyances that follow the line: the baggage is then disposed of on the right or left flank, according to the nature of the ground over which the army is to pass, and covered by a strong force, to repel the rapid charges of the enemy's cavalry.

It

It is asserted that many benefits attend this mode in India; that if the line is attacked on either flank, it is enabled to form with much celerity by a simple movement of conversion; and that if a charge be made in front or rear, the corps have only to advance, or countermarch and form a front to the attack. But a large army marching by files is many miles in length, consequently there is little communication between distant parts of the line; neither can a Commander observe the whole extent, or know the state of different divisions. If in marching by files, a movement to the front or rear is necessary in line of battle or by corps, much time is lost in the manœuvre, and in the precautions requisite in the face of an enemy. The Carnatic army, adhering to this principle, have frequently been cannonaded many hours before they could form the line for action.

To

To remedy these evils I proposed to form the army into five divisions, and to dispose them in shape of what in another science is called a quincunx. The European brigade being usually placed in the centre of the line, should form the centre division of the quincunx, with a Sepoy brigade in front, another in the rear, and one on each flank: the battering train and baggage to move under cover of the division least likely to be charged; and the brigades to move, not by files, but in columns, and at such distances, that whenever it may be necessary to form the line to the front, flank, or rear, the centre brigade, and that which is to become the right and left wings, may occupy the whole intermediate space. Thus, if the line be attacked in front, the centre brigade and the two flank brigades immediately form a line to the front, and the advance and rear brigades take their stations either as a second line, as a baggage-guard
and

and a reserve, or to extend the main line. If the line be attacked, or if it be meant to attack on the right or left flanks, the centre brigades, with the front and rear brigades, face to the right and left, and form the line, while the two brigades that were the flank divisions on the line of march are posted as circumstances may require. Thus, in every possible point of attack, the line is quickly formed, the baggage protected, and the army prepared for action.

Your instructions of the 18th of August directed me to remain on the frontiers, ready to act offensively, in case of an infraction on the part of Tippoo Sultaun; and for this purpose, the army moved to re-occupy Daraporam. We found that the magazines which we left there in June had been greatly consumed; but there still remained a fortnight's subsistence for the troops.

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From the ultimate object of a movement to the capital of Myfore, we had never deviated. Guns, shot, and stores, had been collected from the southern garrisons, and numerous artificers were employed on our carriages and conveyance. The zeal of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Irwin, and Mr. Hippeley, had forwarded our views; and the Rajah of Travancore had been solicited for an advance of stores, in the event of our moving against the southern possessions of Tippoo Sultaun. This could not fail to coincide with the wishes of the Rajah, which induced him to support Colonel Humberstone on the Malabar coast during the preceding year, and to reinforce his army with several battalions.

A constant correspondence was also carried on with the Zamorin, or ancient sovereign of Calicut, and the other Rajahs on the Malabar side of the peninsula who were disaffected to the Myforean usurpation; and

no

no circumstance was omitted that appeared conducive to the important operation which we had so earnestly in view: but although the army had acquired strength and efficiency, yet we possessed not that fulness of equipment which cannot be accomplished with an empty treasury. Tanjore and Tritchinopoly had not yet recovered from the calamities which they had experienced: the Marawas and Tinivelly were new in their allegiance. Those countries therefore, far from affording sufficient payments for the army, could hardly be supposed competent, under such circumstances, to defray the current charges of their garrisons, although the wise arrangements of your superintendants gave us every reason to expect a rapid increase of revenue.

The gentlemen who zealously supplied us with stores and conveyance, were obliged to employ their personal credit, trusting to the future solvency of Government: the

native troops were twelve months in arrear: our ordnance, though numerous, was of inconvenient calibers: the carriages had suffered by our continued marching: gunney-bags for carrying rice, copper hoops for powder-barrels, cordage for dragging the guns across a country unexplored by armies, and various other articles in the Commissary of Stores' department, were deficient indeed, when compared with the supplies that the Carnatic army daily received from the Presidency. Above all, the want of money rendered it impossible to pay the Head Black men, who had employed bullocks in the service for such a length of time, that their private funds were exhausted, and their faith in the Company impaired.

During former wars there ever had been frequent payments to the troops, which enabled them to procure supplies from the traders and inhabitants, even in the enemy's country. Under these circumstances, the
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conveyance of many days provision was not indispensably required : whereas the want of magazines and money left us no security of subsistence, except the grain we could carry with us, or seize as we advanced : for this purpose statements were procured of the grain deposited within two hundred miles of our front and flank ; and several hundred people were employed on that and other business of intelligence.

It was farther necessary, not only to conceal our own intentions, but to discover those of the enemy ; for want of similar precautions, three English armies had been cut off or taken prisoners in India.

As no one Harcarrah can possibly keep pace with the rapid movements of the Mysore cavalry, confidential intelligencers were established at every considerable town in the Mysore dominions, as well as in the enemy's camp, and in the Durbars of the Ra-

jahs inimical to Tippoo Sultaun. On the first notice of any material incident, these intelligencers dispatched small cadjeans*, which were more rapidly conveyed to me than any horse could travel, by Tappals or relays of Colleries, stationed at moderate distances, and unsuspected by the enemy. Harcarrahs, Peons, Lubby-merchants, and Sepoys, were also constantly traversing all parts of the enemy's country; others, carrying dispatches to Madras and the southern provinces, to Travancore, to Cochin, to the Malabar Rajahs, to General Macleod at Cannanore, to Colonel Campbell at Mangalore, and to the Residency at Telicherry. The intelligence of every individual was carefully registered, and tended to confirm or to refute the various intimations constantly arriving. By these means, during many months of continued marching through a country almost unexplored, we never once

* Cadjeans are thick leaves, resembling the papyrus, on which the Gentoos write.

failed in our supplies, nor did any material incident escape our knowledge.

The discretionary powers with which your Board invested me, rendered it my peculiar duty to consider the mode of warfare most likely to distress the enemy. The system of a war in India, which is to depend on field operations, must ever be exposed to disappointment. In the war of 1767, General J. Smith pursued Hyder's army in a series of rapid marches, in order to bring him to a decisive action; but Hyder, after leading him through the Myfore country in various directions, marched past our army to Madras *, and intimidated the Government into a disreputable treaty.

It was obvious that our circumstances did not admit of war on such conditions: that strong forts must be reduced, territories pos-

* Before this event took place, General J. Smith was called to the Presidency, and the army was commanded by Colonel Fitzgerald.

ferred, their magazines and revenues rendered productive; and that we must proceed, by unexpected strides, to such positions as might preserve a communication with our own provinces, forming at the same time regular stages towards the capital of Mysore. This implied that we were to act on the principles of a besieging army, to make lodgments as we advanced, and still to press forward; to diminish the resources of the enemy, while we increased our own; to oblige him, either to suffer us to proceed unmolested in the prosecution of operations, of which the ultimate object was the overthrow of his government, or else to compel him, in the obstruction of these proceedings, to afford us the wished-for opportunity of a close engagement in the field. Such was the system on which I proposed to act, trusting that the inefficiency of the opposite or field system, as evinced in the conduct of the war of 1767, and in the late Carnatic war, would be held sufficient to induce a
change

change of measures; for an army constituted as Hyder's, with a superabundance of elephants, camels, bullocks, and cavalry, must out-march an army formed of infantry like ours,—unqualified by principle and formation to commit the devastation of a Maratta or Mysorean army. Our field operations are neither alarming to the enemy, nor productive of advantage to our own cause; and our forces, when constituted for field operations only, pass through a country, and leave no vestige of their services.

On the fourth of October I represented our alarming situation, in case Tippoo Sultaun should leave us long in a state of uncertainty; and added, that to remain upon the frontiers, in expectation of events, would be impossible, for we could not hope to procure more than a month's provision within the district: that to fall back upon the Company's southern possessions, would
frustrate

frustrate your intentions, and exhaust the produce of those countries. Besides, so large an army unpaid and unemployed, is ever at the mercy of the first incident that may occasion discontent. These considerations induced me to solicit from your Lordship and the Board, a latitude of purveyance, even in the enemy's country, in case his protractions should endanger the safety of the troops, so critically situated.

On the sixteenth of October the army marched towards Pylny, about thirty miles south of Daraporam, in order to put the renter of Dindigul's family in possession of their inheritance, or petty Rajahship of Pylny. They assured me of grain and cattle at that place; and this was the last resource we had to expect, without advancing into the enemy's country, or falling back on the southern provinces. Most fortunately, while impressed with the approach of these impending difficulties, an
official

official letter from Mess. Frith and Patterson, members of the residency of Telicherry, informed me of a re-commencement of hostility, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, against Mangalore. I consequently held myself bound by your instructions of the eighteenth of August, to take immediate measures to resent the infraction.

On the eighteenth of October it became my duty to inform your Board, of the embarrassments under which we laboured, and to intimate my intention of moving in full force to the westward. The immediate object of this movement was the relief of Mangalore: the ultimate object was, the reduction of Hyder's family, or at least the attainment of a respectable accommodation. Our expectation of relieving Mangalore, by an actual appearance before the place, was exceedingly remote; for we had not less than 500 miles of an enemy's country to traverse. There
appeared

appeared but two practicable movements of sufficient moment to make Tippoo raise the siege of Mangalore: the one was, to move by Coimbatour, Settimungulum, and the pass of Gudjereddy, which leads up the ghauts or mountains on which the kingdom of Myfore is elevated, directly to Myfore fort and Seringapatam: the other was, to move against Palagatcherry.

The design I had formed of moving to Tippoo's capital, with a view of forming a permanent establishment, has been already stated. For this purpose, an intermediate place of strength and resources was required, to serve as a magazine of stores and provisions for the prosecution of our undertakings, or to secure a retreat if necessary. Neither Coimbatour, though the capital of a rich Rajahship, nor Settimungulum, nor Ardenelli, which are the principal forts in the direct road from Daraporam to the city of Seringapatam, were of sufficient strength

strength to justify our trusting any of them as our main deposit. For the unexpected loss of such a magazine, while the army might be several hundred miles advanced in an enemy's country, surrounded by a formidable force, might have subjected us to disasters, of which the English armies, defeated and taken prisoners during the war, were melancholy remembrancers.

Palagatcherry held forth every advantage, being a place of the first strength in India, while its territory afforded a superabundance of provision*. The mountains that bound the pass which it commands, are strengthened by thick forests and surrounding woods; and the intersections of the Paniani river, through deep rice grounds, concurred to enable a small body of infantry to defend

* Palagatcherry was completely rebuilt by Hyder since the war of 1767 with the English, and was furnished with all the advantages of European construction and defence.

the territory against any number of horse. It farther commanded the only practicable communication between the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and promised us possession of all the countries from Tritchinopoly by Daraporam, in a track of more than 200 miles.—It opened the means of supply from Travancore, Cochin, and other places on the Malabar coast.—It afforded confidence to the Zamorin, and other disaffected Rajahs, from Cochin to Goa, who were struggling to shake off the yoke of Hyder.—It left us at liberty to disguise our movements, and to proceed either by the route of Coimbatour and Gudjereddy, or by Calicut on the Malabar sea, and the pass of Damalcherry, to the siege of Seringapatam.—It was besides of such intrinsic consequence to the Myfore Government, that the reduction of it could not fail to weigh essentially in the negotiations for peace then said to be in agitation, and promised to make Tippoo Sultaun

Sultaun raise the siege of Mangalore in order to oppose our further progress.

We advanced from Pylny on the twenty-second of October, reduced the forts of Cumalum, Chuckligerry, and Annamalley, and passed through a rich country, abounding with dry grain*, cattle, wood, and rice fields. At Palatchy the ground attains its highest elevation, and the streams run east and west to the Coromandel and Malabar seas. During our whole march through this part of the country, the flank brigade under Captain Maitland, moved constantly in front, occupied positions, and secured provisions for the army.

From Annamalley our progress became truly laborious, being obliged to force our way through a forest twenty miles in depth, extending thirty miles across the pass of Pa-

* Dry grain is that which grows without flooding the land, cholum, natcheny, cumbo, gram, doll, &c. whereas rice requires at certain seasons to be under water.

lagat. Our object was to reach Colingoody, a post on the western side of the forest, within fifteen miles of Palagatcherry. The frequent ravines required to be filled up before it was possible to drag the guns across them,—innumerable large trees, which obstructed the passage, required to be cut down and drawn out of the intended track, and then the whole road was to be formed, before the carriages could pass. The brigades were distributed to succeed each other at intervals, preceded by pioneers, in order to clear what the advanced body had opened for the guns and stores that were to move under cover of the rear division.

While we were thus engaged, an unremitting rain, extremely unusual at that season, commenced. The ravines were filled with water,—the paths became slippery,—the bullocks lost their footing,—and the troops were obliged to drag the guns and carriages across the whole forest. I
forced

forced on with the advance to Colingoody, in order to make the necessary arrangements with the people of the Zamorin, who had prepared for the future subsistence of the army. The dispositions of the inhabitants towards us, and their means of supply, exceeded our most sanguine expectations. The Zamorin's Vakeel informed the Bra- mins, that we were friends to their cause, and earnest to deliver them from the yoke of Hyder; that we only wished to receive the public proportion of the grain, but none from individuals; and that any person belonging to the camp who should attempt to plunder, would be hanged in front of the lines. On hearing these declarations, they testified the strongest satisfaction; and their confidence increased when they found that the first offenders were executed.—The rains continuing fourteen days without intermission, the passage through the forest became daily more distressful, and the troops were exposed in their whole progress,

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gress, without the possibility of pitching tents, or of procuring for them either cover or convenience.

Colingoody is fifteen miles from Palagatcherry, and the road lies entirely through rice grounds, with intersecting ridges covered with cocoa and other trees. The water and embankments necessary for the cultivation of rice, render it difficult for guns to pass, and impracticable for cavalry to act. As soon as a sufficient force got through the wood, the advanced corps moved to the bank * of the Paniani river, within random shot of the works of Palagatcherry, where we took a secure position, and prepared to invest the place. My Bramin Harcarrahs † had executed a model of the fort in clay, a work at which they are extremely dexterous; and on all hands we had received accounts of it that appeared

* November 2d.

† Harcarrahs are people who give intelligence, show roads, &c.

exaggerated; but a near inspection of its strength impressed me with serious apprehensions that much time might be wasted in its reduction.

On the fourth of November, the main body of the troops, not including the rear division, arrived at our position on the river, which we passed next day, and encamped about two miles east from the fort, across the great road that leads from Combatour. The engineers' stores arrived, and a post for them was established, where all the preparations for a siege were collected. As our next object was, to circumscribe the besieged, and accelerate our approaches, with this view we occupied the pettah, or open town, on the east and north faces of the fort: and on each of these faces carried forward an attack. During the whole period of our approaches, and in the construction of our trenches, parallels, and batteries, the besieged kept a continued fire on our covering and

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working

working parties. The battering train and stores, however, under cover of the fourth brigade, reached our encampment on the ninth, after a succession of toil that would appear incredible if recited in detail.

Apprehending much delay from the strength of the works, and the obstinacy of the defenders, especially if they should force us to approach by sap to the crest of the glacis, and to proceed from thence by regular gradations across the ditch, we resolved at a seasonable opportunity to attempt the gateway. We found it so strongly flanked and fortified, that it appeared almost secure from any attack; however, having no draw-bridge, we founded our hopes of accelerating the siege on this circumstance. We did not therefore permit any heavy metal whatever to be fired till the thirteenth, when we opened with twelve guns and four howitzers from two batteries at 400 yards distance from the east and north faces of the fort,
and

and before sunset the defences were so much damaged, that the fire of the besieged considerably abated.

The particulars of our attack, and the surrender of the place during the night, which are explained at full length in my letter of the fifteenth of November, were not more fortunate than unexpected. We found the fort covered by a respectable glacis, with a good covert-way; a very broad and deep ditch, completely reveted; a large berme, and a very strong commanding rampart. The figure of the fort was nearly quadrangular: the dimensions of its faces were 528 feet by 432: each angle was defended by a capacious round bastion with nine embrasures, and a bastion of a similar construction on the centre of each curtain. It had only one entrance, passing through three gateways, mounted a great number of guns upon the works, and contained a garrison of 4000 men.

On the night of the thirteenth, Captain Maitland, with a part of the four flank battalions, took the advantage of a heavy rain to drive the besieged from the covert-way. Being so fortunate as to succeed, he pursued them within the first and as far as the second gateway, where he was stopped, but maintained his ground with great spirit and ability until a reinforcement arrived. This mode of attack so much alarmed the enemy, that they called out for quarter, and put us in possession of a fort capable of making a long and desperate resistance. We found 50,000 pagodas in the place, besides a very large supply of grain, guns, powder, shot, and military stores.

In my letters to your Lordship and the Board on this subject, it appeared necessary for me to be minute in a description of the place, because its consequence and local situation were not accurately known to Europeans. This fortress com-

mands a fertile and extensive district, the adjacent forests abound with the finest Teek timber* in India, and the river Pani-ani is at hand to float it to the Malabar sea. Palagatcherry, from its position, equally menaces the possessions of Tippoo on the western coast and towards Mysore by the route of Combatour and Gudjereddy; while the movements of the southern army, almost without money or subsistence, except what we procured on our march, afford sufficient proof, that magazines of grain established there would enable armies to penetrate with confidence and security from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar, and thus bring the military resources of Madras and Bombay into one point of union and effect.

On the surrender of Palagatcherry, the place was garrisoned by the nineteenth

* Teek timber is equal, if not superior, to Oak for the purposes of shipbuilding. There is likewise a great quantity of Sandal-wood in the neighbourhood.

battalion, with a few Europeans and some irregulars under Captain Dewar, one of your ablest officers. The heir apparent of the Zamorin left his retirement in the woods, and remained with me during the siege. In answer to his urgent solicitations, that we should restore him to the dominions of which Hyder had deprived his family, I declared, that in the event of our moving by Calicut, we might hope to effect his re-establishment there; and that in the mean while he should be reinstated in the territory of Palagat, an ancient dependency of the Zamorins,—requiring only from him, that he should furnish grain for the army while in that vicinity, without any other obligation, until the conclusion of the war, or until your Government should make some regular agreement with him.

To establish more fully the Zamorin's authority, and to afford him the necessary support in his present situation, a
large

large body of Bramin Harcarrahs, who had constantly remained with me in camp, were employed, and proved not only of great service in the business of intelligence, but of material influence in conciliating the Gentoos. Accompanied by them, we frequently rode through the adjacent villages, assembled the head people, and assured them of protection. During these proceedings I maintained a correspondence with Brigadier General Macleod, Colonel Campbell, and the Residency of Telicherry, intimating my intention of approaching their coast, and assuring General Macleod of my earnest wish to co-operate with him in every measure that could tend to advance us in full force against Seringapatam. Having heard that there was abundance of battering guns and military stores at Telicherry, I wrote for such supplies as could be spared, offering to move down to Paniani or Calicut, and to proceed to Seringapatam, either by the pass of Damalcherry, through the country of
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our friends the Nyars, or else to return from Paniani or Calicut to Palagatcherry, and from thence by Coimbatour, as he might judge most eligible.

The Admiral Sir Edward Hughes being then at Telicherry with the squadron, I entreated him to send a vessel with stores to Paniani, and, in order to guard against disappointment, dispatched messengers to Cochin, to secure an ample supply at that place. General Macleod with his distinguished liberality of character assured me, that in the event of my moving towards him, he would unite in prosecuting the movement to Seringapatam, without taking any advantage of his seniority, and without interfering in the command of the southern army. Finding, however, that his army could not be put in motion in less than two months, for want of bullocks and conveyance; that no substantial stock of military stores could be expected at Telicherry; and

and that we should meet with extreme obstruction in our progress through the deep and intersected routes leading from Palagatcherry to Calicut; we resolved to rely on Cochin for supplies, and to prosecute our measures by Coimbatour, still preserving the utmost union of operation with the Malabar army.

We arrived before Coimbatour on the twenty-sixth of November, having been annoyed with rockets on the march, by a very large body of horse. Finding that there was no glacis, we proceeded immediately to erect a battery, but before we had effected a breach, the Killidar* surrendered; and on this occasion we treated him and his garrison with the utmost kindness, as we had before done those of Daraporam and Palagatcherry. A great quantity of ammunition, stores, and grain, were found in the fort; and the adjacent grounds were co-

* Commander of the Fort.

vered

vered with abundant crops. The possession of this town, being the capital of the greatest ancient Rajahship in the country, promised eminent advantage ; for although not remarkable on account of its military strength, it is held in higher estimation than any other place belonging to the Mysooreans in the Payen Ghaut, or country below the mountains.

We now arrive at the most interesting moment of the war. The garrison of Mangalore, under its inestimable commander Colonel Campbell, had made a defence that has been seldom equalled and never surpassed. With a handful of men, worn out by fatigue and famine, he resisted for many months a formidable army under Tippoo Sultaun. The whole power of that prince, assisted by the science of his French auxiliaries, could not force a breach that had long lain open, and he was repulsed in every attempt to carry it by storm.

Tippoo's

Tippoo's army, particularly the cavalry, had suffered greatly by a perseverance in the siege during the whole period of the rainy season. The interior affairs of his dominions, being unsettled since his recent accession, were in extreme confusion. His failure against Mangalore had encouraged the Corga Rajah, a powerful Chief under the mountains that separate the Malabar country from Myfore, to assert independency by arms; while every other ancient Rajah on the Malabar side of India, from Goa to Cochin, was eager to repel the tyranny of the Myfore Government, to which the whole of that extensive coast no longer owned subjection.

General Macleod at the head of the Malabar forces, strong in Europeans, artillery, and native corps, supported these Rajahs, and laboured with his usual energy to complete the system that he had materially promoted. There was likewise a force acting

acting under General Jones, against the Cudapah country, or northern possessions of Tippoo Sultaun, where his power was ill established; and the army under my direction was perhaps the strongest force belonging to Europeans that had ever been employed in India. The countries we had reduced extended 200 miles in length, from the district of Trichinopoly on the east, to Ramgarry, thirty miles west of Palagatcherry, afforded provisions for 100,000 men, and yielded an annual revenue of 600,000*l.*, while every necessary arrangement had been made for the regular collection of these resources.

The fort and pass of Palagatcherry secured our western flank, and the intermediate position of General Macleod's army between that place and Tippoo's main army at Mangalore, together with the singular combination of ravines, rivers, and embankments, that intersect the Malabar countries,

tries, and the mountains that divide them from Myfore, through which the passes were occupied by our friends the disaffected Rajahs, rendered it almost impracticable for Tippoo to move in that direction against our new acquisitions. To attack them by a movement through the passes of the Ghauts, on the eastern flank towards Salem and Erode, supposed a circuit of five or six hundred miles from the position of Tippoo's army before Mangalore. His movements therefore against these acquisitions could only be attempted by the central pass from Myfore at Gudjereddy, which is not fifty miles in front from Coimbatour: and the possession of that pass assured us an immediate access to the capital of Tippoo's kingdom, commanding a communication with our new acquisitions, and with the Company's southern provinces. Besides, as far as the system of defending front flanks and rear can ever be extended from the position of an army to the topographical

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cal circumstances of a country, it would enable us to secure those territories from any considerable irruptions. At this period too, the chumba or great crop throughout the country was upon the ground, and, independently of the magazines in our front, promised ample provision.

The Corga Rajah had repeatedly promised us supplies from his country, extending within thirty miles of Seringapatam. These promises were confirmed by the Zamorin, who had abundantly furnished us with grain at Palagatcherry. This Prince likewise engaged for the assistance of all the Malabar Chiefs, commanding the ghauts or mountains that bound Myfore upon the west; and convinced us that they were not only willing to provide for us during the siege, but to form magazines in strong positions among the mountains, and to join us with 20 or 30,000 Nyars, if required.

Mahomed

Mahomed Ally, and other distinguished leaders, had been executed in the camp of Tippoo, for exciting disaffection. A recent conspiracy had occurred in Seringapatam, menacing the releasement of the English prisoners, the exclusion of Tippoo's family, and the re-establishment of the ancient Rana, or Gentoo sovereign of Mysore. In addition to this enumeration of advantages, we had every reason to rely on the Gentoo or Canara race forming the great mass of inhabitants in Mysore, who had unequivocal proofs of my earnest zeal to support their interests and favourite family; while every circumstance of present situation or of future prospect seemed to mark this interesting moment as the crisis of the war.

The troops were immediately provided with ten days grain, the carriages repaired, the departments arranged, and the army prepared to march. My design against the

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forts and magazines of Settimungulum and Ardenelli *, was communicated to your Board; and from thence it was my intention to push forward to the city of Seringapatam with the utmost rapidity that could be united with precaution. Exulting in the bright perspective that lay before us, we felt a painful eagerness for the moment of departure; our expectations, however, of restoring the English name and consequence in India were of short duration.

Your Lordship and the Board had judged it expedient to delegate your powers of negotiation to commissioners, who were to treat of peace at the Durbar of Tippoo Sultan. Invested with full authority by your Board to give what instructions they thought proper to all troops of the English em-

* Settimungulum is situated on the banks of the Caveri, below the pass of Gudjereddy. Ardenelli stands on the top of the ghauts, on the elevated flat or table land of Mysore.

ployed against the Myforeans, they proceeded to the camp of Mudeen ul Deen Cawn, near Arnee in the Carnatic. Between that place and Atcherry Waukum they received intelligence, that in consequence of information from the Residency of Telicherry, intimating to me a renewal of hostility on the part of Tippoo Sultaun against Mangalore, the army under my command had moved into the enemy's country, and had reduced Palagatcherry. After many compliments to my own conduct and exertions, they directed me forthwith to restore all posts, forts, and countries lately reduced, and to retire within the limits possessed by the English on the twenty-sixth of the preceding July. This letter reached me on the twenty-eighth of November, two days before my intended march towards Gudjereddy and Seringapatam. Neither feeling myself at liberty to disregard an order so peremptorily conveyed, nor to fulfil the utmost extent of its literal signification,

I stated to them the benefits of our position, and the menacing appearance on the Malabar coast; transmitting at the same time similar communications to your Board, and intimating my intention of remaining at Coimbatour until I should be farther instructed. My Aid de Camp, Captain Moody, with the same view, proceeded to Madras; and was fully qualified by knowledge and ability to explain our situation, and to prove that a movement to Seringapatam would endanger the throne of Hyder.

During the succeeding interval, every moment was employed in adding to the fulness of our equipment. Rochin Cawn, the commander of Tippoo's army in the country of Coimbatour, was informed, that we would observe the cessation till further orders *. Captain Maitland, with the flank

* Habits of intercourse took place between Rochin Cawn's camp and ours, of which there had been no example between contending armies in India.

brigade,

brigade, proceeded to Dindigul and Tanjore, in order to bring supplies of stores from the southern garrisons. Mr. Digby, Paymaster in camp, whose zeal and public talents have on all occasions been conspicuous, went to procure money at Tinivelly, and to concert with Mr. Irwin, Superintendant there, a permanent mode of remittance and supply: and as soon as this reinforcement should be ready to move towards us, it was my intention to fall back and cover the junction. In the mean time the third brigade was detached by Palagatcherry to Cochin, where the Governor had prepared for us a considerable stock of arrack, stores, and ammunition; while the main body of the army remained at Coimbatour, ready to oppose the enemy. But these and all similar arrangements were rendered abortive by your minutes of consultation dated the fifth of December, directing me to fulfil the order of unqualified restitution enjoined by your Deputies, as the preliminaries of negotiation

with Tippoo Sultaun. These papers reached me about the middle of December, and a few days afterwards I received from the Commissioners another letter, repeating their instructions.

We had entirely consumed the grain in Coimbatour, and all that was ripe in the adjacent fields. We were not at liberty to move in our intended course, nor to look for new supplies, which would have been considered as an infraction of the cessation; it therefore became necessary to return to Palagatcherry, where the troops received grain to subsist them as far as Trichinopoly and Madura, a distance of two hundred miles. On the twenty-eighth of December, the army advanced towards the southern countries; and at the same time three battalions under Captain Wheeler were detached to escort the stores from Cochin, with directions to evacuate Palagatcherry, and to join us by the route of Annamalley and Pylny, close to the

the mountains. On our second march we were visited by the Rev. Mr. Swartz, whom your Lordship and the Board requested to proceed to Seringapatam as a faithful interpreter between Tippoo and the Commissioners. The knowledge and integrity of this irreproachable Missionary have retrieved the character of Europeans from imputations of general depravity. A respectable escort attended him to the nearest encampment of the enemy; but he was stopped at Settimungulum, and returned to Tanjore. I rejoice, however, that he undertook the business; for his journal which has been before your Board evinces, that the southern army acted towards our enemies with a mildness seldom experienced by friends in moments of pacification. From him also you learned, that this conduct operated on the minds of the inhabitants, who declared that we afforded them more secure protection than the commanders of their own troops.

The army had now been fed for many months entirely at the expence of the enemy; and directions were given, that all grain found in the country should be served out to the troops in lieu of batta*, thereby saving to the Company an advance of nearly 500*l.* per day for the whole time the army was so subsisted, and leaving the troops to make their after-claims, in case they should expect to receive that grain on the footing of capture †.

On the fourth of January 1784, the army arrived at Ayryacotta. Colonel Stu-

* Batta is the extra sum allowed to troops over and above their pay, in lieu of subsistence while in the field.

† Some other armies had charged the Company with the batta due to every soldier in the field, notwithstanding that a sufficiency of grain had been seized for the maintenance of the troops. Thus the amount of the grain found was diverted from public saving to the benefit of individuals. If I had permitted this practice, the difference to the Company would have been a loss of 200,000*l.*—It may be proper to observe, that what is here stated, only refers to armies which acted in the enemy's country, and consequently can have no allusion to the Carnatic army.

art with the main division proceeded to Caroor, on the borders of the Trichinopoly country; Colonel Forbes, with a strong force, remained in the districts of Darapuram and Dindigul; while Colonel Kelly, with another division, advanced to Cavanore on the borders of Madura and the Marawas. This distribution was intended to relieve your provinces from the burden of subsisting too large a proportion of troops. At the same time the divisions were so stationed, as to overawe every district to the southward, and to form the army on the shortest notice, in the event of a renewal of the war against Tippoo Sultaun.

Having proceeded with the Cavanore division, as the most central situation, to the southward, these arrangements were hardly finished * when I received your orders to reassemble the army, and to pre-

* On the twenty-fourth of January 1784.

pare for a recommencement of hostility. You likewise directed me to retain possession of Palagatcherry, in case by any accident it should have been restored. I instantly issued orders to all the garrisons and stations to augment our equipment; wrote to Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Hippisley, and the other Gentlemen in the civil departments, intreating them to procure bullocks, gunney bags, and money for the pressing exigencies of the army: and farther made a circuit of the southern countries to accelerate these preparations. From Ramnad I went to Tinivelly to forward the business of money and conveyance, collecting for us there by Mr. Irwin; and from thence wrote to the Zamorin, exhorting him to retain Palagatcherry, which he had occupied after it was abandoned by Captain Wheeler. Captain Agnew was soon afterwards dispatched with a party of Sepoys, to solicit four battalions from the Rajah of Travancore, who very graciously complied with
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my request; and by means of that assistance, Captain Agnew would no doubt have enabled the Zamorin to maintain the place, had not the Zamorin * and his adherents, despairing of support, abandoned the fort, and retired to their recesses in the mountains.

On the north-east border of the Tinivelly country, a letter reached me from the Commissioners, dated the eleventh of February near Mangalore, and written in terms which not only marked the enmity of Tippoo, but convinced me that a rupture was unavoidable; and this opinion was afterwards confirmed by a detail of particulars, in a letter from General Macleod. No time was therefore to be lost in ordering the stores to join Colonel Stuart's division near

* The Zamorin and his followers of the Nyar cast are rigid Gentoos, and venerate the Bramins. Tippoo's soldiers, therefore, daily exposed the heads of many Bramins in sight of the fort. It is asserted that the Zamorin, rather than witness such enormities, chose to abandon Palagatcherry.

Caroor, and we marched the same night to Madura.

On my arrival at Covanore *, I found that fanams †, amounting to a lack of pagodas, had reached the camp from Tanjore. The impatience of the troops for this supply was proportioned to the severity of their distress; excepting the prize-money at Palagatcherry, and the working money to the parties employed on extra labour, no sums had been issued to the army during our whole progress, in crossing and recrossing India. Unfortunately the coin in which this payment was received, became a more copious source of discontent, than all the hardships they had endured. The star pagoda ‡ is understood to be the only legal tender of your Presidency: it

* Colonel Kelly's division was stationed there: it is on the confines of the Marawa country, less than twenty miles from Madura.

† Fanams are a small coin of different value, composed of silver and copper.

‡ The star pagoda is worth eight shillings.

is not coined to the southward, but its place had usually been supplied by the Porto Novo pagoda, which is less valuable by ten per cent. The Rajah of Tanjore has not exercised the right of coining pagodas, and of late has paid his tribute * in fanams. The Dutch coinage at Negapatam formerly amounted to four or five lacks of pagodas annually, but this has been discontinued since we got possession of that city. As there is no gold coinage in any other place to the southward, nor any regular circulation of rupees, the whole currency of those provinces, exceeding the pagodas that happen to be in use, consists of fanams; of these every district coins a different sort, and no comparative rate having ever been established between the star pagodas and those inferior coins, their value fluctuates according to the

* The tribute amounts to four lacks of pagodas, or 160,000 l.

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relative demand, and the coinage of one province is seldom or never at par in another.

Whenever it is known that a large issuing of fanams is at hand, the Shroffs, Soucars, and Dubashes *, purchase all the pagodas they can procure. Thus the fanams are kept at a high price, till the disbursement has taken place, and the rate is fixed at the current exchange for the day. But no sooner has this fluctuating coin been circulated, than the pagodas come forth, and in forty-eight hours the holders of fanams suffer a depreciation of six, eight, or ten per cent. Still more oppressive is this medium of public payment, when the fanams are issued in a province to which they do not properly belong: for the Tanjore fanam has no regular currency in any

* Shroffs, Soucars, and Dubashes, are money changers, bankers, and black agents of the Europeans.

other province. And this applies to all coins of that description, fabricated in Tritchinopoly, Madura, Tinivelly, Ramnad, and Shevigunga.

The commercial evils from this debasement and diversity of coin are not less considerable. A merchant cannot make a remittance to any place north of the Coleroon, without much trouble and expence in purchasing pagodas, or else by an unreasonable premium to Soucars. The money remitted to the army from Tanjore was issued in Tanjore fanams, at the rate of twenty-two and an half per star pagoda: but when the Sepoys received this money in distant encampments, they found that twenty-four or twenty-five fanams were required for a pagoda there; nor could they in many instances, without enormous loss, procure the necessaries of life for those uncurrent fanams.

To prevent as much as possible the troops from suffering by a loss upon exchange, which in common justice should fall upon the public, it was proposed to Mr. Sullivan, and immediately acceded to by him, that the paymaster should carry the difference to the account of the Company. It was therefore directed, that the officers commanding divisions of the army, should form a Board to ascertain the loss sustained by each battalion, and Mr. Digby, paymaster in camp, was instructed to give credit to the corps for the amount of loss incurred, agreeably to the general statement transmitted to me by the abovementioned Board.

It appeared requisite to be minute in this recapitulation, in order to impress the necessity of reform in the southern payments. This will be effected, by ordering a large coinage of pagodas, and by establishing a tarif or proportional value between the pagodas and fanams, in the same manner as
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in England twenty-one shillings are at all times equivalent to a guinea.

My next object was to concert measures with Mr. Sullivan for the safety of the southern countries, while the army should, for the third time, advance into the enemy's dominions. With this view I proceeded to Tanjore, and from thence by Trichinopoly joined the main division at Caroor. You had been pleased to reinforce us from the Presidency with the ninety-eighth regiment, a party of European artillerymen, and some heavy ordnance. Other guns were received from Tanjore, and the exertions of Mr. Sullivan procured us many articles in which we had been before deficient.

During my late progress through the southern countries, Mr. Digby called forth every exertion of his personal credit, and in addition to conveyance for the whole ordnance, ammunition, and stores of the army,

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he had actually provided carriage complete for 300,000 sears of rice; which at the rate of one seer per day for 15,000 men, amounted to twenty days provision, exclusive of other conveyance, amounting to ten days more. The main body of the army was assembled at Caroor, excepting the division with Colonel Forbes, which remained in force at Daraporam, ready to join at the shortest notice. Nothing farther was wanting but specific orders from your Lordship and the Board, or from the Commissioners, to re-commence hostility; and I had still a plan of operations in view, that promised to lead us to the capital of Myfore by a route not less favourable than that which we had been directed to relinquish, in case it should have been judged necessary to renew the war. This event became extremely probable from the recent conduct of our adversaries. Previously to my arrival at Caroor a foraging party had been attacked, and an European officer, who fell into the enemy's hands,

hands, was closely confined at Sankarydurgum. The second battalion had been advanced from General Jones's force to the northward, and was entirely cut to pieces by Tippoo's troops near Cumalum; while Tippoo himself, finding that the southern army was ordered to abandon his country, and that no other force could venture to oppose him, persisted in his investment of Mangalore, and compelled that distinguished garrison to yield at last to the necessity of famine, and surrender the place *.

Notwithstanding the flagrant treachery by which Mangalore was lost, and the deliberate massacre of General Mathews, with many other captive English officers, the treaty of peace was mutually signed on the eleventh of February, and exchanged between the Commissioners and Tippoo Sul-

* Colonel Campbell marched off with his few remaining troops to Telicherry, agreeably to the stipulation with Tippoo, and died soon after, worn out with fatigue.

taun*. The treaty specified the enlargement of the Bushwanna or Amuldar of Palagatcherry, whom we had detained in order to give evidence concerning the murder of a party of Europeans taken prisoners near Palagat, at the time that Colonel Humberstone's army was before that place†. He was sent with an escort to the camp of Nawas Begg, and from thence returned me his thanks for the good treatment he experienced. This was the only subject of Tip-

* As I have stated at some length the circumstances that led me to consider a continuation of the war as eligible, it might be expected that I should also have explained the many and perhaps unanswerable arguments that induced the Government of Madras to adopt a contrary conduct. In addressing that Board, an enumeration of those arguments would have been superfluous and impertinent; but it would be an injustice to the merit of their determination, if I omitted here to remark, that the tenor of instructions from home, the state of negotiations in Europe, and the impoverished condition of the Company's territories, concurred to impress the ablest men in India with the propriety and necessity of that measure, which procured to Lord Macartney's Government the warmest acknowledgments and approbation of their superiors.

† This party was put to death by the express order of Tippoo Sultaun.

poo who had not been immediately released, although nearly 10,000 prisoners had been taken by us during the operations of the southern army. The Commissioners also directed me to restore the forts and countries of Caroor and Daraporam, but to retain possession of Dindigul, and to station a strong force there until the English prisoners should be actually enlarged.

No time was lost in evacuating the specified countries; and on the first of April Colonel Forbes's division moved to Dindigul, and Colonel Stuart fell back from Caroor upon the province of Trichinopoly, with instructions to deposit all the stores and heavy ordnance of the army in that garrison. While we remained at Dindigul, the troops in that quarter suffered a continuation of fatigue, and were obliged to march seventy miles to the head of the Outumpollum valley, to receive the grain necessary for their current subsistence.

In obedience to your orders desiring my opinion on the most advantageous mode of reforming and arranging the southern forces, I had the honour, on the twenty-sixth of April, to express my sentiments on that important subject *, and stated that the vicinity of Trichinopoly was the most eligible position for a cantonment, where a strong force, complete in every circumstance of field equipment, should at all times be stationed; that the great deposit of military stores and provisions should be formed there, with the field and battering train, pioneers, and main body of the southern artillery;—that the Commandants of corps should be charged with the carriage of their battalion-tents, stores, and ammunition, as well as rice, if requisite, at the usual rates specified in the Company's regulations. It was also suggested, that whenever military aid should be found necessary

* See that Letter in the Appendix.

for the interior business of the country, the civil Chiefs, Residents, and superintendants, should address their applications, not to the subordinate officers casually employed in the different districts, but to the Southern Commander, in order that the requisition might be complied with from the main station or cantonment of the southern forces. By these means the troops would be preserved in a constant state of discipline, the jarrings incident to the detail of subordinate interference between civil and military would be avoided, and every corps would have a rotation of detachment duty. An immediate reduction of Peons, Ty-nauts, and other irregulars, was also recommended, to the amount of 10,000 men; from whence a monthly saving of 25 or 30,000 pagodas would arise. I flattered myself, that the adoption of arrangements proposed in that letter would have removed the deficiencies under which the southern forces labour; and that, in the event of

hostility in that part of India, they would have added such vigour to your operations as would have precluded a renewal of those calamities which occurred during the Carnatic war.

By the end of May, it became impracticable to subsist so large a force in the Dindigul country. A strong garrison was therefore left in that fortress, and the division was withdrawn towards Madura, where the Europeans and some native corps were cantoned. As soon as the review of the battalions was finished, which had engaged me for several months, three battalions were detached under Captain Wheeler to the Tinivelly country; and, at the same time, it became necessary for me to move thither in person in order to arrange a permanency of payment and supply for the troops in that province. Some occurrences which happened there respecting the Polygars, Catambominaigue, and Shevigherry, were immediately

diately communicated to your President; and evinced the refractory disposition of that race. From Tinivelly I proceeded by Negapatam and Tanjore to Tritchinopoly, in order to provide by personal endeavours for the distreffes of the troops.

It now remained for me to undergo a duty more painful than all the embarrassments hitherto experienced. Your Lordship and the Board found it requisite to order a reduction of many thousand independents, and other southern irregulars, who had been raised by his Highness the Nabob Mahomed Ally. During the whole period of misfortunes to the southward, they still bore the rigour of distress with a resignation unknown to Europeans. Among these men, there were the most respectable soldiers of the east; some of them had followed their fathers into the Carnatic, in the days of Dooft Ally and Anwaradeen Cawn: others had remained in
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the service since the days of Chunda Saheb, and the deposed Rana or Gentoo queen of Trichinopoly. Many of them had continued since the campaigns of Lawrence, Clive, and Hoof Cawn, in a constant series of military duty. To these wretched adherents, an average of twelve months pay was due. The misfortunes of the times rendered it impossible to discharge those claims, for the regular corps of the army were not less in arrears: under such circumstances, to turn them loose to misery, while the country was in a state that could afford them no relief, would have distressed the most unfeeling mind. They assailed me daily with their sufferings, and the only expedient was adopted, that promised to combine the duties of obedience with the obligations of humanity, by directing the officers commanding the corps of those irregulars, to furnish me with rolls, containing the names of each black officer and Sepoy under their command, specifying

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ing the length of service and arrears of pay; in order that each of them might receive a certificate of his demand on the Company, to be countersigned by the officer, and by the commandant of the garrison with which the corps corresponded; and at the same time desiring a particular recommendation of every individual who had any pretension to indulgence.

This being finished, our next object was, to disband the raw and undeserving rabble, who had been collected during the distracted period of the southern affairs. They were ordered to receive on the first of each succeeding month, thirty days subsistence in grain, until their arrears should be discharged. The ancient and respectable part of those corps, were to be continued on the rolls, until we should be able to procure some adequate provision for so deserving a class of public servants. In neither instance however,

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did my endeavours prove effectual. The latter class of venerable veterans remains unprovided for; and the monthly issuing of grain depending on your renters and civil servants, it was not within the limits of my power to enforce performance. So much was it neglected by the renter of Tritchinopoly, that after my departure from the southward, these unfortunate victims, impelled by hunger, were driven to such excess in their endeavours to procure relief, as obliged the military commandant to repress them by force of arms.

To these painful incidents were added, the claims and distresses of the army encamped near Tritchinopoly. The troops were accustomed to endure twelve or fourteen months arrears with unexampled forbearance, and the public followers, attendants on the army, had long been strangers to any coin; when to this was added, a failure of their daily allowance of grain

grain in lieu of batta, their case would have been truly desperate, had not Tondiman advanced a month's provision for their relief. Such were the abuses of the renter at Tritchinopoly, that in a favourable season the place was menaced by famine. His disinclination to have a division stationed in the district, suggested so strange a mode of effecting their removal. But by this machination any troops less patient than ours would have been excited to revolt; and the fort of Tritchinopoly would have fallen to Tippoo, if he had thought proper to invest it at the moment.

So urgent was our distress that I found myself obliged, without any previous communication, to disperse the troops in quest of subsistence; the 78th to Tanjore, the Hanoverians towards Tripatore, a large body of Sepoys towards Madura, and other battalions to Mellore and the Marawas.—

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At the same time the 101st, and soon after the 98th, were ordered to the Presidency, to embark from thence for Bengal in their way to Europe.

Your Lordship and the Board were fully impressed with the necessity of reducing the public followers and field establishment of the army, in order to lighten the burden of expenditure, and to liquidate part of those arrears already incurred; but the protraction of the treaty with Tippoo unavoidably induced you to defer that measure, until the mutual restitution of Amboor and Dindigul should be effected. That event at last took place, while his cruel massacre was strong in every memory, while his insulting treatment of those whom he released excited general indignation, and while his detention of 200 * English

* He had made them be circumcised and enrolled in his service.

prisoners seemed to preclude all pacific expectations *.

I hastened to Fort St. George, to lay before your Right Honourable President a faithful statement of your southern affairs; of our proceedings and expenditure; as well as to explain the meritorious conduct of the troops in that quarter, and the eminent exertions made by Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin at the head of the civil departments; to prove that even their abilities had not been able entirely to correct the evils hitherto inherent in the southern system; and to point out resources for the speedy

* I must again be permitted to remark, that such were the embarrassments and distresses under which the different Presidencies laboured, that, notwithstanding these incidents, the treaty of peace with Tippoo Sultaun was generally considered as a measure eligible for the English interests in India: it is also a prevalent opinion, that if the negotiations had not been conducted under some unfavourable circumstances, the distinguished knowledge and abilities of Sir George Staunton were peculiarly adapted to procure the most beneficial terms.

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liquidation of the army arrears ; it was my intention from thence to have embarked with my own regiment for Bengal, where I should have been senior officer of the King's service, and second in command on that establishment ; but I could not think of withdrawing from the southern station while any thing remained for me to represent in behalf of your southern forces.

Permit me now, My Lord and Gentlemen, to offer my best apologies for the tediousness of this recapitulation.—It exhibits various incidents, in their rise, progress, and completion. In this view, it may prove not altogether uninteresting to that class of public servants who wish to derive after-information from past transactions.—At all events, I presume, it has sufficiently evinced that our endeavours having proved less permanently advantageous than might have been expected, arose from the circumstances under which we acted, and
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can never be attributed to me, nor to the army I commanded.

It is fully known to your Board, that the system of conciliation to which Mr. Sullivan and myself had rigidly adhered*, does not accord with the opinions of any considerable portion of either service. Various circumstances of contention had for many years excited enmity between the civil and military.—These habits of disunion were greatly strengthened during the government of Sir Thomas Rumbold, when the pretensions of your subordinate Chiefs were either established or confirmed. By the regulations alluded to, the commandant of a garrison or province came under the detail command of the civil Chief. The Chief received reports and paroles, kept the

* Notwithstanding the dissensions that raged among all ranks of Europeans in India, I had the good fortune to avoid every species of discussion; having neither exhibited a charge, nor been the subject of complaint from any person in the country.

keys of the garrison, and had direction of stores, magazines, and defences in the fort. Hence it happened during the late war, that the command was not delegated to the military officer until the enemy were in motion against the place. Then it was only so delegated, that the Chief might provide for his own safety, and throw the odium of surrender on the Commander. Thus, instead of a regular military control, a systematic animosity prevailed: the magazines were left without grain, the garrisons without stores, and the country so destitute of preparation*, that on the irruption of Hyder Ally, the forts in the Carnatic fell an easy prey to the invader. These irritations were too frequently increased by military vehemence on the one hand, and by assumptions of the civil service on the other.

As the natives of Indostan have little respect for any but the military character,

* Before the commencement of the war, the forts throughout the Carnatic were in general under the orders of the Nabob's government.

the civil servants, in order to acquire consequence, have usually assumed a superiority over the military. Thus the Chief or Resident was frequently held forth as the Phouzdar or General of the province, who was prevented by greater objects from taking the field, but whose mandates the soldiery were bound to obey. The recent contests between Government and the military Commanders, together with the unusual proportion of king's officers lately employed in India, have unavoidably thrown into circulation a greater mass of opinions adverse to the civil service, and given a greater currency to military pretensions, than could be expected from the officers of your own establishment: to these irritating circumstances has been added, the extreme pressure of personal distress in a pernicious climate, where there is perpetual hostility and continued fatigue.

During the late war, many officers were obliged to sell their furniture and wearing apparel, in order to procure a scanty subsistence; while others could not possibly find means of appearing as became their station. If a pittance of their arrears was to be advanced, it often came attended with circumstances so singularly disreputable, that nothing short of penury could justify the offer or acceptance; if in Company's bonds, they were hardly negotiable; if in Bengal bills, the holders of them lost thirty, forty, or fifty per cent.; and if the payment took place in an out-garrison, the discretion or caprice of the paymaster alone determined the mode of payment. Needy officers, at the mercy of such a superior, have frequently submitted to receive a month's arrears in rice, teas, wines, and other merchandize*. When these and similar incidents

* The distresses of the country, the want of money, and the calamities of war, rendered it impracticable for the Board

dents recur to your remembrance; when you recollect how patiently your troops have suffered, and how bravely they have fought; you will undoubtedly admit, that their present discontents are not ill founded, and that their grievances call loudly for redress.

It is by the good order and efficiency of the military constitution alone, that the English dominions in the East can be preserved. This is requisite, not merely to repel invasion, but for the current business of your possessions, which you have never yet been able to conduct without military power. If therefore, an habitual intervention of the military in detail of civil management, justifies the appellation of military government, there is no country

Board of Madras to prevent these evils; on the contrary, the important operations effected by that Government, under the pressure of such embarrassments, is one of the strongest testimonies that can be adduced in proof of their talents, fortitude, and exertion.

on earth so peculiarly entitled to that designation as the English settlements in India. Besides, as no country can be more habituated to convulsions, wars, and revolutions, it follows that the public endeavours should be strenuously directed to obtain perfection in the military system.

When we compare the discipline of your troops, and the constitution of your armies, with those of other European powers in India, the superiority is evidently with the English: but when we look back to the days of Clive and Lawrence, to the smallness of their force, and the magnitude of their achievements, we must confess that more recent occurrences have exhibited a mortifying contrast. The history of many years preceding the period of your Government, is filled with the detail of our impolicy. The best regiments of cavalry upon the Coast were driven from the Nabob's service to the enemy. Garrisons were

were left destitute of military stores, or provision: shameful aggressions* were committed against every native power: unjust wars were unskilfully conducted: there were neither preparations, concert, nor precaution: forts fell at the first summons, detachments were cut off, armies were captured, countries depopulated, a ruinous contest† was concluded by a degrading pacification, only to make way for still more humiliating events; the troops were starving, the treasury empty, all credit gone, and all ranks dissatisfied. The empire of opinion, which we had obtained in India, was thrown away; and there remained a manifest impossibility of maintaining the territorial empire in its wasted and distracted condition.

These form but an incomplete enumeration of circumstances that mark the hasty progress of our decline. The Arabs have

* No faith in our treaties.

† War of 1767 with Hyder.

fallen, the Moors have degenerated, the Portuguese have decayed, the Dutch have dwindled, the French are bereft of territory: all of them have been great and powerful, and conquerors in India; all of them have paid the forfeit of misconduct. The English, having obtained a loftiness of situation in the East beyond the most aspiring fancy of their rivals, are now precipitating from their elevation; and thus they are leaving a monitory example to all future innovators, that no energy of former achievement or extent of actual power can support a government while wasting with internal principles of dissolution.

If we are to look for a renovation of the English interests in India, it must arise from such exertions as those of your Right Honourable President. The difficulties with which you have successfully contended, the counteraction you have experienced, and your ability under most perplexing circumstances,

stances, yield a well-grounded expectation, that in the prosecution of a general and digested reform, your labours would be crowned with the utmost brilliancy of success.

Of all the objects within your Presidency, the improvement of your military system is the most urgent and the least difficult. The discipline and manœuvres of the European and Sepoy infantry, as well as of your artillery and the few cavalry in your service, are formed on the best models of Europe; and it is asserted that, before the war, their appearance would have done credit to any service, while their gallantry and endurance form a subject of historical applause.

The officers upon the Coast are habituated to act in emergencies with a facility that few subordinate officers in Europe ever
have

have a prospect of acquiring. Before an officer attains the rank of Captain, he must unavoidably have been often charged with the command of parties on distant marches, in the conveyance of stores, in the guard of posts and strongholds, in the business of collection, and in menacing of refractory Polygars, together with every other series of duty which can occur. From hence it will be found, that there are few services indeed where so many men possess the practical requisites of an officer. How strongly have zeal, knowledge, and ability been exemplified during the late contest, by those who command your Sepoy battalions?—With what address did they soothe the sufferings of their soldiers, relieve their wants, and restrain the well-grounded clamours of men, whom the public necessities had left in extremity of distress! These considerations suggest the benefit of restraining indiscriminate admission into the service,

service, and of selecting a succession of deserving officers for the command of all your corps.

The higher orders of your service, no doubt, possess in a still stronger degree the practical advantages now described: but as the military rise in India is by rotation without purchase, it is scarcely possible to become a field officer in less than twenty years. Few constitutions are equal, in that climate, to so long a series of fatigue. Besides, your field officers in general command the considerable garrisons. As they regimentally belong to the four battalions of your two regiments of European infantry, these corps are frequently left to the junior Captains, who are solicitous of procuring appointments to the Sepoys, and take little interest in the discipline of the Europeans. But may not the command of an European corps be rendered permanent and advantageous, like those in England?

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May not the condition of ancient officers be relieved by the establishment of half-pay, and the permission of selling their commissions? By these means, those who are disqualified for zealous execution of their duty, might retire with a provision for their after-days, and give opportunities of advancement to others more earnest in pursuit of military reputation.

The growing strength and discipline of your enemies, and our late disasters, point out the wisdom of Sir Eyre Coote's requisitions for an increase of Europeans to form the central strength of your armies. He maintained that at least 10,000 Europeans should be constantly complete for service in the three Presidencies. An objection has arisen from the quick mortality occasioning a burdensome demand for new supplies of men; but this may be in a great measure remedied, by salutary preparations for the reception of the recruits from Europe,—by
stationing

stationing them in healthy quarters, enforcing regularity, and restraining the sale of arrack and other pernicious liquors.

With regard to your Sepoys, the public should be watchful of their discipline, and liberal to confirm their attachment. It is by their good conduct that your settlements have hitherto been preserved, and to them you are to trust for after-stability. That they are partial to your service, is evinced by recent experience. Let them receive the common justice due to every soldier; let them be regularly paid and enabled to subsist their families;—let the wise institution of admitting the children of wounded or deserving Sepoys, to be enrolled and to draw pay from the battalions, be continued; and the Black officers be treated with indulgence and respect. It is farther requisite that the mode of issuing pay be so amended as to remove any possible imputation of fraudulent exactions committed
against

against the Sepoys, by usurious advances of money in the moments of distress, by undue stoppages for articles which either have not been furnished or are overcharged, and by other unjustifiable practices. In that case we may venture to pronounce, that while their expertness in manœuvre, the interior œconomy of the battalions, and the conduct of their officers, continue to inspire them with a sense of superiority, no probable events can shake their adherence. As the European officers on the Coast are not generally conversant with the country languages, it may be farther proper to direct, that every one aspiring to the command or adjutancy of a Sepoy corps, should first learn the Moorish or Malabar dialect.

Although I cannot persuade myself, that it is judicious to admit Parias* into battalions with men of reputable casts†; yet

* Parias are the outcasts of the country, and are held to be impure by the Gentoos.

† Casts mean the different classes or sects to which Gentoos belong.

assuredly

assuredly the mixture of Moormen, Rajapoots, Gentoos, and Malabars, in the same corps, is extremely beneficial, for it stimulates by emulation, and restrains all dangerous confederacies, which cannot escape the jealousy of contending sects. I have also recommended the corps of Topassees or descendants of Europeans, who retain the characteristic qualities of their progenitors. They form a check upon the other native troops, and are more easily maintained in movements of difficulty; for they eat any food like Europeans, and that corps would also become a nursery for hundreds of children who are yearly lost to the community.

The expences attending your cavalry have deprived you of that essential constituent of an army. Indeed, the strange impolicy which drove four well-appointed regiments from the Nabob's service to that of Hyder, has left you with scarcely a suffi-

sufficiency of horse to form a grand guard in front of your main army.—All parties admit the necessity of augmenting that branch of your establishment ; especially as your enemy* can bring more than 60,000 horsemen into the field. But the extravagant rates at which your troop horses are purchased, the still more extravagant price at which they are maintained, the unreasonable pay of your troopers, and the lavish allowances to cavalry officers, render it almost chimerical to suggest the means of new-modelling that service.

Notwithstanding these objections, a plan had occurred to me, which, if it had been my lot to remain in India, should have been submitted to your consideration, for raising 5,000 horse at a moderate rate.—The troopers to receive only a small proportion of pay more than the infantry, and

* Tippoo Sultaun. The Marattas can bring 100,000, and the Nizam 60,000 horse into the field.

the horses to be fed at a very reduced allowance, without any farther contract, contingency, or extra charge.—Thus the expence of a cavalry establishment would be brought within the limits of the Coast finances. Neither would any engagements on the part of Government be required, except that the officer charged with the execution should be established in one of the great northern stations, and that the Nizam, as well as other country Powers, should admit his agents to purchase horses freely throughout their territories. Lastly, that Government should order all renters and collectors of revenue in the possessions of the Company and of the Nabob, not to charge more than eight shillings, or one pagoda *per* 100 measures, for all the gram * furnished to the cavalry, which, at the rate of one pagoda *per* month, would be an allowance to each horse of more than three measures *per* day.

* A kind of pulse on which horses are fed in India.

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The artillery has become a great instrument of military operations in the system of Indian warfare, and has maintained a reputation hardly surpassed in any service. It may not however be unnecessary to observe, that the augmentation of so ponderous a machinery is attended with unsupportable expence, and obstructs those sudden and unexpected movements by which the great events in India have been achieved. But whether it is to be continued on an extended or contracted scale, the department of stores, artificers, and conveyance, forming the great appendage of the artillery, calls aloud for reformation.

It has already been suggested, that all the corps ought to be equipped with a sufficiency of artificers and conveyance for the repairs and movements of their own baggage, stores, and ammunition. Thus they will be at all times ready for emergencies, and the store department will be relieved

lieved from the embarrassment of carrying musket ammunition, with which it is at present encumbered, as well as with various other articles belonging to the battalions.

The numerous body of Lascars, artificers, and other public followers attached to that department, constitute the next object of consideration. They should assuredly be regimented, or formed into corps under the command of European officers, responsible for their conduct, proficiency, and regular receipt of pay. From the want of such an arrangement during the late distresses, all regular disbursements to the troops were impeded, and the public followers were often shamefully neglected. Much benefit would also be derived from separating the complement belonging to the field and battering train; and from establishing in each cantonment a commissary of stores, provided with every article necessary to enable the division to which he belongs, to move on

the shortest notice, without reference to the store-keepers of garrisons, who are not sufficiently under military control to be entrusted with military preparation.

It is farther extremely requisite, that your corps of Pioneers should be encreased, not only for the sake of expertness and dispatch in the preparations of a siege, but to facilitate the rapid movements of your armies. So attentive was Hyder to this branch of his establishment, that he seldom maintained fewer than 5000 Commooty men, or Pioneers, who preceded his line, cleared the roads, and enabled him to move with a celerity seldom equalled by Europeans.

The abuses * and deficiencies in your bullock department, have long been the subject of complaint. When Sir Eyre Coote in 1782 required 30,000 bullocks to enable the Carnatic army to move with

* The great mass of army conveyance in India is performed by bullocks.

effect, the total number actually serving with it did not, I believe, exceed 9000; nor has that army ever been able to procure a complement for distant operations. To this cause has been chiefly attributed the failure of the Carnatic war, and indeed the evil in question seems almost beyond a remedy; for the principal black men, who used to engage their bullocks * in your service, have been suffered to run muster upon muster in arrears, after spending their stock, and straining their credit on the public faith: and at last, such have been the distresses of the times, with more than twelve months of unliquidated balance due to them, and after having lost many hundreds of their cattle through fatigue and sickness, they

* The Company contract at the rate of one and a half pagodas per month, for bullocks of every denomination, allowing the pay of two drivers to every three draught bullocks, which raises the latter to nearly two pagodas per month.—But in compensation for the loss sustained by the bullock owners of the Carnatic army, in the retreat after Colonel Baillie's defeat, the price was advanced to two, and two one-half pagodas, while the Southern army still adhered to the former rate.

have been dismissed from the Company's employment.

It was not by such means that the English character became respectable in this country. There was a period no farther distant than the days of General Lawrence, when the natives of Indostan held the engagements of an Englishman to be unalterable; they represented him with all the attributes of prowess in war, and of justice in peace. Thus confidence and veneration were so mingled in their estimation of him, that their sensations of security were stronger under an English authority, than under the best of their native princes. In those days the purse of the individual was ever open to the public exigency, for every individual confided in the faith and credit of the public. It must be confessed, that a strict adherence to engagement, and the sanctity of public faith, were never more conspicuous than under your Government,
but

but unfortunately the misconduct of your predecessors left you destitute of means to maintain that promptitude of disbursement, and liberality of reward, by which the English first rose to elevation in India.

The next material object is, the department of Engineers, including not only preparations for besieging, but the defensive condition of your forts. You have a respectable corps of Engineers, under an officer distinguished for his talents of arrangement. An official enquiry into the actual state and deficiencies of provisions, ammunition, and other military stores, would enable you to ascertain the specific complement that should at all times be preserved in every garrison of Coromandel.

The inspection and descriptive report of all the southern garrisons, which are the most important on your Coast, have long ago been completed ; for, as soon as the army

returned from the enemy's country, Captain Byres * was requested by me to undertake a survey of Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Madura, Pallamcottah, and Ramnad. This he executed with the utmost ability, and also transmitted to your Presidency a statement of every particular respecting those garrisons, expressed in accurate and comprehensive terms: there remains little farther therefore, except to bestow a similar attention on the other forts, and above all, most rigidly to enforce obedience to such orders, for replenishing the magazines, and augmenting the complement of stores, as your Engineers and a Committee of Inspection may suggest. But vain will these measures prove, unless the stores, magazines, and fortifications, be subjected to severe and periodical examinations, and unless the Commandant of the place be enabled to enforce your instructions. On the other hand, if the military store-keepers and civil managers

* Chief Engineer to the southward.

be suffered to disregard all orders of the Commandant, in the direction of the magazines, and preparations for defence, assuredly the responsibility in moments of attack should likewise be transferred to them, that there might be some restraint, at least, on their negligence or indiscretion.

The late degrading scenes of surrender without resistance at Arcot, Cuddelore, Permacoil, and almost at every other place * where the enemy made any vigorous attack, have suggested an œconomical expedient of destroying many inferior garrisons throughout the country. But your Board will recollect, that every thing was venal on the Coast for years before Hyder ventured an invasion;—that he had secretly purchased the Killidarships † of Arnee, Gingee, Carnatic Gur, Thiagar, and various other posts of strength. These he filled with emissaries of his own, who, on

* Vellore and Wandivash were the only exceptions.

† Killidar is the Moorish Commandant of a place.

his first approach, secured the European officer, if there was one, and surrendered: for those important places were entirely garrisoned by undisciplined dependents of the Nabob. But unless these or similar posts are re-occupied, filled with supplies, and defended by regulars, there can be no security of communication and subsistence; much less can offensive measures be effected from the Carnatic into the enemy's country. It will farther be found almost impracticable to repeople the Carnatic, without forts and strong holds; for the inhabitants fly from situations that afford not protection against predatory cavalry *.

Besides replenishing these inferior forts, the country cannot be secure without better regulation in your considerable garrisons,

* On this question it is but justice to remark that the best military opinions are divided; and at any rate there is little doubt, that if there were a respectable body of cavalry on the Coast establishment, the necessity of maintaining the inferior forts would in a great measure cease.

and

and a distribution of your remaining force into three great frontier cantonments. The main or central one in the Carnatic, somewhere between Arcot and Vellore; the second, or southern one, near Trichinopoly; and the third at Ellore, or in some other northern position. The last would enable you to act in defence of the Circars, in conjunction with the Nizam, or against Tippoo's northern possessions of Cudapah and Kanoul, as circumstances might require. Were the main body of your forces thus established in a connected range upon the enemy's frontiers, the movements of the Carnatic army would no longer continue circumscribed and inefficient as they have been; neither would Tippoo dare to penetrate into your possessions, lest you should retaliate with superior facility against his own.

But we cannot expect a permanency of arrangement in the present indefinite state
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of military command:—while the power that should direct and the power that should obey are at variance, while the subordinates are at the mercy of contradictory orders from contending authorities,—nothing but counteraction can ensue. The inferior officer looks not to his commander for preferment, nor cares for his displeasure, provided his acquiescence with the civil interest can procure him an appointment. The condition of the Commander is still more humiliating:—without weight to resist the encroachments of the civil service, his opposition only exposes his weakness, and his compliance infallibly forfeits the confidence of the army:—involved in odious discussions, and being overwhelmed with committee business, a very small portion of his thoughts is bestowed upon the duties of his station. Hence, for years past, there have been no regular reviews, no inspection of the troops on the part of the Commander in chief,—no enforcement of the established

established regulations of the Coast service, and so little encouragement of parade duty, that the discipline of the army depends solely at this time on the meritorious attention of subordinate officers.

There appears but one remedy for these inveterate evils. While the power of a Governor rests upon a different basis from that of a Commander in Chief, the passion for superiority will occasion violent and dangerous collision. The mass of the civil service espouse the cause of their Governor; the body of the army range under the banners of their General. The first are able and united;—the others are superior in vehemence and number. The discontented of the civil service make common cause with the military;—the obsequious of the military take shelter under the wing of civil patronage. Hence a general ferment is excited:—The civil service prosecute their measures with methodical assiduity;—
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the military indulge in clamorous excess. The grounds of discontent are communicated to the numerous attendants who surround all Europeans:—from these they spread through other classes of the natives, and extending over the peninsula involve every Englishman in the hatred and contempt of all India. The Asiatics cannot enter into European distinctions of participated power:—while they behold Generals seizing Governors, and Governors arresting Generals, they necessarily think ill of either situation.

So indispensable in all Eastern Government is power undisputed and control without counteraction, that we cannot hope to see a period put to these calamities until authority shall issue from one source, and flow in one equal undivided stream. Were this the case,—were the powers of Governor and Commander in chief united in the same person, still subjecting all public acts of
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Government to the voice of a Council or Committee, the civil and military would forget their animosities; and instead of regarding each other as contending squadrons, they would feel themselves confederate forces acting under the same leader. No longer would the deliberative plans for the conduct of a war be thwarted by reluctant execution or actual disobedience, nor the most alluring hopes of decisive enterprise be stifled by the sparing hand that should support them. Neither can it be conceived, that from this amendment any disadvantage would result to the military. At present they have the mortification to behold their leader without power, influence, or respect: in the other case, he would possess them all. Were the same person Governor and Commander in chief, the officer next in seniority would naturally be entrusted with the general conduct of the army, and enjoy consideration due to the second in command

command of a great military establishment. Thus the ungovernable feuds of party would be checked, and there would be some prospect that the public welfare might engage the undistracted attention of those to whom it was entrusted.

With regard to your civil service, it possesses many advantages. The young gentlemen sent out in that capacity are, in general, well educated; and on their arrival at the Presidency, are admitted to assist in the business of the different offices, including nearly the whole detail of public proceedings that can occur in any government. In fact, such has been the salutary operation of these initiations, that your Presidency alone has produced more men of extended capacity in business, than could probably be found in all the public offices of London. These acquirements are extended, as the individual advances in the service. He is successively employed
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as Paymaster and Store-keeper of a garrison, Paymaster and Commissary of an army, Resident with a country prince, Superintendant and Collector of a province, or Chief of a subordinate settlement in the regular gradation towards Council and Committee. In each of these employments, the current transactions are more weighty, the responsibility more immediately personal, and the duty more comprehensive than usually fall to the lot of any unexalted individual in England. It is in your power to direct towards important public purposes those useful qualifications, and to do away any existing imperfections.

Once more allow me to repeat the assertion, that no servant in the civil department, entrusted with the charge of military stores in a garrison, nor any one holding an appointment with an army, should be suffered to consider himself as independent of the Commandant. While

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sanction is given to so unwarrantable an assumption, nothing but negligence and discord can take place. For experience ascertains, that the main contentions in India have arisen from the collision of interfering pretensions. These cannot exist, where the mutual relations of obedience and command are accurately defined. Every officer obeys, with satisfaction, the orders of your Board as the ruling power of the country; but very few submit without reluctance to the mandates of subordinates. When military men, therefore, have had transactions only with the Board, your intentions have been cheerfully fulfilled: whereas, in all instances of inferior interference, ruinous dissensions have been generated. Let me add, that the strong enforcement of obedience by military trial, renders them more prompt and useful instruments of public duty, than those of the other service, who are under no control, and who, by hazarding an eventual but improbable dismissal, may

may commit repeated acts of disobedience with impunity.

Thus far my observations have immediately referred to abuses in your military system; but what avails the improvement of that system, which is only useful to protect your possessions, if waste and devastation are suffered to render them hardly worth protecting, and unequal to support the force on which their safety must depend? You have seen misery in its worst aspect, the misery of famine, abundantly predominant within the bound hedge of Madras: you have seen, under your own walls, the infant dying for want on the breast of his mother; the old and the young, the parents and the children, mingling their last groans, and expiring in your kennels: you have seen whole families of spectres in human shape, digging in the entrails of a dead carrion, and, when these means have failed, surrendering themselves with a truly Asiatic

apathy to the wild dogs and vultures that waited to devour their carcases: you have seen, for months together, a hundred bodies daily covering your streets, with circumstances of horror too shocking to enumerate*! Nor is it within the bound hedge of Madras only, that the internal wasting of the country can be traced: during twenty-seven months of continued movement through a large extent of your dominions, the duties of my station familiarized me with the whole gradation of territorial abuses, neither less palpable nor distressful than those with which you yourselves are personally acquainted.

* Every practicable effort was made by Government and by individuals to relieve the distresses of the wretched natives, who flew from all quarters of the Carnatic to take shelter under the walls of Madras. Thousands of them received daily distributions of rice, and many more were conducted, at the public expence, to the northern provinces, which had suffered less than the Carnatic by the calamities of war.

It

It has been already stated, that the ravages of the enemy are by no means the greatest evils of which those countries have complained. While the territorial management of the countries now assigned to the Company, remained with the Nabob, the oppressive practices undoubtedly prevailed that multiply exaction through every Eastern Government. Indefinite claims and arbitrary impositions fell heavy upon the Polygars, and other tributaries. The head Renters and Amuldars of districts, as well as all inferior instruments of collection, were impelled to harass the inhabitants, not only to satisfy their own rapaciousness, but to feed the avarice of their superiors; for they knew that the only tenure by which they held their appointments, was the frequent repetition of a bribe. The finances of the Durbar were involved by an unmethodized expenditure, and wasted on worthless Europeans at home and abroad. At length the disbursements essential to the current busi-

ness of the country were totally obstructed, and the urgent claims of powerful individuals introduced the destructive practice of granting Tunkaws or assignments on particular districts. In consequence of which, the holder of the Tunkaw is vested with the power of collecting the amount of his assignment within a certain space and period by the most outrageous means.

A band of ill-regulated soldiery and burdensome retainers consumed the produce of the country, and disturbed the labours of the farmer and manufacturer. These causes of defalcation in the Nabob's resources, at a moment when the exigencies of the late war demanded the utmost energy, afforded the strong argument of urgent necessity for transferring his territory and revenues to the uses and direction of the Company. The truth and justice of these arguments must of course remain, as long as the necessity on which they rest.

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At the same time it should not be forgotten, that during the government of the Nabob, no European whatever, excepting those in his service, was permitted to have any influence in the country. The English, therefore, were exempted from the odium of personal interference, or rather the rod of Moorish despotism was contrasted with the milder attributes supposed to characterise an English administration.

When the Company assumed the sovereignty, the transfer of authority from the established ruler to an alien power, no doubt, impressed the natives with distrust; in lieu of which your Committee of assigned revenue have, by their eminent exertions, substituted confidence and security. They have abolished the destructive grants of Tunkaws, and other abuses in the country management;—they have exhibited great ability, as well as unblemished integrity;—and they have rendered the revenues ex-

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tremely productive in most unprosperous times. It was not however possible for them entirely and immediately to repress the misconduct of inferior instruments*, who are eager to perpetuate oppression, and to enforce unusual measures by unprecedented means. The situation of the country rendered it necessary to continue the practice of renting extensive districts to the highest bidder: although every precaution was adopted to prevent the abuse of power, still the collections could not be enforced, unless an unrestrained authority were vested in the Renter. His object too frequently is, to take advantage of the present moment, and, doubtful of futurity in a country at all times liable to fluctuation, to ransack and embezzle, that he may go off at last enriched with the spoils of his province. The fact is, that in every part of the peninsula where the Renters are established, not only

* The Black agents, who manage the whole detail of collection in the different districts.

the Ryot and the husbandman, but the manufacturer, the artificer, and every other Indian inhabitant, is at the mercy of those ministers of public exaction*.

The established practice throughout this part of the peninsula has for ages been, to allow the farmer one half of the produce of his crop, for the maintenance of his family and the recultivation of the land; while the other is appropriated to the Circar. In the richest soils under the Cowle of Hyder, producing three annual crops, it is hardly known that less than forty *per cent.* of the crop produced has been allotted to the husbandman: yet Renters on the coast have not scrupled to imprison reputable farmers, and to inflict on them extreme severity of punishment, for refusing to accept of sixteen in the hundred as the portion out of which they were to maintain a family,

* While Tinivelly remained under the superintendence of Mr. Irwin, that province formed an exception not less pleasing than exemplary from those general observations.

to furnish stock and implements of husbandry, cattle, feed, and all expences incident to the cultivation of their lands. But should the unfortunate Ryot be forced to submit on such conditions, he has still a long list of cruel impositions to endure:—he must labour weeks after weeks at the repair of water-courses, tanks, and embankments of rivers; his cattle, sheep, and every other portion of his property, is at the disposal of the Renter, and his life might pay the forfeit of refusal. Should he presume to reap his harvest when ripe, without a mandate from the Renter, whose Peons, Conicoplys, and Retainers attend on the occasion, nothing short of bodily torture, and a confiscation of the little that is left him, could expiate the offence:—Would he sell any part of his scanty portion, he cannot be permitted while the Circar has any to dispose of:—Would he convey any thing to a distant market, he is stopped at every village by the Collectors of Sunkum or Gabelles, who exact a duty

for every article exported, imported, or disposed of. So unsupportable is this evil, that between Negapatam and Palagatcherry, not more than 300 miles, there are about thirty places of collection; or, in other words, a tax is levied every ten miles upon the produce of the country. Thus manufacture and commerce are exposed to disasters hardly less severe than those which have occasioned the decline of cultivation.

But these form only a small part of the powers with which the Renter is invested. He may sink or raise the exchange of specie at his own discretion; he may prevent the sale of grain, or sell it at the most exorbitant rates; thus at any time he may, and frequently does, occasion general famine. Besides maintaining a useless rabble, whom he employs under the appellation of Peons at the public expence; he may require any military force he finds necessary for the business of oppression, and

and few inferior officers would have weight enough to justify their refusal of such aid. Should any one however dispute those powers, should the military officers refuse to prostitute military service to the distress of wretched individuals, or should the civil Superintendant remonstrate against such abuse, nothing could be more pleasing to the Renter, who derives from thence innumerable arguments for non-performance of engagements, and for a long list of defalcations. But there are still some other not less extraordinary constituents in the complex endowments of a Renter; he unites in his own person all the branches of judicial or civil authority, and if he happen to be a Bramin, he may also be termed the representative of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It would be impertinent to enlarge on the consequences of thus huddling into the person of one wretched mercenary, all those powers that ought to constitute the dignity and lustre of supreme executive authority.

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At the same time it is but justice to remark, that these observations cannot be with truth confined to the countries under Renters appointed in the countries belonging to the Nabob. The interior management and œconomy of Tanjore, in despite of the representations of Mr. Sullivan and the exhortations of Mr. Swartz, are still more wretched. So wanton and iniquitous is the sway of despotism there, that the goods of the merchant or carrier are frequently seized by order of the Durbar. If an individual native is incautious enough to display his wealth, the Rajah's ministers seldom rest till he is caught and plundered: whips, scourges, thumb-screws, and other instruments of Indian torture, are daily applied to the unhappy subjects in every Cutcherry, or court of justice, throughout the country. Every one therefore who possesses either gold or jewels, buries them in some secure spot, and entrusts the secret only to the most confidential

tial of his family. Hence almost the whole specie of the country is diverted from the purposes of circulation; and an enormous annual loss of treasure is thus occasioned by the frequent removal and extinction of families in that distracted territory. By these means the most fertile, and once the most populous, spot upon the globe, is already marked with the distinguishing features of a desert.

If my information be not incorrect, a survey of the Circars, or northern territory of Coromandel, would also exhibit a melancholy picture. Neither war nor convulsions have afflicted those districts for many years that they have been under the territorial administration of the Company, or of Zemindars dependant upon that authority. Their desolation must therefore be still more unequivocally imputed to internal mismanagement.

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When we recollect the original object of the English settlements in India, the benefits of a commercial intercourse with its once industrious coasts, we find that it has long ago been lost sight of, in a multitude of territorial concerns, assumptions of sovereignty, and wanton extension of dominions which our situation renders us unfit to govern. Few of those who are employed in the Company's service will submit to the tedious drudgery of mercantile proceedings; they aspire at fortune through the more magnifying medium of contracts, paymasterships, residencies, and chiefships. The native merchants, Armenians and others, who conducted the trading business of your Coast, have suffered so severely during the late distresses, as well as by the abolition of confidence and public credit, that they have removed to some less precarious situation, or else remain inactive in the hopes of better times. Neither would the present condition

tion of the Coast admit of any immediate means of re-establishment from commercial exertions ; for the staple articles of your commerce are the produce of your lands, and the labours of the manufacturer: the decay and approaching extirpation of that useful class of subjects has been already traced. What then is to constitute the object of exportation ? what is to yield the means of circulation, credit, and resource ? From the southward you have at present no investment * ; in the Carnatic you have hardly the remains of former industry ; in the Circars, hitherto undisturbed by any foreign enemy, you find it difficult to load one annual ship for Europe. If the train of this induction be not false,

* These observations, concerning the decline of trade and the extirpation of manufacturers, must not be considered as entirely applicable to every spot upon the Coast. There are many villages to the southward, and also to the northward, where there still remains a sufficiency of weavers to form an investment, if properly managed ; and the French, as well as the Danes, have lately contrived to export considerable cargoes of Coast goods.

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what hopes can you entertain of lightening the public embarrassments, while every resource in your Government is wasted?

Your predecessors left the country expiring under a complication of calamities. That your wisdom and exertions should have found means to prolong its existence under such a crisis, exceeded the expectations of your most sanguine friends, and excites the admiration of your bitterest opponents. You have already applied the firm hand of undeviating retrenchment to every branch of public expenditure ; and, labouring under unparalleled impediments, you have persevered with a vigour and integrity of which there was no example in the East. By this conduct you may justly assume the merit of preserving the Carnatic, oppressed with the formidable invasion of native and European powers, and the more mortal wounds inflicted by the govern-
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ments that preceded yours. But meritorious as retrenchment undoubtedly is, you feel the inefficiency of that alone to restore the public vigour. Fifty lacks of pagodas remain due by your Presidency, for services actually performed, or value received:—from that sum, when audited, you cannot possibly make any diminution:—to attempt such a measure would forfeit the whole character of Government, or at least would be declaring the Indian Public insolvent, and compelling their lawful creditors into a disreputable composition. You have already heard the clamours excited by supposed injustice in the prosecution of æconomical reform. Too severe a retrospect is not always beneficial, and in the present instance would prove destructive of equity and public faith. Perhaps it may be better to look forward; and instead of invalidating established claims for past services, to take care that every future charge shall

shall accord with that just proportion which should ever exist between the disbursements and resources of the treasury.

Your debts, on their present footing, are destructive of all public welfare. With the wisdom and vigour which have distinguished your administration, if the Government were in any degree permanent, one year's revenue* of your country ought to equal their whole amount. Under a well-established system of public credit, so inconsiderable a proportional sum, at the close of a calamitous war, would hardly cause a perceptible inconvenience.—But consider to whom, and in what manner, this amount is due:—it has been incurred in a series of five years of protracted and growing arrears, in all the fractions of pay, batta, extra-charges, and allowances to Civilians, Contractors, Soldiers, Sepoys,

* About fifty lacks of pagodas, or 2,000,000 l.

Artificers, Camp-followers, and all descriptions of men connected with the peace or war establishment. If the unfortunate individual, urged by severe necessity, though he must not hope for money, should demand a certified statement, he is harassed with a long and fruitless attendance;—the auditor disputes his vouchers, and contests his claims.—If at length the certificate should be granted, it remains an useless docket; on the credit of which he can neither purchase nor procure one single article of life. Your Government has exhibited a political phenomenon, unprecedented in the annals of mankind—a State or Public indebted almost to every person in its service, and yet the functions of authority continuing unimpeded by any serious commotion. Several circumstances however have sufficiently denoted the hazard of such a situation. When the embarrassments resulting from a treasury exhausted, a country desolate, and a credit ruined

ruined in the prosecution of a destructive war, impelled you to direct that all allowances of batta should cease, at a period when the arrears of the army and distresses of the country rendered that indulgence peculiarly indispensable, the remonstrances and vigorous measures adopted by the military evinced the public danger of uniting the individuals of a community against the Government. There is but one alternative ;—you must either liquidate the arrears due to your establishment, or you must risk the loss of India. If Europe and Bengal unwisely should withhold their aid, that liquidation cannot possibly take place but by the re-establishment of your own credit and finance : these, as well as commerce, are the offspring of cultivation and manufacture, which can exist only by industry and population. Your endeavours to re-establish that natural relation of things have already crowned the measures of your administration ; and when carried to their full comple-

tion, will add, to the merit of having preserved the Carnatic from destruction, the distinguished character of having restored it to prosperity.

It would ill become me in addressing the Government of an extensive country, to enlarge on the detail of means by which this restoration may be effected. Permit me, however, to suggest, that the legislative, judicial, and executive regulations necessary to the prosperity of an Indian Government are neither complicated nor refined. There is one maxim peculiarly applicable to that country,—that there is no evil more dreaded than innovation, nor any duty more sacred with the natives than custom. Let this truth then be the unalterable beacon and directory in all plans of renovation respecting India, where the continued repeals and fluctuations incident to European establishments excite the utmost dread and detestation.

The mode of restoring prosperity to your territories, is, in my opinion, extremely simple. These countries experienced the refinements of civil polity and regulation suited to their condition, ages before they even heard the name of European. You have only to restore the general form and tenor of the Indian jurisprudence; and where that system, over-rating the pretensions of superior casts, tends to the violation of natural law and public welfare, there the rigour of Gentoo enactments should be mitigated, without destroying the established order and gradations of the country. Protect the poor from the oppression of the great, restrain the despotic violence of the native leaders, and let every one within the limits of the English influence feel that he is safe in his property, his person, and his life. If this were actually the case, the husbandman, the labourer, the manufacturer, and the merchant, would very soon fly from every corner of Indos-

tan, to take shelter under a government that respected the sacred rights and established institutions of their ancestors, while it afforded personal security and independence, the offspring of an English polity.

The country still abounds so much with sheep and cattle, that the full complement for all the purposes of labour and subsistence would soon be procured; the towns and villages would be repeopled, and the fields recultivated with a rapidity unknown in other climates. Such is the natural fertility of those countries, and so strong their propensity to reproduction, that the quick renewal of abundance, industry, and commerce, is the necessary consequence of security; which implies the protection of every one in the possession of his own, by restraining all from the forcible or fraudulent appropriation of that which belongs not to themselves. Neither is the celebrated Dr. Smith's remark less worthy of observ-

observance, that it is the height of impertinence, even for any public body, to interfere in the private concerns of individuals. How much more pernicious must the pressure of that system be, which delegates to every subordinate instrument of public authority, that privilege of individual interference, not for public welfare, but for selfish purposes, at the expence of the property and industry of the subject!

While the Company holds the territorial management of the country, it is to be dreaded that this happy renovation cannot be accomplished; because your civil servants, by the constitution of your establishment, are under no restraint, excepting those of their own sentiments. Every one knows that orders are nugatory where there is no punishment for disobedience, and the severest denunciation of your displeasure against a civil servant, only dismisses him from a service, which the very act that
incurs

incurs your censure probably enables and inclines him to relinquish. The expedient of military interference in the business of interior management, is still a more egregious violation of all good policy and public trust. For though military men are far more proper to be charged with specific orders than Civilians, being answerable for disobedience with their lives; yet the exertion of the military arm in the detail of civil regulation implies a total abrogation of all civil rights, and declares aloud that no power prevails but that of force.

You have already found, that ruinous as both these modes undoubtedly are, they seem mild and reputable, in comparison with the only other means of management that it has hitherto been found practicable to adopt with success in any part of India—the delegation of territorial authority to native Agents, and black Renters, who
have

have no tie whatever of character, permanency, or situation, to restrain them from the commission of outrages too atrocious for any European imagination to suggest. What then remains but to perform an act of equal policy and justice? To redeem the English name from the general imputation under which it labours, of violating the rights and honour of our best adherents, of coveting the possessions of friend and foe*, and of a total incapacity, from situation and constant change of system, to manage what we so unjustifiably acquire? Disprove the allegation, restore the country and the sovereignty to

* The hardships and humiliation which have been endured by the Nabob of Arcot, by the Rajah of Tanjore, by the Nabob of Bengal, and by the Mogul himself, while under the protection of the English, afford the strongest grounds for other Princes of India to dread an intimate connexion with us. At the same time it must be confessed, that many powerful arguments may be adduced for retaining the interior management of the countries within our influence.

its rightful owner the Nabob* ;—emancipate the Rajah of Tanjore, and all other Rajahs, Princes, and Zemindars, belonging to your Coast, from the vexatious interference of the civil, and from the rough assumptions of the military power;—employ the former in the proper duties of their station, in the business of office and investment; and in pursuance of your favourite system of retrenchment, reduce their numbers to the proportional diminution of demand for their services: would they acquire fortune, let them aspire to it, not in the spoils of districts, but in the prosecution of commercial operation. As for the latter, confine them to their garrisons, stations, and cantonments; suffer them not to be scattered through the country, and remind them that their business is not usury and exaction, but discipline and war. In

* This cannot be supposed to take place until the period for which the Nabob's revenues were assigned to the Company be elapsed, and until the object of that assignment be fulfilled.

order that this salutary alteration may be attended with popularity and effect, their professional emoluments ought to be sufficient, without any aid from indirect acquirement.

Should the Nabob, the Rajahs, or the Zemindars, take advantage of your indulgences, and endeavour to withhold their stipulated payments; shew them that lenity and justice are neither the offspring of indolence nor weakness: but, on the first symptoms of their persistence in such delays, march a body of troops to enforce your orders, make them pay the expences of the expedition, and teach them that you will not suffer intentional misconduct to pass unpunished. You have likewise to restrain every class of Europeans, the merchant only excepted, from mingling with the natives; for when they are familiarised with our practices, they cease to respect our virtues in the just abhorrence of our crimes.

Above

Above all, let it never be forgotten, that in the present state of national depravity, wherever a latitude of power is lodged, whether in civil or military hands, the eye of justice must be more piercing, and her sword more severely pointed against delinquency, before you can hope to restrain the repetition of abuse.

The restitution of the revenues and sovereignty to the Nabob, will no doubt be opposed, on the former grounds of unwise and prodigal administration; assuredly, however, this evil may be remedied. You will also recollect, that the waste and prodigality of the Durbar arose from the rapaciousness of Europeans, who never ceased to prey upon the Nabob; but misfortune has fallen heavy on the hoary head of Mahomed Ally; the picture of European treachery is drawn in colours too strong to be effaced from his remembrance. At any rate let him be removed
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from the Presidency, the chief seat of intrigue and corruption, and Europeans; let him be re-established in the ancient capital of his Government; let that capital be restored to its former splendor: he will there be rescued from the ruinous intercourse of powerful and designing adventurers, and the country will rejoice that there is again a rightful Sovereign.

But it will be asked, How shall you restrain the Nabob's Government from the detail of individual oppressions, arbitrary exactions, and frequent violations of the rights of property and persons, incident to all Asiatic institutions? To these let me answer, that the protection of the country, and an adequate appropriation of the revenues for the support of your establishment remaining in your hands, it becomes you to preserve a controlling authority sufficient to restrain abuse. The annual amount of sums due, services to be performed, rents
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to be paid to the Circar, and gross produce of every village or Muganum on the Coast, have been accurately recorded for ages in the Cutcherries, or public Courts of the districts. Should a Manager or Renter exact more than that stipulated or wonted sum, refer to these records as the common and statute law of the country, in all cases of revenue: if the means of private admonition to the Durbar should fail, let your Board or Government be the tribunal before which the cause is cognisable in the last resort; for it is presumed that no inferior jurisdiction could give sentence between the Nabob and his subjects. Should any servant of the Circar attempt to seize the property, or restrain the person of an inhabitant, let the injured party, if all inferior means of justice fail, have ultimate recourse to the same superior and controlling power: let the rulers and the ruled feel, that under the sanction of an English Government, the poor as well as the rich
are

are entitled to protection. It will leave nothing to be added to the merits of your Government, if you curb oppression, and cause the pure streams of English justice to unite with Indian jurisprudence, and both to flow in the channels of sacred, immemorial usage.

It must be confessed, that the power to restrain, implies also the power to commit abuse; and if such ministers of public vengeance as involved the Carnatic in the war with Hyder, were again to constitute the Government, it would be fruitless to suggest a thought of reformation. But this letter is addressed to a Board distinguished by rigorous and persevering integrity: we all know, that your minds cannot be swayed by any improper consideration; and that the animosity of party, though it may distract, has not been able to prevent your earnest endeavours for the public welfare. It may farther be presumed, that the atten-

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tion of the nation is so awake to the state of India, that the succession to the Government in the different Presidencies will henceforth be composed of able and upright men; or else, that all expectation of preserving these settlements will for ever be relinquished.

Another circumstance is particularly deserving of consideration. It is a truth palpable to every mind at all acquainted with political œconomy, that no country whatever is more favourably situated for the support of public credit, and extensive circulation, than India. The mass of treasure has been so widely diffused, the avowed possession of private property is so insecure, and the mode of pecuniary transactions so disadvantageous, that any Government on whose integrity and stability the natives durst rely, might form the greatest bank of deposit on the globe. To the influence derivable from such an institution, would be added

the benefits of circulating bank or public securities in lieu of specie. Those benefits are proportioned to the extent of country in which such notes or securities can have currency, to the quantity that may be safely issued, and to the length of time that they may remain in circulation, as well as to the gain derivable from the intermediate application of money, when not needed in the bank. The profit on bills of exchange, discounting bills, granting cash accounts, and other operations of banking companies, are also considerable. In all these particulars, India possesses peculiar advantages: the range of circulation is more extensive, the probable period of the notes returning into bank more distant, the rate of money higher, the transactions more numerous, and the profits on each transaction greater than in any other country. Had such an establishment of public security existed six years ago, your Presidency could not have fallen into the state

of degradation which it has experienced; nor would it have been oppressed with a mass of paltry debts, whose amount on their present footing may possibly overthrow the Government; but which, with the aid of such a bank, could not for a moment have obstructed the career of public service. In that event, Hyder, so far from ravaging your country, and menacing you within the walls of Madras, would have been quickly driven from the Carnatic and from his own dominions.

Such an establishment would attach all classes by the ties of private benefit; it would subject to your influence every prince in India, by enabling you to supply his wants, or to support his adversaries, according as his conduct merited your friendship or excited your resentment. If similar proceedings have exalted the Seets and other private Soucars throughout Indostan, to a weight and influence little short of princely power, what might we not expect

expect from the operation of such a machine, in the hands of a Government whose wisdom, justice, and stability, should entitle it to public confidence*?

If we might venture to suppose that these suggestions should ever grow into effect, we should no longer have occasion to dread the courts of India meditating our expulsion; for the adoption of a system formed on these principles implies such vigour of interior management, such encreasing opulence, such strictness in the detail of expenditure, such respectability of warlike preparation, and so direct a course of liberal policy towards all the country powers, as would either remove their enmity, or else evince their incapacity to subvert a fabric built upon so sure a basis.

* No degree of energy and rectitude in any individual Governor can possibly produce the benefits in question; it is the energy and rectitude of long established system alone, from whence they can be derived.

I have now, my Lord and Gentlemen, laid before you the condition of your southern provinces, and the tenor of public proceedings since you honoured me with that command. After having stated fairly the embarrassments under which we laboured, and the means employed to overcome them, I have dwelt with no less pleasure than acknowledgment on the exertions of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin at the head of your southern revenues, of Mr. Digby, Mr. Hippisley, and Mr. Orpin, in other departments of civil service; I have repeated the sentiments of obligation due to Colonel Stuart, Colonel Forbes, and the other senior officers of the army, for the strenuous support received from them. It has also been my particular endeavour to impress your minds with a strong and lasting sense of the merits of your southern troops, and I shall feel the highest satisfaction if my representations shall procure for them

them any portion of your indulgence, due by indisputable claims.

With regard to the observations subsequent to the narrative of those proceedings in which the southern army was engaged, they refer to the causes which occasioned the decline of our affairs upon the Coast, and to the conduct that appears best suited to prevent a repetition of similar disasters. These considerations, and the motives which have induced me to submit my opinion to your Honourable Board, will, I trust, incline you to receive them with indulgence, as the well-intended suggestions of one whose zeal to promote the public service exceeds either his abilities or opportunities of information on this complicated and important subject. Few persons however have enjoyed more favourable occasions of enquiry into the local circumstances of those territories: I am conscious too, that my mind has neither been influenced by preju-

dice nor partiality. It only remains that I should apologise for the tediousness of this address, and repeat my warmest acknowledgments for the very flattering marks of public confidence which you were pleased to repose in me. Most cordially do I wish as the best expression of my gratitude, that the vigour, ability, and integrity of conduct by which your President has been enabled to preserve the countries under your direction, may procure to you the distinguished honour of retrieving the English interests in the East.

I shall now take my leave of your Lordship and the Board, and bid adieu to the subject of India.

I have the honour to be, &c.

A P P E N D I X.

N^o I.

Daraporam, 1st June 1783.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

I Have the honour to inform your Lordship and the Board that the army encamped before this place on the thirtieth (afternoon), having made a march of twelve hours. We immediately inspected the ground adjoining to the fort, and at three in the morning proceeded with some Euro-

Europeans and two battalions of Sepoys to take possession of a very strong post on the western side of the river, within three hundred yards of the fort. The men were under cover before day-light; we opened a small mortar battery at eight in the morning, a three gun battery before three in the afternoon, and effected a breach about six o'clock. Parties were sent round the fort and pettah to prevent the escape of the enemy, who did not venture to stand a storm, and the grenadiers entered at day-break this morning.

We have spared the life of every person in the place, and have turned out all the lower class of people; but have thought it necessary to detain some of the principal inhabitants, in hopes of intelligence from them. It is a very extensive place, and capable of much defence. I am happy to inform you, my Lord and Gentlemen, that there is a very considerable magazine of
grain

grain in the fort and pettah, which might prove of essential consequence in the execution of your orders for offensive operations to the westward. A very large army might be subsisted in this neighbourhood for a campaign: there is also a large supply of powder and shot in the magazines here. I shall have the honour to transmit a particular state of the place, as soon as it can be prepared; and shall then take the liberty of submitting to your consideration my ideas of the eminent advantages that will result from the prosecution of your orders to the westward, provided you shall judge it expedient to send such a reinforcement to this army as may enable us to secure some places of importance in the enemy's country, and at the same time to meet his army in the field. Should you, my Lord and Gentlemen, determine in favour of this measure, I may venture to assert that the consequences will not be less beneficial than honour-

honourable: but in the present state of this force, I cannot presume to promise any permanent advantage.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. FULLARTON.

The Right Hon. LORD MACARTNEY,
and the Select Committee, Fort St. George.

N^o II.

Pandalamcourchy, 13th Aug. 1783.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

IN answer to your letter of the eighth of July, I had the honour on the nineteenth of July to inform your Lordship and the Honourable Board of my intention to proceed to Dindigul, in order to wait your farther commands in that place; and on the twenty-fifth and twenty-seventh of July the army marched in divisions from Tritchinopoly by the route of Touracourchy; for there was not a sufficiency of water by the shorter road of Manapar.

At Touracourchy I received a public letter from Mr. Sullivan, containing a formal requisition that I should move the army into the Mellore districts, and from thence
proceed

proceed myself with the detachment to Shevigunga, in order to enforce the payment of the tribute due in that country.

Your Lordship and the Honourable Board, in your letter of the eighth of July, were pleased to give me a discretionary power of proceeding either to Dindigul or to any other place that might tend most effectually to enable this army to carry offensive operations into execution, in the event of Tippoo's refusing to accede to the terms of accommodation that have been offered to him. In addition therefore to the weight of Mr. Sullivan's arguments on this occasion, and to the respect at all times due to his opinion, I conceived it to be my duty to comply with the requisition in question, as it did not interfere with any orders I had received, but on the contrary tended to promote every object of service that this army could have in view.

We

We arrived at Mellore on the second of August, and from thence proceeded to Shevigunga with an escort, whither two battalions were previously detached. On their approach, the Rajah and his Ministers fled to the woods of Callacoil, and could not be prevailed upon to return; but in the course of four days I was lucky enough, in Mr. Sullivan's name, and with his sanction, to bring them into an arrangement; of which Mr. Sullivan will communicate the particulars to your Lordship and the Board, and which I hope will meet with your approbation.

At Shevigunga I received a public Letter from Mr. Irwin, urging the movement of the army into the Tinivelly country, in order to repress the insolence of the Polygars, and assuring me that by this movement he would be enabled to collect a very considerable sum for the urgent necessity of the troops: about the same time I was
informed

informed that the military stores preparing at Tanjore, and the detachment under Colonel Stuart, could not reach Dindigul sooner than the twenty-fifth of August. I therefore, with the advice of Mr. Sullivan, determined to comply with Mr. Irwin's requisition, and to employ the interval in procuring such supplies for the army as might enable me to carry into execution any orders you may be pleased to give me.

I withdrew the troops from Shevigunga on the eighteenth, and joined the army at Trepatchetty. A battalion was left in Mellore, for the purpose of collection, and the remaining force marched by Pallamerry and Naiglapour to Pandalamcourchy, where we arrived yesterday at two o'clock P. M. after marching eighty miles in four days*. The quickness of these marches had not given Catabomanaig time to return from

* The detachment from Shevigunga marched above one hundred miles in four days.

the siege of Chocumpetty ; but we found in his fort about two thousand armed men, who shut their gates, and manned their walls against us. I therefore resolved to attack them immediately ; for Catabo-manaig was very soon expected himself, with eight thousand men. We opened a four gun battery at four o'clock P. M. breached before seven, and after a severe contest, took possession during the night. Notwithstanding the precautions that were taken, and the corps that we had stationed on the different faces of the fort, the troops were so fatigued that many of the enemy effected their escape. We have found about fourteen guns, and a quantity of powder in the place, as well as some money, grain, and bullocks. The military stores shall be appropriated to the public service, and the other articles distributed to the troops, or destroyed.

During the short time we have to remain in this province, I shall use every effort to

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execute

execute such objects of service as Mr. Irwin shall point out; for by doing so I have no doubt that the arrangements of the country will very soon be completed by his zeal and abilities, and that the army, which is already largely indebted to his exertions, will be amply supplied with money and means of conveyance, and enabled to reach Dindigul, as soon as the military stores at Tanjore, and the detachment under Colonel Stuart, can arrive at that place.

I have now, my Lord and Gentlemen, laid before you the proceedings in which the army has been engaged since I had the honour of addressing you last. It will afford me the most sincere satisfaction, if in these particulars my conduct shall merit your approbation, and in any degree tend to give effect to your intentions respecting the future operations of the southern troops.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. FULLARTON.

To the Right Hon. the Governor and President,
and the Select Committee, Fort St. George.

N^o III.

Camp at Shevigerry, 3d Sept. 1783.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

I Had the honour on the thirteenth of August to inform your Lordship and the Honourable Board, of the motives that induced me to move the army from Tritchinopoly to Pandalamcourchy, and of the reduction of that place. Since that time I have been constantly employed in using every effort in my power to bring the Polygars into proper terms of arrangement for their arrears, so as to enable Mr. Irwin to settle the affairs of this province to the advantage of the Company, and to supply the army with a sufficient sum for its intended operations. As the Polygars remained extremely dilatory, notwithstanding the reduction of Pandalamcourchy, it was found necessary to march to this place,

where the Shevigerry-chief was joined by Catabomanaig and two other Polygars, and had all together not less than six thousand people. On the approach of the army they retired from the town of Shevigerry to the Comby; a strong hold in the mountains, which never had been attacked, and which they conceived to be impregnable.

Mr. Irwin concurred with me in thinking that a reasonable accommodation would be more for the Company's interest than to reduce the place by storm. On this principle I remained four days in fruitless negociation with these refractory Polygars, and even submitted to trust myself alone among them, in hopes of bringing their business to an amicable termination. But finding all my efforts ineffectual, I was under the necessity of using force.

The Comby is situated in the recess of an amphitheatre of very high rocks and mountains,

tains, and defended in front by a very strong work, mounting eight guns, and covered by four miles of thick jungle, intersected with barriers and ravines; the whole being inclosed from the country with a high embankment.

The attack commenced yesterday morning at seven o'clock. We were so fortunate as to carry the bank, which the enemy had lined with many thousand men, and to drive them into the woods: we then proceeded to cut a road through the jungle, and effected this service in seven hours, under a continual fire of musketry and repeated sallies of the enemy, who were seldom farther from our front than thirty or forty yards, and several times rushed upon our people with their pikes, but were as often repulsed. As soon as we had forced our way to the foot of the high mountain that commands the Comby to the southward, we advanced to

gain the summit, and by six o'clock we had driven the enemy from their posts upon the eminence; and from thence we kept up such a fire upon the Comby that they were forced to abandon the place, and to retreat through rocks and thickets, where it was impossible for us to pursue them with any effect: we have found eight guns, three elephants, and a large quantity of grain. I cannot say too much in commendation of the officers and men in this business; and am happy to add, that if we consider the strength of the place, our loss is extremely inconsiderable, as will appear from the enclosed copy of the killed and wounded.

I am in hopes, my Lord and Gentlemen, that this success will bring all the Polygars into an immediate arrangement with Mr. Irwin; for the letter of the eighth of August which I have just received from your Lordship and the Honourable Board,

and the approach of the detachment under Colonel Elphinston towards Trichinopoly, renders it impossible for me to think of remaining any longer in this quarter; and I shall in consequence move the army immediately to Dindigul, in order to carry forward those important operations which you have been pleased to direct me to pursue from thence.

I shall think myself particularly fortunate if my movement to the Tinivelly country, and the operations that have taken place since my arrival, shall be honoured with your approbation, and tend to give effect to your expectation from the Southward.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. FULLARTON,

To the Right Hon. the Governor and President,
and the Select Committee, Fort St. George.

N^o IV.

Fort of Palagatcherry, 15th Nov. 1783.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

I Had the honour on the eighteenth of October to inform your Lordship and the Honourable Board, that I had received official information from Tellicherry of a breach of faith, and a recommencement of hostility on the part of Tippoo Saib, against Mangalore. The critical situation of that important place, and the tenor of my instructions, induced me to move towards Palagatcherry, in order to reduce a fort of such essential consequence to the English interests in India, and at the same time to produce, if possible, a diversion in favour of Mangalore.

After various difficulties in cutting our way near twenty miles through the forest
of

of Annamally (a jungle till then considered as impenetrable for an army), the advance of the line reached this place on the second of November; but the badness of the roads and incessant rains prevented the rear of the army with the battering guns from arriving till the ninth. I found the fort covered by a respectable glacis with a good covert way, a very broad and deep ditch completely reveted, a large berme, and a very strong commanding rampart. The figure of this fort is nearly quadrangular, the dimensions of its faces are 528 feet by 432; each angle is defended by a capacious round bastion with seven or nine embrasures, and a bastion of a similar construction on the centre of each curtain; it has only one entrance, passing through three gateways, mounts twenty-nine guns on the works, and contained a garrison of near four thousand men.

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On the thirteenth, we opened two batteries of six heavy guns each, one on the east and the other on the north face;—the enemy's fire was soon silenced, and their defences destroyed. At night, Captain Maitland, with a part of the four flank battalions under his command, took advantage of a heavy rain to drive the besieged from the covert way. He was so fortunate as to succeed, and pursued them within the first and as far as the second gateway; there he was stopped; but maintained his ground with great spirit and ability, until an addition of troops arrived. The enemy was so much alarmed with this mode of attack, that they called out for quarter, and put us in possession of a fort capable of making a long and desperate resistance.

We have found 50,000 pagodas in the place, besides a considerable stock of grain, powder, shot, and military stores: returns
of

of these articles, together with an accurate plan of the fort, and of the attack, shall be transmitted as soon as they can possibly be prepared; in the mean while a section of the north face is enclosed. Our loss on the occasion was extremely inconsiderable, as you will perceive by the annexed return of killed and wounded.

I have been minute, my Lord and Gentlemen, in the description of this place, because its consequence and local situation are not accurately known to Europeans. The possession of it commands a fertile and extensive district, the adjacent forests abound with the finest teek timber in India, and the river of Paniani is at hand to float it to the Malabar sea. The position of this place equally menaces the possessions of Tippoo on the western coast and towards Myfore, by the route of Coimbatour and Gudgereddy. The movements of this army, almost without money, conveyance,
or

or subsistence, except what we procured on our progress, afford sufficient proof that magazines of grain established here would enable armies to march with confidence and security from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar, and thus bring the military resources of Madras and Bombay into one point of union and effect.

I have set the Killidar and the garrison at liberty, with their side arms and private baggage, and am using every effort to put the place into the best state of defence, as well as to prepare every department of the army for more important operations; as I am very lately informed by Brigadier General Macleod, that Tippoo Saib is still blockading Mangalore, and is determined if possible to reduce it. This has induced the Presidency of Bombay to give orders that General Macleod shall use every effort to save that important fortress. I have the honour to forward a letter from General

neral Macleod to the Right Honourable the President on this subject.

The Rajah of Calicut, or representative of the ancient Zamorins, is now with me, and we receive much assistance from the Bra-
mins and other inhabitants of this country, on whom I bestow every mark of favour and protection, in order as much as in my power to preserve the English name from the stain too often incurred by violence and oppression: I have likewise received the strongest assurance of friendship and support from the different Rajahs on the Malabar coast. I have written to Sir Edward Hughes, to Brigadier General Macleod, and to the Chief of Tellicherry, soliciting most earnestly a supply of battering guns, powder, shot, and other military stores, which could easily be sent to me by the route of Calicut. Should these requisitions be complied with, and the war with Tip-
poo

poo be continued, I have little doubt of being able to march to Seringapatam in hopes of deciding this destructive contest at the gates of his capital. But should your Lordship and the Honourable Board decide on measures of immediate pacification, and wish to preserve possession of the country between this place and Trichinopoly, it is easily within my power to fulfil these views, by falling back to Coimbatour and Erode; for these places, in addition to the country already reduced, would add a revenue of 700,000*l.* per annum, and extend the English territory almost entirely across the peninsula.

The very pressing necessities of the officers and troops have obliged me to take upon myself to order a distribution of the money found in the fort, which I am aware is a measure that may possibly involve me in personal inconvenience; but which I presume no person will venture to attribute

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to any private consideration, when it is explained that I have not, on my own account, received nor stated any charge to the public since my arrival in India; but am applying to the exigencies of the service every fraction I can either borrow or procure.

I have already informed your Lordship and the Honourable Board of the very spirited conduct by which Captain Maitland of the seventy-eighth regiment accelerated the fall of the place. The exertions of Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, during the course of the attack, claim my warmest thanks. Lieutenant Colonel Elphinstone was field-officer of the trenches on the night of the thirteenth, and conducted the operations in a manner worthy of his long service and high military character. It would be difficult for me to do justice to the merits of Colonel Stuart and Colonel Forbes, on this and every other occasion.

Captain

Captain Byres the chief engineer is entitled to my best thanks for his labours and ability.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. FULLARTON.

To the Right Hon. the President and Governor,
and Select Committee, Fort St. George.

N° V.

Camp at Dindigul, April 26th, 1784.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

IN obedience to your orders of the fifteenth of April, I have considered with the utmost attention the important objects held forth by your Lordship and the Board; and I beg leave to assure you of my best efforts to suggest and to promote such measures and arrangements as may tend most effectually to establish a permanent system of protection and defence throughout the southern countries, to reduce as much as may be practicable the military expences of the southern establishment, and to enable the army to assemble and to move with effect on any emergency. These I conceive to be the essential points on which

X

you

you direct me to lay my sentiments before you.

With respect to the allotment of troops for the different garrisons to the southward, I presume that two complete battalions in Tanjore, and one in each of the forts of Tritchinopoly, Madura, Palamcottah, Ramnad, and Kalicoil, including Tripatore, will be sufficient for the ordinary duties of the place.

It is not in my power at present to consult with Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin on the proportion of troops that they may judge necessary for the collection of revenue in the different districts; I must therefore beg leave to refer in this particular to the opinions which they may transmit to your Lordship and the Board. Should Mr. Sullivan state that the four or five battalions of Tanjore Sebbendies are adequate to the purpose of collection in that country; and
should

should Mr. Irwin be satisfied with two battalions for the current transactions of the provinces under his management; it will next remain to be considered what Sepoy force in cantonment will ensure the safety and defence of these extensive territories. It must not be forgotten that the countries of Trichinopoly, Madura, Tinivelly, and Marawa, contain above one hundred thousand Colleries and Polygars in arms, naturally brave, and habitually impatient of all regular government.

The English possessions and resources to the southward have been so recently endangered and impaired by the rebellious spirit of these savages, that I shall never presume to be responsible for the efficacy of any arrangement of defence, until the most refractory of them are disarmed, their woods and strong holds laid open, and their forts occupied on the very first appearance of disobedience, or disrespect to the Circar.

In conjunction with this primary measure of security, I have no doubt that six battalions of Sepoys, cantoned with an efficient force of Europeans near Trichinopoly, and ready to be detached as occasion might require, would fulfil every public purpose that could occur within the provinces. Here I must observe, that many eminent advantages will arise to the service from this proposed mode of answering all requisitions for troops by detachments from the cantonments, instead of appointing battalions to permanent stations, which impairs their discipline, and is productive of various inconveniencies.

Considering the public interests no farther than as internal and defensive arrangements are in question, it will appear to your Lordship and the Board by this statement, together with the enclosed return of regular and irregular corps serving south of the Coleroon, that four battalions, including the detach-

detachments of the twelfth and eighteenth, can be withdrawn from hence, and that a body of Mogulleys, Independents, Irregulars, and troops belonging to His Highness the Nabob, amounting to ten thousand men, may be immediately reduced: such horses of the Mogulleys as are fit for duty might be purchased for the regular cavalry, and the horsemen, who are in general men of high casts and long service, may be provided for in such manner as may seem best to your Lordship and the Board.

A proportion of the Independents, Irregulars, and Nabob's troops, might be enlisted, or draughted into the regular battalions, and their black officers permitted to remain as supernumeraries on the strength of these corps. Thus the hardships that would befall the individuals by reduction may be obviated, and the regular battalions which have suffered so severely during the

late contest may be effectually recruited, even to the present war establishment of one thousand men for each battalion: from this reduction alone, exclusive of the retrenchment of all field-allowances, an expenditure of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand pagodas per month may be saved to the Company.

Were these arrangements to take place, a rigid system of discipline to be maintained among the troops, the decayed parts of the principal forts to be repaired, and particularly a constant and scrupulous attention to be paid to the state of grain, stores, ordnance, and ammunition in the different garrisons, I should presume that little would seem wanting to the well-being of the provinces, as far as the military are concerned, provided a sufficient fund was appropriated to the speedy discharge of the large arrears so long due to the troops, who have fought patiently

tiently and bravely under an accumulation of difficulties. I must farther beg leave to observe, that in my opinion nothing short of such a provision can secure to us the confidence of the Sepoys, on whose adherence and attachment our permanency in this country must ultimately depend.

Your Lordship and the Board are so fully impressed with the necessity of dedicating the moments of peace to the purposes of preparation, in order to guard against the uncertainty of future events, that I cannot fulfil the duty you have imposed upon me without some observations on the mode by which the southern troops may be enabled to assemble and to move as an army, whenever a renewal of hostility shall render that measure necessary.

If it should appear to your Lordship and the Board, as it does to me, that there is not any place on the coast of Coromandel

from whence an army could commence its operations with more advantage against the Myforeans, or indeed against the French at Pondicherry, than from Tritchinopoly, that garrison will naturally become the repository of all the field and battering train, ammunition, and stores of every denomination, necessary to equip an army for the field: and, for the same reason, as well as for the convenience of the troops to be cantoned in its vicinity, a very ample magazine of grain and other provisions should be formed there; but the determination of the Renter to counteract any measure of this nature will require the most positive orders from your Lordship and the Board to give it effect.

In order that the troops in cantonment may at all times be ready to move, I conceive that every Captain commanding a battalion should be directed to entertain, at the usual allowances, a number of draught
and

and carriage bullocks, complete with maffries, drivers, gunney-bags, nofe ropes and faddles, agreeably to the proportions fpecified in the regulations for the conveyance of the brigade of guns, and their tumbrils, the tents, ftore, and ammunition belonging to his corps; fome gun and tent Lafcars and artificers ought alfo to be attached to the battalions; and a fum might be allowed to the officers for furnifhing and repairing their own tents, which would greatly relieve the embaraffments of public conveyance in the army: but fhould any officer ever abufe thefe indulgences, a court martial and difmiffion from the fervice would foon remedy the evil. A corps of artillery, complete in Europeans, Gullanders, and Lafcars, under the fenior officer of artillery to the fouthward, and a proportion of draught and carriage bullocks for the field and battering train, artificers belonging to the Commiffary of Stores department, Dooly Coolies, and public followers

lowers of all descriptions, sufficient to equip the army, according to the strength you intend it to consist of, should constantly be complete in the cantonments: and as well as the bullocks thus proposed to be maintained upon the peace establishment, these followers may be occasionally employed in the carriage of grain, and other business of the Circar, on requisition from the senior civil servant of the station, taking care always that the bullocks shall be attended by a guard of the corps to which they are attached. I also conceive, that a corps of pioneers, under the chief engineer, is extremely necessary to remain upon the establishment.

The expence attending cavalry, and the difficulty of procuring an efficient body of them, almost preclude me from any observations on that subject; but if it be your intention to complete that essential constituent of an army, I shall be happy to

to have your instructions to procure horses from Mysore and other places; and at all events I flatter myself that you will judge it expedient to encrease, and to form into one regiment, the three troops of regular horse now serving to the southward.

Should these arrangements take place, implying a reduction of ten thousand men, and a removal of four regular battalions from hence, it would be necessary, on the renewal of hostility, to reinforce this side of the Coleroon with a force equal to that now supposed to be withdrawn, and to order an additional body of troops to be raised for the purpose of country duty and collection; otherwise it would be impossible to render the southern army at all equal to its present strength: but in this event, it will prove of eminent utility to raise regular corps in preference to the rabble of Peons, Independents, Fynauts, and other idlers, who infest the country, disgust the Sepoys, and impede the recruiting of the battalions.

With these precautions, my Lord and Gentlemen, I cannot think that any Indian enemy could ever gain such advantages over us as have, on a late occasion, endangered the existence of the English in the East; for it is evinced by severe experience, that a number of troops alone is of little avail, unless the means, conveyance, and departments that constitute the essentials of an army, are maintained on such a footing of effect as your Lordship and the Board seem determined to establish.

I send this Letter to Mr. Sullivan, that he may forward it with his remarks and emendations. I shall only farther intreat your indulgence for the tediousness of this detail.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. FULLARTON.

To the Right Hon. LORD MACARTNEY, K. B.
Governor, President, and Select Committee,
Fort St. George.

N° VI.

*A particular Account of the Tanjore Country,
and of its Produce.*

TH E Yacojee Rajah was the first man who took possession of the fort and country of Tanjore from a Gentoo king; this event happened on the 7th day of February 1675, dated in Gentoo, Rauchina Nama Sum vacharum, Magah Sudda Septinee. It appears, from the books which are kept in the palace, that there were 5753 villages, which said villages were divided into the five following subahs or districts; viz.

Subah Trivady,

Subah Combeconum,

Subah Mayaveram,

Subah

Subah Munnargoody,
Subah Pattacotah and Valumputt.

The country produced, in
the year 1675, under the Yaco-
jee Rajah, Paddy Cullums 32,050,000

Yacojee's eldest son Shaha-
jee succeeded to the govern-
ment; and the country yielded
annually, during a reign of
thirty-six years, Paddy Cullums 32,050,000

Shahajee was succeeded by
his brother Sharabajee, who
held the government eighteen
years; the country produced
annually — — 24,000,000

This deficiency in the revenue
was attributed to the careleff-
ness of his manager.

Tuccojee succeeded his bro-
ther Sharabajee, and reigned
six years; the produce of the
country was annually 24,000,000

Tuccojee was succeeded by his son Baba Saib, who lived one year; the lands produced,
 Paddy Cullums — 20,000,000

At his decease, his wife Surjana took charge of the government for two years; and the produce was, *per annum*, 20,000,000

At her death the son of Sharabajee (called Colerajah) succeeded to the government for one year; the produce was 20,000,000

And Colerajah's successor was Pretab Sing, youngest son of the deceased Tuccojee; he enjoyed the government twenty-four years and a half; his four managers were Annajee Shanjogee, Ragupaty a Yangare, Manajee, and the Dobeer; under these four managers the country produced every year 17,000,000

Pretab Sing's eldest son Tuljajee Maharajah succeeded to the throne; he employed the undermentioned managers; *viz.* Manojee Huffain Cawn, Sure-row Balajee Sinda, Dobeer Giligiliaha, Bachanna Hircar Rangia; the country produced, under these managers, every year, Paddy Cullums — 15,000,000

Some time after this, the Nabob took possession of the country and fort of Tanjore; he appointed the Dobeer to be the sole manager, under whose management the country produced — — — 17,000,000

As soon as the Rajah was restored to his fort and country he appointed Bachana Saula Vencataputty Tondamanapa, Annabochy Naick, Gillanapa, Hircar Rangia; under these

managers the country annually
 yielded — — 15,000,000
 The two last years, I believe,
 it has fallen as low as
 13,000,000.

N. B. The foregoing account was received
 from an old man, who was a writer under
 the Dubeer and Manojee in the time of
 Pretab Sing, father to the present Rajah of
 Tanjore. It is given literally from the
 Mahratta Translation.

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An Account of the Tanjore Revenues, extracted from the Circar Books in the three last Years of the Rajah's Father's Reign; viz.

In the year 1759 — 32 lack of Chuckrums.

1760 — 33 D°

1761 — 37 D°

In the two first years of the present Rajah's administration,

in the year 1762 — 28 D°

1763 — 33 D°

1771, being the year of the first siege of Tanjore, 34½ lack of Chuckrums,

During the Nabob's government in the

year 1773 — 33½ D°

1774 — 52 D°

1775, being the year of the Rajah's restoration, the Nabob received, during the

the time the country was possessed by him,
20 lack of Chuckrums.

The Rajah received,
in the remainder of

that year,	10	D°
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Lost by a change of

government	10	D°
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In the year 1776 —	26	D°
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1777 —	24	D°
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T H E E N D.



AFTER MIDNIGHT

the time the country was settled by him

the lack of Government

The first received

in the remainder of

that year

and by a change of

to Government

In the year 1776

1776

THE END

Fullarton, William

A view of the English Interests in India and an account of the military operations in the southern parts of the peninsula during the Campaigns of 1782, 1783 and 1784 in two letters, ...

London 1788

H.as. 1312

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